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Abstract 
 
This dissertation examines the principle of National Treatment enshrined in international 
copyright treaties to address private international law issues in copyright infringement 
occurring over the Internet. The thesis provides a brief overview of private international law 
and analyzed the principle of National Treatment as a private international law rule 
determining jurisdiction and applicable law. The primary case studies in the thesis include an 
analysis of the rules adopted in copyright disputes by courts in England, France, the United 
States and Canada in the pre- and post-Internet contexts, as well as a discussion of the 
European Union as an exception to these rules. The thesis concludes with the finding that the 
principle of National Treatment ensures that no conflict occurs in terms of either jurisdiction 
or applicable law, and courts need not develop private international law rules specifically to 
combat copyright infringement occurring over the Internet.  
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1 Introduction to the Thesis 
 
1.1 Introduction 
1.2 Private International Law 
1.3 International Public Law Developments toward Codification of Private 
International Law - and the “Public Policy Exception” 
1.4 Copyright Law and its Substantive Elements 
1.5 National Treatment in Copyright Law 
1.6 Methodology  
1.7 Organization of Thesis 
 
1.1 Introduction 
This thesis seeks to re-imagine the principle of “National Treatment” enshrined in 
international copyright treaties to address private international law issues in copyright 
infringement occurring over the Internet. This requires the understanding of a number of 
principles of copyright law and private international law. A core discussion in this thesis 
involves the Internet and whether it is a catalyst for the problems outlined in this chapter.  
 The Internet “exists”, notionally, in cyberspace.  It has been described 
as a fascinating exercise in symbiotic anarchy. It is not contained by 
national boundaries.  The Internet thus presents a particular challenge 
to national copyright laws, which are typically territorial in nature.1 
                                                
1 Per Binnie J. in Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v Canadian 
Association of Internet Providers [“Tariff 22” case] 2004 SCC 45, [2004] 2 SCR 427 at 2 
(hereinafter referred to as “Tariff 22”; discussed in Chapter 5 in detail). 
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The Internet as it is known it today is a system of interconnected networks across the 
world, providing a host of resources and services, the most accessible of which include 
the World Wide Web, electronic mail (e-mail) and peer-to-peer networks.2 The origin of 
the Internet can be traced back to 1969, with several computer networks across the world 
being added over the years, eventually growing into the global Internet used today.  
Currently, an estimated 3.6 billion people across the world now have access to the 
Internet, accounting for over 5 million terabytes of data at any given time.3 Access today 
is available in virtually every language and for a multitude of uses, from information 
searches, to e-commerce, banking, product purchases, entertainment, communication and 
education.4 The Internet has been developing on such an exponential scale that several 
international, regional and national legal instruments have been introduced to regulate 
activities conducted over the Internet. The Internet, and its ability to transmit information 
across the world, has brought issues of jurisdiction, sovereignty and territoriality to the 
forefront. Today, courts have begun to involve themselves in copyright disputes over the 
Internet, addressing questions concerning transmission of information over the Internet 
and how private international law principles will apply in cases of cross-border copyright 
infringement.  
                                                
2 Emerging from the development of the Advanced Research Projects Agency Network (ARPANET) in 
1969 in the United States. 
3 World Bank Collection of Development Indicators (last updated on 12-Mar-2015), 
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators. 
4 Information Technology Outlook - ITCs and the Information Economy, ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC 
COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD) REPORT (2002), 
http://www.oecd.org/internet/ieconomy/37620159.pdf (last visited 10 July 2014); see also Peter Jenner, 
Copyright in the Digital Age: Benefitting Users and Creators?, REVIEW OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH ON 
COPYRIGHT ISSUES, VOL. 8, NO. 2, 55-64 (2011); See Tariff 22, supra note 1: [The Internet’s] 
phenomenal growth has been made possible by a number of developments. These include technology 
that allows the digital conversion and storage of mass amounts of data; the increasing capabilities of 
access devices to download large quantities of data; the development of higher bandwidth distribution 
systems; the development of sophisticated routers that transmit information; and the advent of user-
friendly software allowing access to information stored on any connected computer. 
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1.2 Private International Law 
Private international law deals with cases involving a “foreign element”.5 A foreign 
element generally refers to a point of “contact” with a system of law other than the 
domestic one.6 The foreign element, depending on the type of legal or judicial system 
under consideration, may refer to another country entirely, different states within the 
same country, different judicial systems or different legal systems.7 Each of these 
constitutes a specific element of conflict that the domestic court must resolve. 
The elements of private international law comprise the application of the following rules:  
(i) the law of the forum,  
(ii) the law of the place of origin,  
(iii) the law of the place of breach,   
(iv) the law of the place of nationality of the defendant or claimant, and  
(v) particular provisions of domestic law dictating rules for civil and commercial 
disputes regulating choice of forum and jurisdiction, applicable law, and 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.8  
In the case of the law of the forum or lex fori, a domestic court would generally apply the 
law of the place where the plaintiff has brought the suit. The law of the place of origin is 
generally applied to apply the law of the place where a concerned property is situated. 
The place of breach refers to contracts between parties in which a forum has not been 
indicated for resolution of disputes arising from the contract. Lastly, the law of the place 
of nationality refers to the rights vested in a defendant or claimant by virtue of his status 
as a national of a foreign country.  
                                                
5 Albert V. Dicey, Dicey, Morris and Collins on the Conflict of Laws, 14th ed (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 
2006) at 3; Stephen G.A. Pitel, Nicholas S. Rafferty, Conflict of Laws (Irwin Law: Toronto, 2010) at 1. 
6 Dicey et al, supra note 5 at 3. 
7 Ibid. 
8 See Chapter 2 for detailed explanation of each. 
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As of today there exists no international set of rules detailing which of the above five 
rules would apply in a situation where private international laws issues arise. The only 
comprehensive supranational legislation effectively establishing private international law 
rules to direct courts that have jurisdiction in disputes of a civil or commercial nature has 
been adopted by the European Union.9 In the context of copyright law, this may be 
explained by the dependence of national laws on international instruments such as the 
Berne Convention and its numerous revisions over the years.10  
In academic circles, scholars have discussed the trends in private international law 
approaches to copyright cases. Graeme B. Dinwoodie acknowledges that this decision to 
ignore private international law rules stems from the national character of copyright 
which, it had been widely assumed, would result in the application of domestic law to 
any suit brought before a court in any country.11 Further, the effects of extra-territorial 
application of copyright law (or any intellectual property law for that matter) would not 
be as controversial within the country where the protection is claimed, although it may 
affect trade relations between the countries concerned.12  
                                                
9Regulation on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters (22 December 2000) EU No .1215/2012 (entered into force 1 March 2002); See Treaty of Lisbon 
Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community 2007/C 
306/01 (entered into force 13 December 2007), art 5. The legal foundation for the European Union is based 
on several international treaties and agreements made by its Member States and implementation is ensured 
as these Member States have voluntarily transferred part of their sovereignty to the various institutions that 
make up the EU. Membership to the EU therefore involved surrendering sovereignty in limited fields. The 
federalist principle of “subsidiarity”, which was given formal recognition in this treaty under Article 5, 
ensures that the EU institutions do not engage in matters beyond their jurisdiction. It provides that decisions 
should be taken at the “most appropriate level”, urging the sharing of powers at the national and supra-
national levels; Karen Davies, Understanding EU Law (London, Cavendish, 2001) at 21; August Reinisch, 
Essential Questions in EU Law (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 13. 
10 See Chapter 3 on the analysis of the private international law rules embodied in the Berne Convention. 
11 See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, “International Intellectual Property Litigation: A Vehicle for Resurgent 
Comparativist Thought?” (2001) 49 Am J Comp L 429; See Anita B. Frohlich, “Copyright Infringement in 
the Internet Age - Primetime for Harmonized Conflict of laws Rules?” (2009) 24 Berkeley Tech LJ 851. 
12 Dieter Schmidtchen, Roland Kirstein, Alexander Neunzig, “Conflict of Law Rules and International 
Trade: A Transaction Costs Approach” (2004) Center for the Study of Law and Economics Working Paper 
No. 2004-01 (discussing the effect of diverse conflict rules on international transactions and trade 
relations). 
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1.3  International Public Law Developments toward 
Codification of Private International Law - and the 
“Public Policy Exception” 
Would creating a unified set of private international law rules that will apply to 
intellectual property disputes solve the legal dilemma of jurisdiction and applicable law? 
There is a tendency for the international community to seek codification of specific fields 
of law through international consensus.13 One such effort towards harmonization of 
private international law rules in specialized subjects was the Hague Conference on 
Private International Law (or the Hague Conference/Conférence de La Haye, henceforth 
known as “HCCH”).14 The various conflict conventions that the HCCH drafts are left up 
to the member countries to adopt. A key provision in each of these is the “public policy 
exception”. This exception exists in the HCCH’s conventions in order to assure member 
states that their adoption would not require an upheaval of their local policies, 
particularly those concerning public order and morality. The public policy exception, in 
some sense, allows the domestic forum to “sit in judgment over the wisdom and fairness 
of the foreign law”.15  
From a private international law perspective, therefore, the public policy exception refers 
to a situation where a foreign law that would generally be applicable by a domestic forum 
is not enforced because it would violate a public policy of the land.16 How “public 
policy” is defined will vary by jurisdiction or state. However, it may generally be defined 
as a contravention of an essential moral or social value of the forum or state in concern, 
and the forum will not enforce a foreign law that is directly or indirectly causes such 
                                                
13 Stephen M Stewart, International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights, 2nd ed (London: Butterworths, 
1989) at 3.08, 3.09. 
14 Statute of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, 220 UNTS 121, 15 UST 2228, 60 AJIL 
461 (signed on 31 Oct 1951, entered into force on 15 July 1955). 
15 Monrad G. Paulsen, Michael I. Sovern, “Public Policy in the Conflict of Laws” (1956) 56 Colum-L Rev 
969. 
16 Monrad G. Paulsen, Michael I. Sovern, “Public Policy” in the Conflict of Laws (1956) 56 Colum. L. 
Rev. 969 (this is of particular importance when the domestic forum must decide whether it should apply a 
foreign law). 
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contravention.17 In this context, one of the questions that this thesis seeks to address is 
whether it is necessary to develop an international convention or treaty creating a unified 
set of private international law rules to apply for copyright disputes. A treaty assigning 
private international law rules would ideally seek to achieve uniformity in the rules 
followed by states parties and prevent forum shopping by claimants. If international 
copyright conventions address either of these feats, would the development of a dedicated 
set of private international law rules for copyright disputes be useful at all?   
1.4 Copyright Law and its Substantive Elements 
Copyright is a property right where the subject of the property is intangible and the right 
holder derives the property in the work from the act of creation.18 The property is 
therefore an intellectual property due to its incorporeal nature, as it originates from the 
mind of a person, reduced to material form.19 A copyright is therefore recognition of the 
product of the right holder’s skill and labour in his or her property.20 The right to 
property in copyright in vested in the information contained in the work and its manner 
of expression, not the idea itself, thereby requiring fixation on a medium.21 For example, 
while the concept of a science-fiction novel is an idea, only upon its reduction into a 
material form such as a book will the copyright be vested in the novel. Further, the 
copyright is vested in the expression of the novel and not a single physical copy of the 
novel itself. 
Copyright is also an exclusive right of a limited duration granted by the state.22 The 
exclusive right means that other than the right holder, no other person can copy the 
work, unless authorized by him or her. Further, this right lasts for a limited period of 
time. Both the exclusivity and duration of copyright is established by national copyright 
                                                
17 Ibid. 
18 Stewart, supra note 13 at 1.06. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid at 1.08 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid at 1.07. 
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statutes, which are guided by various international copyright conventions.23 After the 
copyright expires, the work then falls into the public domain and persons other than the 
creator may copy or otherwise use the works without the authorization of the creator.24 
Copyright is also a “bundle of rights”.25 A copyrighted work can be assigned, licensed, 
distributed, reproduced, displayed, performed, or used to create derivate works.26 
National copyright statutes also specify these individual rights that comprise the 
“bundle”. Moreover, some uses of a copyright work are free, commonly referred to “fair 
dealing” or “fair use”.27 These exceptions and limitations to copyright may either be 
stated in the national statutes or domestic courts may develop tests to determine if the 
use of a work falls under a possible exception.  
Copyright law as it exists today originated from international consensus through major 
copyright treaties – more specifically, the Berne Convention 1886,28 the Rome 
Convention 1961,29 the TRIPS Agreement 1994,30 and the WIPO Copyright Treaties 
1996.31 These treaties embody several core principles of copyright law (as will be 
discussed in Chapter 3, with the principle of National Treatment being of prime 
importance to this thesis).  
                                                
23 This is different in droit d’auteur countries (following civil law) where instead of a “copyright” granted 
by the state, the right in the work comes from the act of personal creation, intrinsically linking the 
personality of the author to the work. 
24 Stewart, supra note 13 at 1.07. 
25 Ibid at 1.09. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid at 1.11. 
28 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 9 September 1886, S. Treaty Doc. 
No. 99-27 art 5 (entered into force 5 December 1887) (hereinafter referred as “Berne Convention”). 
29 International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting 
Organisations (Rome, 26 Oct. 1961) 496 U.N.T.S. 43 (entered into force 18 May 1964) (hereinafter 
referred as “Rome Convention”). 
30 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 15 April 1994, 1869 UNTS 299; 33 
ILM 1197 art 3 (entered into force 1 January 1996) (hereinafter referred as “TRIPS Agreement”). 
31 WIPO Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 2186 U.N.T.S. 121, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17; 36 I.L.M. 65 
(hereinafter referred as “WCT”); WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 2186 
U.N.T.S. 203, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17; 36 I.L.M. 76 (hereinafter referred as “WPPT”). 
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The term “copyright infringement” differs based on the national statutes in question. 
Generally speaking, if a person exercises the rights of a copyright owner without his or 
her due authorization, unless “fair use” or “fair dealing” provisions protect that use, such 
an act is considered an infringing act.32 Most national legislation includes both criminal 
sanctions and civil remedies for acts of copyright infringement.33 In the international 
copyright law context, no treaty specifically defines “copyright infringement”.34 It is 
therefore largely a definition included in national copyright laws and interpreted 
accordingly by courts. Copyright infringement disputes that involve foreign elements - 
such as a foreign party, a foreign law, or an instance of infringement occurring outside 
the jurisdiction of the approached domestic forum – invoke private international law 
principles.   
1.5 National Treatment in Copyright Law 
Copyright infringement over the Internet often has an international angle. Notions of 
copyright infringement prior to the Internet involved assessing physical copies or 
adaptations or processes used to create physical objects, such as printing, photocopying 
or publication. By comparison, assessing copyright infringement over the Internet is more 
complex. For instance, concepts such as “territoriality” with regards to the work or the 
author are difficult to uniquely confine to a single jurisdiction. Consider that a file 
uploaded in one place is downloaded in another, with the information transmitted through 
servers located all over the world, and temporary or permanent copies being stored at 
every one of these points of transfer or receipt. In other words, there are multiple 
dimensions to the question of transmission itself that must be analyzed in the context of 
choosing in which jurisdictions a copyright dispute can be heard.  
Developing a consistent international copyright environment through treaties and 
conventions appears to have helped address these problems to a certain extent. Many 
                                                
32 Stewart, supra note 13 at 1.07. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Note that the TRIPS Agreement does include enforcement provisions to prevent copyright infringement. 
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countries have come together since the Berne Convention of 1886 to agree to certain 
principles of copyright that these countries then apply in their national legislation. 
International instruments such as the such as the Berne Convention,35 the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights36 (TRIPS) and the World 
Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) Copyright Treaties37 appear to have made 
great strides to unify substantive and procedural aspects of copyright law. The Berne 
Convention was the first international instrument to implement minimum standards 
concerning economic and moral rights38 of authors,39 terms of protection,40 and 
exceptions to protection.41 TRIPS and the WIPO Copyright Treaties refer to the Berne 
Convention’s substantive provisions, add new types of works or clarify certain rights of 
authors and users, and further stress enforcement on the national level.42 The mandate for 
TRIPS varies greatly from the mandate for the Berne and Rome Conventions. Berne 
focussed on copyright specifically while TRIPS included several forms of intellectual and 
industrial property under its scope.43 Where Berne formed a “Union” of member states 
separate from the Convention, TRIPS relies on countries’ memberships in the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) and the fact that observance of intellectual property norms 
                                                
35 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 9 September 1886, S. Treaty Doc. 
No. 99-27 art 5 (entered into force 5 December 1887). 
36 15 April 1994, 1869 UNTS 299; 33 ILM 1197 art 3 (entered into force 1 January 1996). 
37 WIPO Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 2186 U.N.T.S. 121, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17; 36 I.L.M. 
65 arts 1, 3; WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 2186 U.N.T.S. 203, S. Treaty 
Doc. No. 105-17; 36 I.L.M. 76 arts 3, 4. 
38 Moral rights were first introduced in an international document in the Rome Act of 1928 and 
subsequently added to the Berne Convention in the same year under Article 6bis. 
39 Supra note 35, art 6bis, 8-18. 
40 Ibid, art 7, 7bis. 
41 Ibid, art 9. 
42 WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 37, art 14; WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, supra note 
37, art 23. 
43 Ibid, art 2 – 7. 
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are tied to countries’ WTO trade concessions to review and implement provisions and 
resolve disputes.44  
One of the core principles of these international instruments on intellectual property is 
that of non-discrimination. Signatory countries are mandated to treat foreign rights 
holders in the same manner that they would treat domestic rights holders. This is 
commonly known as the “National Treatment” principle.45 The definition of National 
Treatment has evolved over the years in international texts to include newer forms of 
copyrightable works than the drafters of the Berne Convention could have anticipated. 
Article 5(1) of the Berne Convention, 1886, states: 
Authors shall enjoy, in respect of works for which they are protected 
under this Convention, in countries of the Union other than the country 
of origin, the rights which their respective laws do now or may 
hereafter grant to their nationals, as well as the rights specially granted 
by this Convention. 
The National Treatment principle requires the country signatory to the Convention 
employing the concept to treat all foreign works or works by foreign authors in the same 
manner as it would treat its own national authors and works. Article 2(1) of the Berne 
Convention elaborates on “literary and artistic works” and provides a non-exhaustive list 
of examples.46 The term “author”, however, is not defined in Berne, although the rights of 
authors47 and the terms of protection of their work48 are specified. Therefore, both the 
                                                
44 In this thesis, however, the TRIPS+ regime’s requirement of enforcement is not in consideration as the 
enforcement provisions are implemented by the WTO as part of the member states’ commitment to the 
international trade treaties. This is markedly different from the Berne Convention as all signatory countries 
are expected to include National Treatment and minimum rights in their national legislation by virtue of 
their international obligations to a treaty signed by them. 
45 Berne Convention, supra note 35, art 5 (1); Anselm Kamperman Sanders, ed, The Principle of National 
Treatment in International Economic Law: Trade, Investment and Intellectual Property (Cheltenham, UK: 
Edward Elgar, 2014) (noting that the concept of National Treatment is prevalent in related fields such as 
international trade law, taxation and investment law). 
46 Berne Convention, supra note 35, art 2(1).  
47 Ibid, art 5, 6, 6bis, 8, 9,  11-15. 
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concept of “work” and “author” are defined differently across various jurisdictions, 
depending on the way in each state has transformed its international obligations into 
domestic law.49   
The National Treatment principle has been treated differently in various texts. Some 
scholars consider it to be a territorial choice-of-law provision, stating that the applicable 
law in the case of multi-jurisdictional infringement actions must be the law of the country 
in which the infringing act occurred, not the law of the state in which the author is a 
national or the place of first publication of the work.50 Others consider it to merely be an 
international copyright norm recognized by signatory countries to restrict arbitrary 
treatment of foreign authors by a Contracting State.  
Aside from these interpretations, National Treatment is an important principle of 
copyright law that all signatory countries of the Berne Convention are required to adopt 
into their national legislations.51  
Since multiple jurisdictions are involved in the context of the Internet, a copyright owner 
or rights holder may file a suit in any country where an infringing act may have occurred. 
Therefore, the protecting country and the country where the suit is filed may be different. 
By examining some of the leading cases involving copyright infringement over the 
Internet, this thesis ponders whether courts of different jurisdictions waver between 
implementing their obligations under international copyright instruments and applying 
their own private international law rules to determine jurisdiction and the applicable law.  
                                                                                                                                            
 
48 Ibid, art 7, 7bis. 
49 The Canadian Copyright Act, RSC 1985, c C-42, s 1 defines different types of works, including 
“architectural work”, “artistic work”, “choreographic work”, “cinematographic work”, “collective work”, 
“dramatic work”, “literary work”, “musical work”, “work of sculpture”, or “work” in general which 
“includes the title thereof when such title is original and distinctive”. 
50 See Chapter 3 for a literature analysis of the private international law rule embodied in the National 
Treatment principle. 
51 Berne Convention, supra note 35, art 5; National treatment provisions of the Berne Convention have been 
included in the TRIPS Agreement under the compliance clause of art 9.1 as well.  
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The research question that this thesis puts forth is the following: 
What is the extent to which the principle of “National Treatment” can be 
applied as a private international law or conflict of laws rule to resolve 
cross-border copyright infringement issues over the Internet? 
The hypotheses put forth before embarking on my research were:  
1. The application of the principle of National Treatment reflects a 
private international law rule applicable to cross-border 
copyright disputes.52 
2. Domestic courts need not adopt any private international law 
rule in addition to the principle of National Treatment in order to 
resolve cross-border copyright disputes. 53 
3. The Internet has changed the circumstances of cross-border 
copyright infringement such that it can only be combated by the 
application of principles in addition to National Treatment and 
involving other private international law rules.54  
1.6 Methodology  
Doctrinal legal research was followed as the preferred methodology. For the purpose of 
understanding the development of international copyright law and private international 
law rules, a doctrinal approach was taken, mapping out the evolution of National 
Treatment and the handling of private international law questions in cross-border 
                                                
52 As seen in Chapter 3, by mapping out the historical significant of the National Treatment principle and 
examining the opinions of various scholars in the area. 
53 As seen in Chapters 4 and 5, my research supports this hypothesis. Further, as explored in Chapter 2, the 
treaties codifying private international law rules are not necessary in the context of copyright cases. 
54 As discussed in Chapter 5, although the Internet has raised questions regarding jurisdiction and 
applicable law in copyright disputes, domestic courts have readily accepted a technical understanding of the 
Internet in order to address these questions. However, the principle of National Treatment effectively 
answers these issues irrespective of the role of the Internet in the infringing acts. Therefore my research 
only partly supports this hypothesis. 
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copyright infringement cases. Judgments of courts in cross-border copyright infringement 
cases in the United Kingdom, France, United States and Canada were analyzed and 
discussed for both pre- and post-Internet scenarios.55  
1.7 Organization of Thesis 
This thesis comprises seven chapters in all. The current chapter, Chapter 1, introduced 
the research question, the core constructs in the question, the hypotheses, and the 
methodology employed to collect and assess relevant data. It also provides a basic 
understanding of the core concepts explored in later chapters.  
Chapter 2 examines private international law in general, outlining the basic rules that 
courts follow to resolve jurisdictional, applicable law and choice of law issues before 
them. This chapter also outlines the sources of private international law and the 
questions involved in private international law disputes before courts. The chapter 
provides an overview of the current private international law rules in place in order to 
better appreciate the data in subsequent chapters. This chapter also examines the “public 
policy” exception in public international law treaties codifying private international law 
and whether such treaties have been successful.   
Chapter 3 discusses the evolution of copyright law on the national and international 
stages and the principle of National Treatment. This chapter highlights the evolution of 
                                                
55 Note that the first copyright statutes were adopted by England and France, with the United States 
adopting legislation much later and in a manner different from its colonizer England (detailed in Chapter 
3). The international conversation on copyright law began through bilateral treaties in Europe while the 
United States remained intriguingly detached from committing to international conventions. This makes 
these countries and their domestic forums ideal case studies for the purpose of this thesis. Further note that 
private international law questions in copyright law arose in the 1950s, as evidenced in the case studies in 
Chapters 4 and 5. The objective of this thesis is to examine the role that the Internet plays in the application 
of these rules: to address whether it a factor in influencing private international law issues of jurisdiction 
and applicable law or whether it has merely exacerbated an already existing problem. An explanation for 
the prevalence of private international law questions for transactions occurring over the Internet may be the 
entry of the United States to the international copyright landscape and the treatment of copyright cases by 
its courts (also detailed in Chapter 4). As explored in Chapter 6, the example of a case before the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) shows that the Internet may not be a direct factor, although an 
alternative method is required for assessing cases applying EU Directives. 
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national legislation in England, the United States and France, the emergence of bilateral 
treaties and the principles enshrined in them, as well as the evolution of the major 
international copyright treaties. The chapter then discusses scope of National Treatment 
in the Berne Convention of 1886, the Rome Convention of 1961, the TRIPS Agreement 
of 1994 and the WIPO Copyright Treaties of 1996. Lastly, a broad literature review is 
conducted regarding the status of the principle of National Treatment as a core 
international copyright norm and as a private international law rule.  
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 analyze important cases concerning private international law rules 
applicable to cross-border copyright infringement disputes. Chapter 4 comprises cases in 
the pre-Internet context before courts in England, France and the United States between 
1960 and 2011. Chapter 5 comprises cases from the United States, France and 
Canada between 2000 and 2011. Chapter 6 deals with an exception noted in the case of 
the European Union, where private international law rules are embodied in EU 
Directives. The objective of these chapters is to analyze each case on the basis of three 
questions:  
i. Does the domestic forum have jurisdiction over the dispute? 
ii. If yes to question (1), does the domestic forum apply the law of the forum or the 
foreign law to resolve the dispute? 
iii. How does the domestic forum address the principle of National Treatment, a 
private international law rule, or both, in the question of applicable law in (2)?  
Lastly, chapter 7 provides the conclusion to the thesis. It restates the research problem, 
summarizes the findings and addresses the hypotheses laid out in this Chapter. It also 
draws upon the conclusions of each chapter and discusses some further areas of research.  
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Chapter 2  
 
2 General Principles of Private International Law and 
Efforts to create Public International Law Treaties about 
Private International Law 
 
2.1 Introduction 
2.2 Conceptualizing Private International Law 
2.3 Why Would a Domestic Court Take Jurisdiction of a Case with a “Foreign 
Element”? 
2.4 How Does a Court Decide What Law to Apply? 
2.5 Questions in Copyright Disputes Which Involve Private International Law  
2.5.1 Lex fori 
2.5.2 Lex originis 
2.5.3 Law of the Place of Breach or Harm 
2.5.4 Place where the Defendant Resides 
2.5.5 Law relating to Contractual Provisions 
2.5.6 Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments 
2.6 Sources of Private International Law 
2.7 Public International Law Treaties and Texts about Private International Law - and 
the “Public Policy” Exception 
 
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter provides an overview of the general private international law principles that 
courts use to determine questions of jurisdiction and applicable law in disputes involving 
“foreign elements”. Private international law deals with cases involving a “foreign 
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element”.1 A foreign element generally refers to a point of “contact” with a system of law 
other than the domestic one.2 Such a contact may exist for many reasons – the defendant 
is present in a foreign place, property in question is situated in a foreign place, the 
contract was made or designates a foreign judicial system for remedies, or a tort may 
have been committed in the foreign place.3 The foreign element, depending on the type of 
legal or judicial system under consideration, may refer to another country entirely, 
different states or provinces within the same country, different judicial systems or 
different legal systems.4 Each of these constitutes a specific element of conflict that the 
domestic court must resolve. To that end, the term “foreign” for the purpose of private 
international law is entirely circumstantial and depends on the specific facts of the case. 
This chapter will describe the framework of private international law in order to provide a 
background to the specific application of private international law by domestic forums 
described in this thesis in Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6. To specify, Chapter 3 examines the 
private international law rule hidden in the National Treatment principle, Chapters 4 and 
5 analyze pre-Internet and post-Internet case law applying private international law rules 
respectively, and Chapter 6 analyses an exception in the EU system.  
The chapter begins by conceptualizing “private international law”, providing a general 
definition and discussing how adding a “foreign element” to a dispute will affect matters 
of jurisdiction and applicable law. The chapter then discusses why a domestic court 
would take jurisdiction of a case with a “foreign element” and which law would it apply 
if it does take jurisdiction.  
                                                
1 Albert V. Dicey, Dicey, Morris and Collins on the Conflict of Laws, 14th ed (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 
2006) at 3; Stephen G.A. Pitel, Nicholas S. Rafferty, Conflict of Laws (Irwin Law: Toronto, 2010) at 1; 
Adrian Briggs, The Conflict of Laws, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) at 1; Geoffrey 
Cheshire, Private International Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Claredon Press 1938) at 70; James Fawcett, Janeen 
Carruthers, Cheshire, North and Fawcett on Private International Law, 14th ed. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press: 2008) at 30; Henceforth referred to as “private international law”. 
2 Dicey et al supra note 1 at 3; Pitel and Rafferty, supra note 1 at 1. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Briggs, supra note 1 at 2. 
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The chapter then briefly covers the sources of private international law. Lastly, This 
chapter also includes a description of public international law efforts – and “model” 
efforts to standardize and codify private international law precepts across nations.  As 
will be discussed, in each of these attempts, the proposers have included a “public policy” 
exception.  The relevance of this exception to this research will be introduced. 
2.2 Conceptualizing Private International Law 
In a world of increased globalization that relies heavily on cross-border transactions, 
private international law plays an important role in resolution of disputes arising from 
these transactions.5 Private international law aims to balance international consensus in 
specialized areas of law with domestic recognition and implementation in relation to 
actions of private persons.6 Private international law is also referred to as “body of 
conventions, model laws, national laws, legal guides, and other documents and 
instruments that regulate private relationships across national borders.”7  
Consider examples to highlight the usefulness of private international law: if there exists 
a contract between two Frenchmen for the performance of a contract in France, and a 
breach of said contract occurred within the borders of France, there is no foreign element 
in such a case. When brought before a court in France (or the court designated in the 
contract), the dispute resolution will involve French law and principles of remedies for 
breach of contract and the judgment thus rendered will be enforced in France against the 
party found to be liable. Additionally, if any properties of the parties are situated within 
                                                
5 Albert V. Dicey, Dicey, Morris and Collins on the Conflict of Laws, 14th ed (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 
2006) at 3; Stephen G.A. Pitel, Nicholas S. Rafferty, Conflict of Laws (Irwin Law: Toronto, 2010) at 1; 
Adrian Briggs, The Conflict of Laws, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) at 1; Geoffrey 
Cheshire, Private International Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Claredon Press 1938) at 70; James Fawcett, Janeen 
Carruthers, Cheshire, North and Fawcett on Private International Law, 14th ed. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press: 2008) at 30; Henceforth referred to as “private international law”. 
6 Don Ford, “Private International Law” in American Society of International Law Electronic Resource 
Guide (2013) at 3. 
7Ibid. 
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France, the enforcement of the judgment against the property will be guided by French 
principles, as well.  
Now consider adding “foreign elements” to the example. If the contract was made 
between an Englishman and a Frenchman in France, with the contract itself not 
specifying the law to be used in case of dispute, and the court that was approached was an 
English court, what would be the outcome? There are several points of “contact” in this 
example - as the English court would be the domestic court,8 and one party is English, the 
points of contact with a foreign element would include the contract itself being entered 
into in France and one of the parties being a Frenchman. In such a case, the English court 
would be required to approach the dispute from two angles. Firstly, whether the English 
court or the French court has jurisdiction over the matter. Secondly, if the English court 
does have jurisdiction, which law it should apply - English or French law.  
Therefore, in any dispute involving the application of private international law rules, the 
relevant legal issues before a domestic forum would include: 
(i) What is the legal issue before the forum? 
(ii) To what category of law does this issue belong? 
(iii) What is the “connecting factor” relevant to solve the conflict?9  
For the first question, the court must decide how many issues are before the court, which 
ones involve a “foreign element” and what are the primary and incidental issues. For the 
second question, the field of law is relevant.10 In copyright disputes, for example, tort 
principles have been applied to cases of infringement and contract principles may be 
applied for breach of a contract between the plaintiff and defendant.11 For the third 
                                                
8 The Courts of the United Kingdom are separated into three separate jurisdictions, the Courts of England 
and Wales, Courts of Scotland and the Courts of Northern Ireland. 
9 Stephen M Stewart, International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights (London: Butterworths, 1983) at 
3.03. 
10 Ibid at 3.04. 
11 Patrick Russell Goold, "Is Copyright Infringement a Strict Liability Tort?" (2015) Berkeley Tech L  
  
19 
question, the court must consider whether the factors surrounding the circumstances of 
the dispute and the cause of action are connected to the domestic legal system or a 
foreign one. Depending on its assessment of the three factors, the court must then decide 
which legal system or law to apply to resolve the dispute.12   
It can therefore be noted that private international law rules are highly procedural in 
nature.13 Although the end outcome is to resolve a substantive question of law, the 
process of deciding which court has jurisdiction and which law will eventually be 
applicable to the dispute in a given court is covered by private international law.14 
Determining the process of dispute resolution is hence the role of private international 
law. For that reason, private international law is tied to domestic civil procedure rules in 
many countries, either by way of legislation or through rules established by courts that 
have addressed conflict issues before.15  
                                                                                                                                            
 
(forthcoming) (the opinion that copyright infringement is also a fault-based tort has been prevalent in the 
American legislative and judicial context); Religious Technology Center v Netcom On-Line Communication 
Services 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1370 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (holding that “although copyright is a strict liability 
statute, there should still be some element of volition or causation”); Education Testing Service v Simon, 95 
F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1087 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (holding that copyright infringement “is a strict liability tort”); 
Charles Adams, "Indirect Infringement from a Tort Law Perspective" (2008) 42 U. Rich L Rev 635 at 636 
(asserting that the law of indirect infringement of copyright in the U.S. is “derived from common law 
doctrines of joint liability for concerted action, aider and abettor liability, and liability for permitting or 
directing the conduct of another”); Samuel Oddi, “Contributory Copyright Infringement: The Tort and 
Technological Tensions” (1989) 64 Notre Dame L Rev 47 (examining the tort theory underlying 
contributory copyright infringement). 
12 Ibid at 3.05, 3.06. 
13 Pitel and Rafferty, supra note 1 at 1. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Dicey et al, supra note 1 at 4. 
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2.3 Why Would a Domestic Court Take Jurisdiction of 
a Case with a “Foreign Element”? 
In the context of private international law, there can be two general instances in which a 
court takes jurisdiction of a dispute.16 Firstly, if the choice of forum is stated by 
agreement of the parties, either by a clause in a contract in dispute or by their submission 
to a particular forum, the court so approached will generally exercise jurisdiction over the 
dispute.17 The second and more complex question of jurisdiction arises when no such 
agreement has been established and the court must decide whether it is competent to 
decide a case and has the power to determine the outcome of the dispute.  
Whether or not a court may take jurisdiction over a dispute therefore rests on the source 
of the private international law rule that determines jurisdiction. This may be either by 
common law rules established by courts or through domestic legislation indicating when 
jurisdiction is to be exercised.18 In the common law context, an example would be that of 
English courts (before the United Kingdom joined the European Union).19 Under 
traditional English common law rules of private international law, an English court could 
take jurisdiction of a case where: (i) the defendant is present within the jurisdiction of the 
court at the time of filing the claim, or (ii) the defendant has submitted itself, himself or 
                                                
16 Ibid at 4. 
17 Fawcett et al, supra note 1 at 3.01 (often, a particular jurisdiction gets popular among parties for 
obtaining a judgment favourable to them, also called “forum shopping”. Courts aim at preventing this 
phenomenon by generally requiring some connecting factor of inherent jurisdiction, and if that could be 
established, the court will apply the applicable law of the forum. Further, the forum can claim lack of 
jurisdiction or refuse to apply the local law by acknowledging that the foreign or public rights in concern 
are incompatible with or against the “public policy” of the of the domestic forum); Paul Goldstein, 
International Copyright Principles, Law and Practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001) at 99. 
18 Ibid at 463, 464. 
19 Karen Davies, Understanding EU Law (London, Cavendish, 2001) at 21: The European Union functions 
as a supranational organization and its basis is found in a series of international treaties and agreements 
made by its Member States. Membership in the EU requires surrendering a certain degree of sovereignty 
and adherence to the principle of subsidiarity, with potential sanctions in case of Member States failing to 
act in accordance with legislation; August Reinisch, Essential Questions in EU Law (New York, 
Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 13 
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herself to the jurisdiction of that court.20 A reason for the evolution of common law 
principles in conflict cases is the inherent role of the judiciary as an independent body 
free from the pressures of legislative or executive actions to conduct its responsibilities.  
2.4 How Does a Court Decide What Law to Apply? 
Why would a court be willing to resolve a dispute using foreign law at all? Courts 
generally apply the law of the land (also known as the law of the forum). The necessity of 
this aspect of private international law can be justified through a multifaceted answer.  
The first part of the justification views private international law as the implementation of 
the “reasonable and legitimate expectations of the parties to a transaction or 
occurrence.”21 Many scholars consider the term “private international law” to be a more 
accurate name than the other common term in the area, “conflict of laws,” as the former 
label describes its role in a more effective manner – the law concerning actions arising 
from the actions of private persons that have a foreign element.22 “Private international 
law” distinguishes this area of law from “public international law.” Public international 
law is defined as “that body of rules which is composed for its greater part of the 
principles and rules of conduct which states feel themselves bound to observe, and 
therefore, do commonly observe in their relations with each other.”23 Private 
international law, on the other hand, is law that involves a given jurisdiction in disputes 
involving factual aspects occurring in other jurisdictions and the possible application of 
foreign law in a domestic forum.  
                                                
20 Ibid at 464; 
21 Dicey et al, supra note 1 at 5. 
22 Pitel and Rafferty, supra note 1 at 4 (referring to A.V. Dicey, A Digest of the Law of England with 
Reference to the Conflict of Laws (Stevens & Sons: London, 1896)); See Briggs, supra note 1 at 2. 
23 Ivan Shearer, ed, Starke’s International Law, 11th ed (London: Butterworths, 1994) at 3 (Starke 
additionally defines “international law” as the “rules of law relating to the functioning of international 
institutions or organizations, their relations with each other, and their relations with states and individuals” 
and “certain rules of law relating to individuals and non-state entities so far as the rights and duties of such 
individuals and non-state entities are the concern of the international community”); John H. Currie, Craig 
Forcese, Joanna Harrington, Valerie Oosterveld, International Law: Doctrine, Practice, and Theory, 2nd ed 
(Toronto: Irwin Law, 2014) at 13, 14. 
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If the parties have clear expectations from their transactions regarding a unique choice of 
forum or unique choice of law applicable to them, then, as mentioned above, the courts 
may not be required to make decisions involving private international law principles at 
all.24 Private international law therefore generally only becomes relevant where the 
expectations of the parties are not mutual. The application of private international law 
rules, therefore, is to achieve a sense of “justice” by evaluating objectively the 
expectations of the parties in any given dispute.25 
A second relevant justification for the necessity of private international law rules is the 
principle of comity.26 Comity connotes reciprocity between states in the context of 
private international law rules. It refers to the “accepted rules of mutual conduct as 
between state and state which each state adopts in relation to other states and expects 
other states to adopt in relation to itself.”27 Comity can therefore either be respected as a 
form of courtesy or can be established through extensive agreements between the states 
concerned. The very objective of comity is therefore to respect the sovereignty of other 
states while expecting that those states do the same as well.28 Comity has been cited as 
the principle force that pushed the development of common law rules of private 
international law, evolving from English courts.29 The development of a system of 
common law rules governing private international law has ensured that comity no longer 
remains just a courtesy, but is an established principle of procedural law.  
Scholars have established the relationship between public international law and private 
international law. Professor Ellory C. Stowell recognises that private international law, 
                                                
24 Alex Mills, The Confluence of Public and Private International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009) at 8. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Dicey et al, supra note 1 at 5; Pitel and Rafferty, supra note 1 at 207. 
27 Ibid (quoting Diplock L.J. in Buck v Attorney-General [1965] Ch. 745 (CA) at 770). 
28 Ibid (quoting Diplock L.J. stating that one of the foremost objectives of comity was to ensure that no 
state involved itself in the domestic and sovereign affairs of another state, and that any involvement should 
be on the basis of agreed-upon rules of public international law). 
29 Ibid at 6. 
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although administered by national courts, is as much a discharge of the obligations of an 
international function analogous to that fulfilled by the national courts.30 The obligation 
to apply a rule from a foreign jurisdiction is therefore an international law obligation that 
the state must fulfill.31 It is not clear, however, if that obligation rests upon the state, the 
courts or both. The role that the state and courts perform are inherently different: while 
the state can often direct courts how to proceed in conflict matters through legislation, 
such legislative rules cannot be expected to be comprehensive and cover all exigent 
circumstances.  
A third potential justification for the prevalent use of private international law is that of 
vested rights.32 A foreign person who acts in a particular country generally acquires 
certain rights or liabilities under the law of that country.33 For example, if an Englishman 
enters into a contract in France, he would be vested with the same rights as any other 
person competent to enter into a contract in France.34 If the Englishman then decided to 
approach a court in England for remedies, but the court decided to apply English contract 
law principles rather than French law, the court would effectively be ignoring rights the 
Englishman would have acquired as a person who entered into a contract in France, to the 
extent that such rights were not reflected in the English law.  
Although each of these justifications has its own flaws, it can be safely said that private 
international law gained prominence for an important reason: the acknowledgement that 
local or domestic law cannot govern every transaction and that domestic courts cannot 
ignore foreign elements that influence the issues in disputes before it.   
 
                                                
30 Ellory C. Stowell, Intervention in International Law (Washington, D.C.: J. Byrne, 1921) at 299. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Pitel and Rafferty, supra note 1 at 207. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
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2.5 Questions in Copyright Disputes Which Involve 
Private International Law  
In any issue involving private international law, the domestic court will follow a series of 
steps to resolve the procedural aspects of the dispute in terms of factual foreign elements: 
(i) The court will decide whether it has jurisdiction over the matter. 
(ii) If the court decides to take jurisdiction, it will then turn to the law it will 
apply.  
(iii) A court may decide to apply its domestic law to some issues in dispute and 
apply foreign law to others.  
(iv) If it does decide to apply different laws to different aspects of the dispute, it 
will proceed to characterize the issues so as to identify separate issues within 
the dispute, and then decide the law applicable to each.35 
“Characterization” of an issue or “issue spotting” before the court refers to the legal 
treatment of the issue prior to the application of a specific law or assumption of 
jurisdiction by that court.36 Defining an issue and locating the connecting and 
contributory factors is called the characterization.37 Characterization is the process by 
which a conflict issue is isolated from the myriad of primary and secondary issues in any 
given case with a foreign element. Characterization is a often a problem in traditional 
common law systems of private international law rules due to the fact that these common 
law systems develop conflict rules as judicial concepts and principles.38 Such a system is 
markedly different from a civil law system where statutes detail rules that would apply to 
general or specific conflict issues.39 Characterization is particularly important in cases 
                                                
35 An additional step to this process would be the enforcement of the judgment, if procured from a foreign 
court. 
36 Robert A. Pascal, “Characterization as an Approach to the Conflict of Laws” (1940) 2 La L Rev 717; 
Ernest Lorenzen, “Qualification, Classification, or Characterization Problem in the Conflict of Laws” 
(1940) 50 Yale LJ 743. 
37 Ibid at 743 – 745. 
38 Dicey et al., supra note 1 at 37. 
39 Ibid. 
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where courts attempt to localize or connect factors surrounding an action such that the 
court may take jurisdiction over the dispute.   
When determining jurisdiction and applicable law, courts look at the following essential 
principles:  
2.5.1 Lex fori 
Under this rule, the issues identified by the domestic court are to be resolved using the 
law of the land or the domestic law of the forum.40 The simplest justification for this rule 
is that if foreign law is considered in all cases involving a foreign element, the domestic 
court will cease to be a master of the conflict rules of the land.41 Further, the domestic 
forum would be required to either be well versed in the laws of the foreign land or seek 
the opinion of experts in the foreign law. If two legal systems are in conflict and the 
domestic forum has found it can exercise jurisdiction over the dispute, it would ideally 
favour that law that it knows best: the law of the forum.  
2.5.2 Lex originis 
Under this rule, place of the origin of the act or cause of the dispute will be the 
applicable law in the dispute.42 A primary argument for the use of this rule is that “every 
legal rule takes its classification from the legal system to which it belongs”.43 Therefore, 
when a domestic court accepts that a foreign law is relevant but refuses to apply it, the 
process of identifying the laws in conflict would become a redundant exercise.44 This 
rule is not as widely adopted as lex fori by courts, unless the issue before it has been a 
conflict between two foreign systems not connected to the domestic forum at all (often 
seen when parties approach a forum designated by contract or mutual agreement).  
                                                
40 Dicey et al., supra note 1 at 39. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid at 40. 
43 Martin Wolff, Private International Law, 2nd ed (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1950) at 154. 
44 Dicey et al., supra note 1 at 40. 
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2.5.3 Law of the Place of Breach or Harm  
The private international law rule of lex loci delicti would apply to tort actions, that is, 
where the tortious act or harm occurred. Certain concepts of tort law such as 
contributory acts, joint liability, aider and abettor liability, and liability for permitting or 
directing the conduct of another occurring in other jurisdictions are often considered by 
domestic forums.45 Under this rule, a domestic court would first determine whether the 
tort occurred in a place over which the court has jurisdiction and then determine the 
applicable law (generally the law of the place where the tort occurred).46 However, 
certain jurisdictions have developed other tests to determine whether the domestic forum 
has jurisdiction over the dispute or not. One of these if the “most significant 
relationship” rule.47 Under this rule, the most significant factors that determine 
jurisdiction include where the tort has occurred and the place of residence or domicile of 
the parties. The court must first determine which place has the most significant 
relationship with respect to the tort issues in dispute. Factors that determine a significant 
relationship include: the place of harm, the place where parties conduct caused the harm, 
place of residence, domicile or nationality of the parties, and place of interaction 
between the parties, if any.48 If the place that has the most significant relationship with 
the tort is within its jurisdiction, the court may then move to the question of the 
applicable law.  
2.5.4 Place Where the Defendant Resides 
As noted earlier in the Chapter, traditional common law rules have established that a 
domestic court may take jurisdiction of a case if the place where a defendant resides is 
within its jurisdiction or if he or she submits himself before that court. National 
                                                
45 Adams, supra note 11 at 636. 
46 Ibid at 1892. 
47 Ibid at 1893. 
48 Ibid. 
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legislation may also specify that the place of residence or domicile of the defendant will 
give the court of that place the jurisdiction to decide the outcome. 
2.5.5 Law relating to Contractual Provisions 
Questions regarding jurisdiction would be irrelevant in a case where an existing contract 
between the parties prescribes the applicable law.49 As long the contract is valid and 
enforceable according the laws of the country in which the protection is claimed, the 
clauses of the contract will be read to determine the applicable law. However, this 
approach may not be universal.50 Even though a valid contract may exist that designates 
the applicable law, the law of the contract may conflict with the law that would apply 
within that jurisdiction in the absence of the contract.51 For example, under French 
copyright law, any agreement to waive the moral rights of an author would be held 
unenforceable in a court of law.52 Under American law, moral rights of attribution and 
integrity may be transferred or waived if the author expressly agrees to it by way of a 
written instrument.53 If the contract designates American contract law to apply to 
disputes, but either the place of infringement is within the borders of France or the filing 
of the suit takes place in a French court, an initial conflict issue will arise to determine 
whether the American law is incompatible with the French law and therefore cannot be 
applied. Such a conflict issue is fundamentally distinct from the issues that concern 
ownership and infringement in a scenario where no contract exists - in the latter, two 
laws are in conflict, while in the former, two legal systems are in conflict.54   
                                                
49 Fawcett et al, supra note 1 at 3.01; Goldstein, supra note 17 at 99. 
50 Goldstein, supra note 17 at 108. 
51 Ibid at 99, 115. 
52 Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle, Act No. 92-597 (1 July 1992), art. L121-1. 
53 U.S. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. Section 106A(a). 
54 Goldstein, supra note 17 at 115, 116. 
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2.5.6 Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments 
The recognition and subsequent enforcement of a foreign judgment are integral aspects of 
private international law and embody the concept of res judicata, the principle that a 
foreign judgment is conclusive on its merits.55 Recognition of a foreign judgment is a 
requirement before a court can enforce the judgment. Recognition is therefore a precursor 
to enforcement itself, although in common practice, the use of both terms has been 
blended.56 Enforcement is when a party that has procured a judgment from another court 
of competent jurisdiction and wishes to collect on that judgment in another place, 
generally where the property of the defendant is situated. Recognition, however, does not 
necessarily lead to enforcement under all circumstances. For example, if the party that 
has procured a judgment from a foreign court finds itself being involved in litigation on 
the same facts and issues in question, the party can seek its domestic forum to only 
recognize the judgment and not enforce it. In both recognition and enforcement, the 
domestic forum makes a separate judicial pronouncement effecting the recognition or 
enforcement of the foreign judgment.  
There are some defenses that defendants may use to prevent a foreign judgment from 
being enforced, including the defenses of fraud, failure to apply principles of natural 
justice, judgment being rendered by an incompetent court, and the judgment offending 
the public policy of the local state.57 Some scholars have suggested that these defenses, 
particularly the public policy exception, should be available on a large scale to ensure 
                                                
55 Willis L. M. Reese, “The Status in This Country of Judgments Rendered Abroad” (1950) 50:6 Colum- L. 
Rev 783 at 790; Jean-Gabriel Castel, “Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Personam 
and in Rem in the Common Law Provinces of Canada” (1971) 17:1 McGill LJ 11; Yuliya Zeynalova, “The 
Law on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: Is It Broken and How Do We Fix It?” (2013) 
31 Berkeley J Int'l L 150 at 155. 
56 Ibid at 156. 
57 For example, the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, Uniform Law Commission 
(1962) in the United States is an agreement between party states of the United States of America, where 
§4(b) notes the following instances as exceptions to enforcement: (1) lack of subject-matter jurisdiction by 
the rending court; (2) inadequate notice to defendant; (3) fraud; (4) violation of the public policy of the 
recognizing court; (5) conflict with another final judgment entitled to recognition; and (6) inconsistency of 
the foreign proceedings with the parties’ forum selection agreement. 
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appropriate protection to defendants.58 Some have suggested that the exceptions should 
be read within narrow parameters, in the interest of international comity and 
reciprocity.59 Still others have recommended that the public policy exception be removed 
entirely from the text of relevant international conventions, particularly if the scope of the 
convention is restricted to judgments in civil and commercial matters.60 In reality, the 
extent of interpretation of any exceptions to enforcement would be dependent on the facts 
and circumstances of that specific case. There is thus a burden upon the domestic forum 
to balance comity with the public policy of the state.   
2.6 Sources of Conflict of Law 
As discussed earlier in this Chapter, courts may take jurisdiction of a case involving a 
foreign element for any one or more of a number of reasons. In doing so, courts regularly 
evidence their appreciation of comity and acknowledge the rights vested in parties by 
their actions in other jurisdictions.61 
Historically, legislative intervention in private international law was sparse.62 In England, 
for example, statutes aiming at fixing jurisdictional or choice of law issues were only 
passed for glaring anomalies in the law.63 To illustrate, the 1861 Wills Act was passed to 
ensure that in the case of a will made by a British subject, all British courts would apply 
the law of the place where the testator was domiciled at the time of making the will.64 It 
                                                
58 Karen E. Minehan, “The Public Policy Exception to the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: Necessary 
or Nemesis” (1996) 18 Loy LA Int'l & Comp L Rev 795; See Chapter 7 of this thesis analyzing why the 
“public policy” exception model that international conventions regarding conflict rules utilize is irrelevant 
in the context of cross-border copyright cases due to the principle of National Treatment. 
59 Minehan, supra note 58 at 799. 
60 Peter Kaye, Civil Jurisdiction And Enforcement Of Foreign Judgments, 1987 (Ammanford, UK: 
Butterworths) at 1437. 
61 Dicey et al, supra note 1 at 5. 
62 Ibid at 10. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Wills Act, 1861, 24 & 25 Vict. c. 114. 
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has been largely established in literature that statutory provisions that deal with private 
international law rules may be divided into six categories: 
(i) Statutes that lay down a substantive or domestic rule without indicating its 
application in any specific circumstance. 
(ii) Statues that lay down a private international law rule that indicates when a 
substantive or domestic law is applicable.  
(iii) Statutes that lay down a general private international law rule to govern a 
given question of law.  
(iv) Statutes that contain a limitation that restricts the application of a rule to 
certain factual circumstances or given question of law.  
(v) Statutes detailing rules that apply to special circumstances dictated in the 
statute and would not generally be applicable as a normal private international 
law rule.  
(vi) Statutes detailing rules that do not apply to special circumstances even though 
they would be otherwise generally be applicable as a private international law 
rule.65  
Despite this sparsity of government intervention in private international law, attempts 
have been made to enshrine public international law convention deliberately intended to 
codify private international law rules for ease of adoption by governments. For states 
where there is not separation of the judiciary from the legislative arm of government, if 
nation states want to formalize their relationships with other states in terms of private 
international law, they can enter into formal agreements in that respect.  For other states, 
where the judiciary is separate, it will be difficult, if not impossible, for states to comply 
with such international obligations.  Recognizing this problem, these public international 
law instruments have been drafted to try to counteract that constitutional difficulty, as 
will be discussed further below, with an appropriate “public policy” exception.66 
Nonetheless, these public international law attempts have not been widely successful.  
                                                
65 Dicey et al., supra note 1 at 19. 
66 See this Chapter at 2.7. 
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The only recent example of a successful international treaty codifying conflict rules have 
arisen from the historic and ongoing Hague Conferences on Private International Law.67  
The Hague Conference on Private International Law (or the Hague Conference/ 
Conférence de La Haye, henceforth known as “HCCH”) was one such effort towards the 
unification of private international law rules.68 The Hague Conference has 80 member 
countries including the European Union as a single member, was formed in 1893 to work 
for the “progressive unification of the rules of private international law” in the area of 
contracts, wills, domestic relations, and commercial transactions via international 
agreements.69 These conferences originate in an international organisation established in 
1893 that has developed rules relating to family law,70 international commercial law,71 
and international legal cooperation and litigation.72 It must be noted, however, and 
further discussed below, that these treaties and conventions have found their only 
                                                
67 However, they have not been signed or ratified by most states. For instance, as of this paper, only five 
states have signed on to the Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments 
in Civil and Commercial Matters, and only three have ratified it. 
68 Statute of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, 220 UNTS 121, 15 UST 2228, 60 AJIL 
461 (signed on 31 Oct 1951, entered into force on 15 July 1955). 
69 Ibid, art 1 (the statutory mission of the Conference is to work for the "progressive unification" of private 
international law rules by finding mutually-agreed approaches to issues such as jurisdiction of the courts, 
applicable law, and the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments); Stewart, supra note 9 at 3.09. 
70 See Convention of 12 June 1902 relating to the settlement of the conflict of the laws concerning 
marriage; Convention of 17 July 1905 relating to conflicts of laws with regard to the effects of marriage on 
the rights and duties of the spouses in their personal relationship and with regard to their estates; 
Convention of 12 June 1902 relating to the settlement of the conflict of laws and jurisdictions as regards to 
divorce and separation; Convention of 12 June 1902 relating to the settlement of guardianship of minors; 
Convention of 1 June 1970 on the Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations. 
71 See Convention of 1 February 1971 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil 
and Commercial Matters; Supplementary Protocol of 1 February 1971 to the Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters; Convention of 18 
March 1970 on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters. 
72 See Convention of 17 July 1905 relating to civil procedure; Convention of 1 March 1954 on civil 
procedure; Convention of 25 November 1965 on the Choice of Court; Convention of 25 October 1980 on 
International Access to Justice; Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements. 
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stronghold in the European Community – and this has been through supranational 
legislation and directives.73 
 
2.7 Public International Law Treaties and Texts about 
Private International Law - and the “Public Policy” 
Exception 
As noted in a previous section of this chapter, international treaties and conventions can 
be a source of private international law principles. A treaty dictating private international 
law rules could ideally seek to achieve uniformity in the rules followed by states parties 
and thereby prevent “forum shopping” by claimants.74 As these treaties are international 
law instruments, it is signatory states that play a central role in their development.75 
Participants ensure that an international consensus is reached as to the text of the 
provisions in the treaties and also bring to the discussion the various constitutional 
constraints states may face in their abilities to adopt and implement the treaties as part of 
their national laws. 
The International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (henceforth known and 
UNIDROIT), an international organization, has also been active in seeking to promote 
international public law ways to harmonize private international law principles in 
contracts for the international sale of goods, business and wills.76  
                                                
73 See Louwrens Rienk Kiestra, The Impact of the European Convention on Human Rights on Private 
International Law (New York: Springer Law, 2014) at 19. 
74 Julian G. Ku, "The Crucial Role of the States and Private International Law Treaties: A Model for 
Accommodating Globalization" (2008) Missouri L. R. 1063 at 1063. 
75 Ibid. 
76 UNIDROIT is an international organization working for the harmonization of private international laws; 
Relevant conventions include Convention relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods 
(1964); Convention relating to a Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods (1964); Convention on Agency in the International Sale of Goods (Geneva, 1983); Convention 
providing a Uniform Law on the Form of an International Will (1973). 
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It is important at this stage to distinguish between the role of a public international law 
convention about private international law that is agreed in the context of the European 
Union and “model” text adopted by international conferences such as the HCCH. The 
ideas put forward by the HCCH are simply suggestions which states may choose to adopt 
as treaty language for implementation between themselves and others when an actual 
public international law treaty is agreed.  Agreements made in the context of the EU, on 
the other hand, are law for the Member States and Member States must follow them.77 
A key provision in the HCCH “model” conventions is the “public policy exception” or 
exception for “ordre public.” This exception exists in the HCCH’s conventions in order 
to assure states that their adoption of the text would not require an upheaval of their local 
policies, particularly those concerning public order and morality. The public policy 
exception, in some sense, would allow a domestic forum to “sit in judgment over the 
wisdom and fairness of the foreign law”.78 For instance, in the Hague Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 
recognition or enforcement of a decision may be refused if the “recognition or 
enforcement of the decision is manifestly incompatible with the public policy of the State 
addressed.”79 In the Hague Principles on Choice of Law in International Commercial 
Contracts, Article 11(3) states: “A court may exclude application of a provision of the 
law chosen by the parties only if and to the extent that the result of such application 
would be manifestly incompatible with fundamental notions of public policy (ordre 
public) of the forum.”80 Article 11(4) goes on to state: “The law of the forum determines 
when a court may or must apply or take into account the public policy (ordre public) of a 
State the law of which would be applicable in the absence of a choice of law.”81 The 
                                                
77 An analysis of the unique nature of the EU Directives governing private international law in civil and 
commercial disputes can be noted in the introduction to Chapter 6. 
78 Davies, supra note 19 at 969. 
79 1 February 1971 (entered into force 20 August 1979), art 5(1). 
80 The Hague Principles on Choice of Law in International Commercial Contracts, Prel. Doc. No 6 of July 
2014 (entered into force 19 March 2015). 
81 Ibid. 
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HCCH commentary on Article 11 requires that the forum state must sufficiently justify 
the fundamental notion of public policy in question, find that the chosen law to be applied 
is inconsistent with that policy, and prove that the incompatibility arises in the application 
of the chosen law to the dispute before the forum. 
In the Convention on the Choice of Court Agreements, two distinct provisions refer to the 
public policy exception.82 Article 6(3) requires that a “court of a Contracting State other 
than that of the chosen court shall suspend or dismiss proceedings to which an exclusive 
choice of court agreement applies” unless “giving effect to the agreement would lead to a 
manifest injustice or would be manifestly contrary to the public policy of the State of the 
court seized”. In addition to this, Article 9 states that recognition and enforcement of a 
foreign judgment may be refused if the recognition or judgment “would be manifestly 
incompatible with the public policy of the requested State, including situations where the 
specific proceedings leading to the judgment were incompatible with fundamental 
principles of procedural fairness of that State.”  
Under the UNIDROIT Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure, a final judgment 
awarded in another forum in a proceeding substantially compatible with these Principles 
must be recognized and enforced unless substantive public policy requires otherwise.”83 
Under the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts, the Principles 
do not apply to invalidity arising from “immorality or illegality.”84 Commentary for this 
provision states that the reason for the exclusion of invalidity arising from immorality or 
illegality in “inherent complexity of questions of status and of public policy and the 
                                                
82 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, 30 June 2005, 44 I.L.M. 1294. 
83 UNIDROIT Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure, Principle 30. 
84 UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts, 3.10. 
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extremely diverse manner in which they are treated in domestic law.”85 Therefore, such 
matters are to be governed by the applicable law identified by the forum.86  
From a private international law perspective, therefore, the public policy exception refers 
to a situation where a foreign law that would generally be applicable to a domestic forum 
will not be enforced under the treaty because its enactment by the state would violate a 
public policy of that land.87 How “public policy” is defined is left open by these texts and 
will presumably vary by jurisdiction or state. The concept of “public policy” or “ordre 
public” is generally defined as a contravention of some essential moral or social value of 
the forum or state concerned, and the forum will not enforce a foreign law that is directly 
causing or indirectly causes such contravention.88 Public policy is also intrinsically 
attached to principles of natural justice followed by common law countries.89 Natural 
justice is concerned with the “fairness of procedure by which a foreign judgment was 
obtained”, while public policy relates to “the substantive character of the foreign law”.90 
Under the public policy exception, a court may refuse to enforce a foreign judgment, 
despite a treaty that has been implemented into the law of the court’s nation, because 
enforcement would violate a public policy of that jurisdiction in the eyes of the court. 
                                                
85 UNILEX, International Case Law and Bibliography on the UN Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods (Irvington, N.Y.: Transnational Publishers, 1996); Stefan Vogenauer, Jan 
Lkeinheisterkamp, ed., Commentary on the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 
(New York, Oxford University Press, 2009). 
86 Michael J. Bonell, “The New Provisions on Illegality in the UNIDROIT Principles 2010” (2011) 
Uniform L Rev 517 at 517 – 519. 
87 Monrad G. Paulsen, Michael I. Sovern, “Public Policy in the Conflict of Laws” (1956) 56 Colum L Rev 
969 (this is of particular importance when the domestic forum must decide whether it should apply a 
foreign law). 
88 Nicholas Rafferty, ed., Private International Law in Common Law Canada Cases, Text and Materials 
(Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications, 2010) at 61. 
89 Ibid at 70. 
90 Ibid. 
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The purpose of the public policy exception is therefore to facilitate party (national) 
autonomy and protect those policies that are fundamentally important to states.91 It is a 
common element in public international law treaties affecting civil and commercial 
disputes.92  Why, though, is the public policy exception such an important part of these 
treaties? This question may be partially answered by the concept of independence of the 
judiciary and its separation from the legislative and executive branches of the state. The 
operation of any private international law rules can be suspended when a claim before a 
domestic forum invokes foreign or public rights that are incompatible with those of the 
domestic forum.93 This is a well-established principle in penal and foreign tax laws, and 
the much broader area of “other public laws”.94 Further, even though public international 
law treaties about private international law refer to courts, the treaties are to be ratified by 
the state government.95 In practice, courts prefer to apply the principles they know, and 
their expertise lies in the law of the forum.96 The public policy exception allows domestic 
forums to apply lex fori instead of the foreign law and is therefore a type of “shield” 
against application of the foreign law.  
The public policy exception is important in terms of a domestic forum’s exercise of 
jurisdiction over disputes that it considers incompatible with the laws applicable within 
its forum. This makes the public policy exception an important element of private 
                                                
91 Ibid. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Rafferty, supra note 1 at 61. 
94 Ibid. 
95 The Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters, 1 February 1971 (entered into force 20 August 1979), art 1 (this provision states that 
the Convention shall apply to decisions rendered in civil or commercial matters by the courts of 
Contracting States and subsequent provisions provide for the recognition and enforcement of judgments 
rendered by courts of Contracting States. Only a court can recognize and enforce the judgment of any other 
court and the state or government is not involved in the process or recognition and enforcement. This 
Convention therefore directs courts of Contracting States to recognize and enforce valid judgments from 
any other Contracting State, and the state must ratify it as well.). 
96 Stephen M Stewart, International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights (London: Butterworths, 1983) at 
38. 
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international law that a treaty codifying private international law rules must include in 
order to assure states parties that the inherent powers of their courts are not stripped from 
them.  
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3.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the evolution of copyright law on national and international stages 
and considers, in this connection, the principle of National Treatment.  
The chapter begins by providing a historical overview of copyright law, its development 
from England (and subsequent exportation to the United States) and in France – and then 
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throughout the global landscape through to the formation of the Berne Union. This 
chapter highlights the evolution of national legislation in England, the United States and 
France precisely because, as will be demonstrated, they are the key jurisdictions involved 
in the history of copyright.1  
As the chapter will demonstrate, throughout the eighteenth century, copyright law was 
restricted to national legislation with little development on an international scale.2 The 
development of copyright law was predominantly through statutes – the laws were 
territorial and remedies were largely available only to local authors for acts described 
specifically by the national statutes.3 As will be discussed further in this chapter, 
copyright law is still enforced through national legislation and is grounded in 
territoriality. Authors have thus faced unique challenges with respect to how their works 
get treated in foreign countries.  
The chapter will continue by describing the emergence of bilateral treaties and the 
principles enshrined in them, followed by the evolution of the major international 
copyright treaties. Continuing to investigate further the challenges authors faced when 
their works were distributed beyond their nations’ borders, this part of the chapter will 
                                                
1 It is this dominance in the history of copyright that justifies the focus on these three jurisdictions in the 
exploration of decisions in the following chapters. The United Kingdom and France were the first and and 
most active jurisdictions involved in the drafting and adoption of the Berne Convention. On the other side 
of the spectrum, the United States refused to engage in global copyright developments till 1988. With the 
U.K. and France on one side and the U.S. on the other, copyright principle developed differently on each 
side, and for the purpose of this thesis, it is important to investigate both. The fourth jurisdiction included in 
the study is Canada (notes in Chapter 5) and this inclusion is because Canada’s Supreme Court is one of the 
few highest courts to tackle head on the problem around which this thesis is centred. 
2 Hector MacQueen, Waelde Charlotte, Graeme T Laurie, Contemporary Intellectual Property Law and 
Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) at 34 (upon the introduction of printing in the 15th century, 
governments and churches aimed to regulate the number of copies printed in an effort to censor dissent 
towards them); Ronan Deazley, Rethinking Copyright: History, Theory and Language (Cheltenham, UK: 
E. Elgar Publishing, 2006) at 20; Ronan Deazley, On the Origin of the Right to Copy: Charting the 
Movement of Copyright Law in Eighteenth-Century Britain (1695-1775) (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004) at 
4. 
3 Deazley, supra note 2 at 35 (in prominent cases such as Donaldson v Beckett (1774) 2 Bro.P.C. 129, 
English courts held no copyright existed under common law principles and that if statutes did not express 
provide for a specific right, the same cannot be claimed under common law principles). 
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provide a historical background to the principle of “National Treatment” – a core concept 
of copyright treaties that has facilitated the dissemination of information in protected 
works while also ensuring economic and moral rights to authors irrespective of their 
nationality. This part of the chapter will also chart the evolution of the principle of 
National Treatment in Europe and its relevance to the copyright treaties and conventions 
in force today.  
It is important to note at this juncture that it is through the early evolution of the multi-
lateral public international law Berne Convention that the principle requiring no 
formalities in the copyright law of any member nation arose.4 That principle means that 
copyright has come to be different from all other industrial property (principally 
trademark law and patent law) in that there is no mandatory requirement for registration.5 
Thus, while plaintiffs in a dispute involving industrial property infringement will have to 
provide proof of registration in the country where the domestic forum is situated, the 
same is not true for copyright infringement. In a cross-border copyright dispute, the 
domestic forum is instead faced with the problem of “characterization” or “issue 
spotting”.6 The problem of “characterization” arises both in terms of asking the question 
“ who owns the work at issue” and in asking “whether there has been an infringement”.7 
For copyrighted works that are distributed over several jurisdictions, establishing the 
chain of events for accurate characterization is not an easy pursuit despite the accepted 
                                                
4 Stockholm Act revising Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 9 September 
1886, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27 (revised 14 July 1967) (the U.S. did not accept the principle of informality, 
opting instead for the principle of reciprocity through the Rome Convention); See International Convention 
for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organisations (Rome, 26 
Oct. 1961) 496 U.N.T.S. 43 (entered into force 18 May 1964) (hereinafter the “Rome Convention”]. 
5 It must be noted as a caveat to this statement, in regard to trademark law, that in common law countries 
the tort of passing off continues to perform a function in trademark law, which also involves no formalities 
(no registration) and creates what is frequently termed “the common law mark.” However, passing off is a 
tort and does not involve the infringement action, which is characteristic of the registered industrial 
property under discussion here and is also the private law action in copyright. 
6 Paul Edward Geller, “Conflicts of Laws in Copyright Cases: Infringement and Ownership Issues” (2004) 
51 J. Copyright Society U.S.A. 315 at 318. 
7 Ibid at 318, 319. 
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legal premises that (1) national copyright legislation establishes the ownership and (2) all 
other jurisdictions are expected to respect the same, and (3) the root cause of action in 
any copyright dispute is infringement.8 
The chapter will focus upon the development of the principle of National Treatment as a 
key element of copyright law as it spread globally – and its acceptance in key 
international agreements through to the present, from the original Berne Convention of 
18869 through to later international agreements (specifically the Rome Convention of 
1961,10 the TRIPS Agreement of 199411 and the WIPO Copyright Treaties of 1996).12  
Finally, before concluding, the chapter will turn to a consideration of the question of the 
identity of the principle of National Treatment in copyright as an example of a Private 
International Law rule and the opinions of legal scholars on this point. 
3.2 Evolution of Copyright Law  
Before copyright legislation was discussed and coordinated at an international level, 
several states had begun introducing privileges to publishers and authors of books, 
gradually evolving into copyright statutes. Major developments in national copyright law 
occurred in England, the United States and France.   
 
                                                
8 Note that challenging registration is also a cause of action, although not the focus of this thesis. 
9 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 9 September 1886, S. Treaty Doc. 
No. 99-27 art 5 (entered into force 5 December 1887) (hereinafter the “Berne Convention”). 
10 International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting 
Organisations (Rome, 26 Oct. 1961) 496 U.N.T.S. 43 (entered into force 18 May 1964) (hereinafter the 
“Rome Convention”]. 
11 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 15 April 1994, 1869 UNTS 299; 33 
ILM 1197 art 3 (entered into force 1 January 1996) (hereinafter “TRIPS”). 
12 WIPO Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 2186 U.N.T.S. 121, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17; 36 I.L.M. 65 
(hereinafter “WCT”); WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 2186 U.N.T.S. 203, S. 
Treaty Doc. No. 105-17; 36 I.L.M. 76 (hereinafter “WPPT”). 
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3.2.1 England 
The introduction of the printing press in England in the 15th century and its subsequent 
popularity spurred Parliament to control the publication of books by granting publishers 
the sole right of publication.13 England followed a system of granting privileges or 
monopolies for certain goods by the monarch,14 with this power being relegated to the 
Worshipful Company of Stationers in 1557, established by a royal charter.15 In 1662, the 
Licensing Act established this monopoly.16 However, increased interference by the 
Parliament in censorship of books led to 1695 reforms to reduce censorship. This, in turn, 
led, in 1710, to the first modern copyright legislation, namely the Statute of Anne.17 The 
Statute of Anne helped consolidate the law relating to “copying”. The Statute aimed at the 
“encouragement of learning by vesting the copies of printed books in the authors or 
purchasers of such copies.”18 It was originally applicable only to books and recognised 
“authors” to be the legal owners of books written by them.19 It granted authors of books 
monopoly protection, from the date on which the Statute came into force, for a period of 
fourteen years. If this fourteen-year period expired before the author’s death, the 
copyright protection could be renewed for another fourteen years, after which the book 
would enter the public domain.  
                                                
13 Stephen M Stewart, International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights (London: Butterworths, 1983) at 
2.11. 
14 Deazley, supra note 2 at 24. 
15 Ibid. at 24. 
16 An Act for Preventing Abuses in Printing Seditious, Treasonable, and Unlicensed Books and Pamphlets, 
and for Regulating of Printing and Printing Presses (the Licensing Act), 1662, 13 & 14 Car.II, c.33. 
17 An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in the Authors or 
Purchasers of such Copies, During the Times therein mentioned, 1710, 8 Anne, c. 19; Copyright Act 1709 
8 Anne c. 21; See John Feather, The Book Trade in Politics: The Making of the Copyright Act of 1710, 
"Publishing History", 19(8), 1980, p. 39 (note 3); See Catherine Seville, The Internationalization of 
Copyright Law (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006) at 22. 
18 Supra note 17, preamble. 
19 “Whereas Printers, Booksellers, and other Persons, have of late frequently taken the Liberty of Printing, 
Reprinting, and Publishing, or causing to be Printed, Reprinted, and Published Books, and other Writings, 
without the Consent of the Authors or Proprietors of such Books and Writings, to their very great 
Detriment, and too often to the Ruin of them and their Families.” 
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While the Statute explicitly refered to publishers and authors and recognised the 
economic repercussions of printing, republishing and selling without their consent, it 
failed to define either “publisher” or “author” definitively.20 Therefore, while the Statute 
was the first in the world to recognise the rights of authors, these rights were a 
consequence of the Statute’s primary goal of “encouragement of learning”.21 The Statute 
of Anne created a “public domain” for books and literary works by limiting the period of 
monopoly that copyright owners enjoyed and also ensuring that physical copies of a 
work, once purchased, would lie within the purchaser’s control, thus preventing the 
copyright owners from exercising control over uses of the physical books.  
3.2.2 United States 
In 1710, the United States was not an active participant in the conversation involving the 
adoption of national copyright laws:  it did not exist.  The English Statute of Anne did not 
apply to the American colonies yet 12 out of the 13 original States that eventually 
founded the United States had passed laws relating to copyright protection before that 
founding.22 The American Constitution declares “the Congress shall have power to … 
promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors 
and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.”23 Under 
this power, Congress passed the Copyright Act of 1790 which required registration of 
works, gave authors an initial protection period of 14 years and gave authors the sole 
right and liberty to print and publish their works. The Act also specifically noted under 
Section 5 that none of the provisions of the Act would extend to works that are “written, 
                                                
20 Deazley, supra note 2 at 35. 
21 Supra note 17, preamble. 
22 Stephen, supra note 13 at 2.17; J.A.L. Sterling, World Copyright Law: Protection of Authors' Works, 
Performances, Phonograms, Films, Video, Broadcasts, and Published Editions in National, International, 
and Regional Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) at 12; See Bruce W. Bugbee, “Genesis of American 
Patent and Copyright Law” (1968) 73-4 Am Hist Rev 1232. 
23 United States Constitution, art. I, s. 8, clause 8. 
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printed or published by foreigners in places outside the United States”.24 This restrictive 
American policy would continue well into the nineteenth century and would only be 
relaxed upon the U.S. signing the Universal Copyright Convention in 1955, and 
eventually the Berne Convention in 1988.25  
3.2.3 France 
The French copyright regime (“droit d’auteur”), like England’s, evolved from royal 
privileges that were granted to authors, publishers and heirs of authors.26 The first royal 
privileges were granted in 1498 and included protection for new books, maps, artwork 
and certain designs, and those seeking royal privileges were required to pay fees to the 
monarch.27 Protection was usually granted for six years and renewal was left up to the 
monarch. The royal privileges were treated as property and could hence be licensed by 
the author.28 An evident drawback of this system was that parties were favoured for 
privileges at the whim of the monarch and not all authors would be treated in the same 
manner, with the works of many authors plagued by state censorship as well.29 Small 
publishers and authors who could not afford the privileges were refused protection.  
In 1777, the duration of royal privilege was set at a minimum of 10 years or the lifetime 
of the author, whichever period was longer, without renewals.30 Authors also enjoyed 
certain minimum rights: the right to publish and sell their own works, the right of heirs to 
                                                
24 Sterling, supra note 22 at 13; See Stephen P. Ladas, The International Protection of Literary and Artistic 
Property (New York: Macmillan, 1938) at 328. 
25 Sterling, supra note 22 at 13 (the United States would only go on to ratify the Berne Convention from 1 
March 1989 by the passing of the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988). 
26 Ibid at 2.09; Oren Bracha, “The Adventures of the Statute of Anne in the Land of Unlimited Possibilities: 
The Life of a Legal Transplant” (2010) 25 Berkeley Tech LJ 1427 at 1428, 1440. 
27 Deazley, supra note 2 at 44. 
28 Deazley, supra note 2 at 45. 
29 Censorship laws and administrative hurdles also plagued the royal privileges regime. 
30 Stewart, supra note 13 at 2.09 (Louis XVI issued six decrees in 1777, of which the Arret sur les 
privileges established two privileges: first for the authors by recognizing their exclusive right over the 
creation of their work, and the second for publishers to recoup their investments in publication of the 
works; Deazley, supra note 2 at 45. 
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enjoy the privilege, and the right to transfer or sell the privilege.31 Between 1791 and 
1793, this system was overhauled several times and would eventually come to recognise 
two categories of rights for authors, performers, composers, painters and engravers: 
economic rights and moral rights.32 Economic rights are those rights that allow 
commercial exploitation of an authors’ work.33 Moral rights are those that are 
intrinsically associated with an author’s personality, ensuring maintenance and integrity 
of her or his work.34 The development of economic and moral rights in French copyright 
law enabled French courts to develop the droit d’auteur without the need for legislative 
intervention till the Copyright Act of 1957 was adopted, which contained detailed 
provisions in accordance with the Berne Convention.35 The current French copyright 
statute is the Code de la propriété intellectuelle,36 which incorporates the provisions of 
the European Union Directive on copyright law.37 
3.3 Emergence of Bilateral Copyright Agreements 
Foreign reproductions of literary works were passing through borders that were becoming 
harder to control. States were finding it difficult to guarantee rights to authors in a 
uniform fashion, causing foreign authors to be alienated from domestic copyright law. 
The British book trade of the early 1800s, for example, suffered major losses due to the 
reprinting of copyrighted works by French, German and American publishers, yet Great 
Britain could not prevent such activities since they were occurring outside its own 
                                                
31 Stewart, supra note 13 at 2.09. 
32 Ibid at 2.10; Sterling, supra note 22 at 14 (the English copyright regime only recognized statutory 
economic rights at this time). 
33 Stewart, supra note 13 at 4.17, 14.23 (known as droits patrimoniaux). 
34 Ibid at 4.39, 14.22 (known as droits moraux). 
35 Ibid, at 2.10, 4.01. 
36 Le code de la propriété intellectuelle est un document du droit français, créé par la loi no 92-597 du 1er 
juillet 1992. 
37 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the 
harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, (22 June 2001) 
Official Journal L 167. 
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borders.38  Britain attempted to strengthened its customs rules and watch its borders very 
closely, but the much cheaper foreign reprints often found their way into the country 
despite these efforts. These developments urged nation states to enter into bilateral 
agreements protecting national interests in intellectual and industrial property.39  
By 1880, European countries were entering into bilateral agreements offering reciprocal 
protection for certain intellectual and industrial property, with copyright protection 
leading the discussions.40 One of the more pressing issues included the treatment of 
foreign authors under domestic copyright laws.41 To deal with this issue, countries would 
include in the provisions of their bilateral agreements that each country would grant the 
same protection to citizens of the other country as it granted to its own citizens.42 States 
were beginning to realize that copyright depends on authorship, and authorship should be 
interpreted in the same way on a global scale.43  
One of the drawbacks of a given state entering into several bilateral treaties, however, 
was the failure to establish a uniform and non-discriminatory set of rules that would 
ensure that all foreign authors were treated in the same manner. Firstly, each treaty could 
contain different copyright term.44 The assessment of the legal status of a book written by 
a national of country A, which was published in country B, where unauthorised copies 
were being made in country C, for example, would be an extremely complex dispute to 
resolve, depending on which country’s courts were approached for resolution. Moreover, 
                                                
38 Seville, supra note 17 at 22, 23. 
39 Ibid at 3, 41 (Seville details the difficulties that states faced with respect to the treatment of foreign 
reprints of copyrighted material). 
40 For example, France had signed thirteen bilateral treaties, Belgium has signed nine and England and 
Germany has signed five each; See Sam Ricketson, Jane C. Ginsburg, International Copyright and 
Neighbouring Rights: The Berne Convention and Beyond (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005) at 
1.29; Sterling, supra note 22 at 15. 
41 Sterling, supra note 22 at 15, 16. 
42 Ibid. at 15. 
43 This conversation would eventually leak, in the twentieth century, into the area of international trade as 
well; See this chapter in “TRIPS Agreement”. 
44 Sterling, supra note 22 at 16. 
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each treaty could contain different provisions about key substantial elements of 
copyright, including the duration of protection and the requirement for registration of the 
work.  
The several bilateral treaties that were concluded before the advent of the 1886 Berne 
Convention created a network of reciprocal rights throughout Europe. Each of these 
treaties differed in the texts and the rights offered to authors. The need for multilateral 
consensus only grew because these treaties were not particularly effective in battling the 
movement of unauthorized copies. Moreover, bilateral treaties restricted authorship rights 
within the mould of trade relations between the party states, thereby preventing 
authorship from being recognized as a global right that binds authors to their works.  It 
was becoming evident that copyright law was gaining an international angle and domestic 
law could not extend its hand far enough to address the issue.  
3.4 First Intellectual Property Treaties and the 
Principle of National Treatment 
Through the development of the bilateral treaties described above, two concepts arose as 
early international copyright law norms.45 The first was the concept of “National 
Treatment”: the principle that nationals and foreigners were to be treated equally. The 
second was the idea of certain “minimum standards of protection” extended to both 
nationals and foreigners equally by following the National Treatment rule. National 
Treatment therefore embodies two important justifications for the use of private 
international law rules: comity and the recognition of vested rights for an individual by 
reason of the individual’s actions in another state.46 Much later, as contemporary 
international law blossomed, these two principles were embodied in other contexts, in 
important international instruments. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for 
example, under Article 27(2) states: “Everyone has the right to the protection of the 
moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of 
                                                
45 Ibid at 16. 
46 See Chapter 2. 
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which he is the author.”47 This language borrows directly from the nineteenth century, 
multilateral Berne Convention (discussed below)48 which aimed to establish an effective 
connection between an author and his work and supplement it with economic rights.49  
3.4.1 Paris Convention, 1883 (On Patent) 
The Paris Convention of 1883 included three main categories of substantive provisions: 
National Treatment, rights of priority, and a set of common rules that all signatory states 
were to incorporate in their domestic law.50 The Paris Convention included patents, 
trademarks, industrial designs and utility models, but excluded copyright from its 
scope.51 However, the Convention constituted a “Union” of member states committed to 
the protection of industrial property and, as noted below, this structure was also 
implemented in the Berne Convention.52 Article 2 of the Paris Convention contained the 
provision assuring National Treatment, stating that the “[N]ationals of any country of the 
Union shall, as regards the protection of industrial property, enjoy in all the other 
countries of the Union the advantages that their respective laws now grant, or may 
hereafter grant, to nationals.” The provision also stated that nationals of other countries of 
the Union “shall have the same protection … and the same legal remedy against any 
                                                
47 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, General Assembly Resolution 217 A (III) 
(entered into force 16 December 1949). 
48 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 9 September 1886, S. Treaty Doc. 
No. 99-27 (entered into force 5 December 1887), art 5(1), 5(3). 
49 Antoon de Baets, “The Impact of the ‘Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ on the Study of History” 
in History and Theory 48:1 (2009). 
50 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, 20 March 1883, 21 UST 1583, 828 UNTS 
305 (entered into force 27 September 1975). 
51 Ibid, art 1(2) (“The protection of industrial property has as its object patents, utility models, industrial 
designs, trademarks, service marks, trade names, indications of source or appellations of origin, and the 
repression of unfair competition”); 1(3) (“Industrial property shall be understood in the broadest sense and 
shall apply not only to industry and commerce proper, but likewise to agricultural and extractive industries 
and to all manufactured or natural products, for example, wines, grain, tobacco leaf, fruit, cattle, minerals, 
mineral waters, beer, flowers, and flour”). 
52 Ibid, art 1(1). 
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infringement of their rights, provided that the conditions and formalities imposed upon 
nationals are complied with.”53 
3.4.2 Berne Convention, 1886  
Emulating the efforts of the conference leading up to the Paris Convention, the concerns 
of the international community regarding harmonizing copyright law were addressed in 
the Berne conferences of the 1880s, and culminated in the signing of the Berne 
Convention in 1886.54 The very first draft convention resulting from the Berne 
Conference of September 1883 included, in its ten preliminary articles, the requirement 
of National Treatment, formality requirements, and the scope of protection of authors 
who qualify for that protection.55 However, the National Treatment provision was based 
on the place of publication (or the place of origin) of the work and not on the nationality 
of the author. Further, the draft lacked specific definitions with regard to “infringement” 
and “adaptation”. A subsequent conference in September 1884 saw participating 
countries juggling with whether or not the convention should be based on the principle of 
National Treatment. By the end of this conference, participating states came to the 
conclusion that the principle of National Treatment was integral to the convention and 
should be preserved. Instead of removing the concept of National Treatment, delegates 
instead added provisions relating to duration of protection so that foreign authors would 
all be entitled to the same minimum duration of protection across contracting states. 
However, countries that opposed provisions relating to the very first “fair use” principles 
did not receive this draft of the convention as warmly as the first draft.56  
The September 1885 conference proceedings were similar to those of the 1884 
conference. The inclusion of National Treatment was not contested, however the extent to 
which it would apply was questioned. The conference had to choose between establishing 
                                                
53 This is different from the Berne Convention where there is no requirement of formality, rendering 
copyright as a global right of the author. 
54 Primarily signed by European countries, requiring decades for the rest of the world to sign and ratify it. 
55 Ricketson & Ginsburg, supra note 40 at 6.73. 
56 Including restriction of copyright by the state for educational or scientific purposes. 
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a strict convention that would invariable exclude countries that had not yet developed an 
effective domestic copyright regime, or adopt a lenient approach that would include more 
countries as signatories. The conference opted for the latter, ensuring that National 
Treatment would be afforded to all authors from signatory countries. This measure was 
necessary to ensure that states would sign on to the Berne Convention, with the ultimate 
goal being harmonization of copyright laws. To that end, the conference discussed the 
need to establish certain minimum rights and the period for these minimum rights to be in 
force. The discussions of the 1885 conference paved the way for the final draft of the 
convention to be circulated and finally adopted in 1886 as the Berne Convention, creating 
a “Union” for the protection of the rights of authors over their literary and artistic 
works.57 The Berne Union, as distinct from the Berne Convention that founds it, is the 
community of signatory nations that governs the Convention and its text.58 With the 
adoption of the Convention by the United States in 1988 – and its incorporation in 
TRIPS,59 it has now been signed onto by virtually all jurisdictions, remains in force 
today, and provides the basis for both international public copyright law and international 
trade law encompassing intellectual property law.  
                                                
57 Berne Convention, supra note 9,art 1 (“The countries to which this Convention applies constitute a Union 
for the protection of the rights of authors in their literary and artistic works.”). 
58 Ibid, art 6(1) (“Where any country outside the Union fails to protect in an adequate manner the works of 
authors who are nationals of one of the countries of the Union, the latter country may restrict the protection 
given to the works of authors who are, at the date of the first publication thereof, nationals of the other 
country and are not habitually resident in one of the countries of the Union. If the country of first 
publication avails itself of this right, the other countries of the Union shall not be required to grant to works 
thus subjected to special treatment a wider protection than that granted to them in the country of first 
publication.”) (in the TRIPS+ regime, the “Union” is read differently: allowing for differentiation of 
treatment between nationals of signatory and non-signatory countries in a way that encourages non-
signatory countries to accord adequate protection to nationals of the Union). 
59 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 15 April 1994, 1869 UNTS 299; 33 
ILM 1197 art 3 (entered into force 1 January 1996) (hereinafter “TRIPS”), art 1. 
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3.5 Scope of “National Treatment” under International 
Copyright Conventions 
The principle of National Treatment described above forms an essential part of the five 
major international copyright treaties and conventions adopted by the international 
community so far: the Berne Convention of 1886,60 the Rome Convention of 1961,61 the 
TRIPS Agreement of 199462 and the WIPO Copyright Treaties of 1996.63  
In the earliest of the five, the Berne Convention, National Treatment is first referred to in 
Article 5(1), referring to rights guaranteed outside the “country of origin”:64 
Authors shall enjoy, in respect of works for which they are protected under 
this Convention, in countries of the Union other than the country of origin, 
the rights which their respective laws do now or may hereafter grant to 
their nationals, as well as the rights specially granted by this Convention. 
To remove any ambiguities regarding definition, the Convention states that the “country 
of origin” shall be considered to be: 
(a) The country in which the work was first published, and the country of first 
publication is a Union member.  
(b) The country of which the author is a national, if the work was first published in a 
country that is not a member of the Union.  
                                                
60 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 9 September 1886, S. Treaty Doc. 
No. 99-27 (entered into force 5 December 1887), art 5. 
61 International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting 
Organisations (Rome, 26 Oct. 1961) 496 U.N.T.S. 43, entered into force 18 May 1964 (hereinafter Rome 
Convention], arts. 2, 4, 5, 6. 
62 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 15 April 1994, 1869 UNTS 299; 33 
ILM 1197 art 3 (entered into force 1 January 1996), art. 3. 
63 WIPO Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 2186 U.N.T.S. 121, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17; 36 I.L.M. 65, art 
3; WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 2186 U.N.T.S. 203, S. Treaty Doc. No. 
105-17; 36 I.L.M. 76, art 4; See Chapter 4 for an analysis of the private international law rule hidden in the 
principle of National Treatment. 
64 See Appendix I. 
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(c) In the case of simultaneous publication of a work in a country that is a member of 
the Berne and another country that is not, the former will be considered the 
country of origin.  
(d) In the case of unpublished works or works first published in a country that is not 
a member of the Union, then the country of which the author is a national will be 
considered the country of origin.65 
Article 5(2) further specifies that the enjoyment and exercise of these rights are not to be 
subjected to any “formality” and such enjoyment is to remain independent of the 
existence of any protections in the country of origin of the work. This provision stresses 
that the laws of the country in which protection is sought shall govern the extent of 
protection and the remedies available to the foreign author. Not to leave out the 
obligations of the country of origin, Article 5(3) states domestic law will govern that 
protection in that instance. Where an author is not a national of the country of origin, 
however, he would still enjoy the same rights as a national author of that country. The 
criteria for eligibility for protection are also elaborated under Article 3, with Article 2 
listing “works” that are protected under the Convention. The Convention therefore 
includes both protected works and protected authors, both of which are granted said 
protection without discrimination under Article 5(1).  
The simple conclusion that the principle of National Treatment means that under a 
nation’s laws, a foreigner enjoys no lesser rights and benefits than a citizen of that nation 
receives. Under Article 5(1), there is an obligation to grant to nationals of countries of the 
Berne Union National Treatment in respect of the rights specifically covered by the 
Convention. The country where the copyright is claimed governs questions as to whether 
a work is copyrightable, the term of duration of the copyright, and exceptions and 
limitations to protection. 
Therefore, National Treatment is a rule of non-discrimination that promises foreign 
authors (from countries that are members of the Union) that they will enjoy the same 
                                                
65 Berne Convention, supra note 60, art 5(4); see Appendix I. 
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protection of their works in the protecting country that the nationals of the protecting 
country would enjoy. It means, for example, that a Canadian work for which copyright 
enforcement is sought in the United States would be treated under American law exactly 
as if it were an American work that was registered in the U.S., and all the remedies 
available to an American author would be available to the Canadian author as well.  
Currently, 168 states are party to the Berne Convention, making it one of the most signed 
and ratified international conventions. The minimum standards specified in Berne have 
therefore been adopted by an overwhelming majority of states across the world. Berne is 
also referred to by all the copyright conventions following it, making it relevant in all 
copyright contexts today. For this reason, the principles embodied in Berne have become 
internationally accepted norms, inseparable from the very concept of copyright.  
3.5.1 Rome Convention, 196166 
The Rome Convention affords protection for performances to performers, for phonograms 
to producers of phonograms and for broadcasts to broadcasting organizations. It was the 
first copyright treaty post-Berne and governs “neighbouring rights” in copyright, a direct 
cause of the technology boom after Berne was adopted.67 Under Article 2, the Rome 
Convention expressly lists the parameters for the application of the National Treatment 
principle. The text of Article 2 states that “National Treatment shall mean the treatment 
accorded by the domestic law of the Contracting State in which protection is claimed”. 
The provision refers to performers, producers of phonograms and broadcasting 
organizations as special classes of persons to whom the National Treatment principle is to 
be extended.68 It may be noted that the criteria for National Treatment in the Rome 
Convention extends beyond nationality of the creators of the works. Article 2(2) states 
                                                
66 International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting 
Organisations (Rome, 26 Oct. 1961) 496 U.N.T.S. 43, entered into force 18 May 1964 (hereinafter “Rome 
Convention”]. 
67 Stewart, supra note 13 at 8.04 (neighbouring rights are those rights related to copyright that protect 
intermediary persons who add substantive creative or technical skill in the production, recording or 
broadcasting of a work). 
68 See Appendix II. 
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that National Treatment “shall be subject to the protection specifically guaranteed, and 
the limitations specifically provided for, in this Convention.” The principle of National 
Treatment enshrined in Article 2(1) will therefore not affect the protection and limitations 
granted in the Rome Convention.69 This means that, for instance, under Article 16, 
country X could deny producers and performers from country Y the right to equitable 
remuneration because its own nationals do not enjoy that right in the country Y. 
However, country X could still provide these rights to its own nationals without violating 
the Convention. Therefore, unlike the Berne Convention, the Rome Convention contains 
the principle of reciprocity in respect of certain rights as decided by the member states. 
Where the Rome Convention protects authors and publishers, the Berne Convention 
protects works.70  
The effect of the Rome Convention on the international community was not as 
phenomenal as the effect of Berne, and the Rome Convention was only signed by a 
fraction of the states that were party to Berne.71 Neighbouring rights have received better 
protection under later TRIPS and the WIPO Treaties72, the latter of which have been 
particularly effective since the rapid growth of the Internet.73 However, the unique 
interpretation of National Treatment and the drafting of specific definitions for the types 
of works protected under the Rome Convention did bring neighbouring rights to the 
spotlight, allowing future treaties to be more inclusive of them.  
                                                
69 Stewart, supra note 13 at 8.07. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Paul Torremans and Jon Holyoak, “Intellectual Property Law” (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) 
at 254.  
72 Which will be discussed in the following sections. 
73 Pamela Samuelson, “The U.S. Digital Agenda at WIPO” (1997) 37 Va J Int’l L 369 (discussing the 
TRIPS Agreement’s lack of attention towards digital copyrighted works and the drafting of the WIPO 
Copyright Treaties). 
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3.5.2 TRIPS Agreement, 199474 
The mandate for TRIPS is very different from the mandates for the Berne and Rome 
Conventions. The two earlier public law treaties were focussed specifically on copyright 
matters: TRIPS includes several forms of intellectual and industrial property under its 
scope, including copyright and related rights,75 trademarks,76 geographical indications,77 
industrial designs,78 patents,79 integrated circuit designs,80 trade secrets and confidential 
information.81 Where Berne itself formed a “Union” of member states to govern the 
Convention, TRIPS relies on countries’ memberships in the World Trade Organization 
(WTO). Indeed TRIPS is a part of the comprehensive WTO Agreement.82 And, also, 
TRIPS implementation and dispute resolution mechanisms are drawn from the body of 
the main WTO Agreement.83 The TRIPS Agreement, in respect of copyright, is built 
around incorporation by reference of the text of Berne (Articles 1-21)84 In addition to 
adopting the principles of the Berne Convention, TRIPS also includes, for copyright, 
additional administrative and enforcement provisions relating to minimum remedies, 
enforcement procedures and the process of dispute resolution, none of which are part of 
                                                
74 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 15 April 1994, 1869 UNTS 299; 33 
ILM 1197 art 3 (entered into force 1 January 1996) (hereinafter “TRIPS”). 
75 Ibid, art 1. 
76 Ibid, art 2. 
77 Ibid, art 3; See Appendix 3.  
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Berne.85 Most importantly, in terms of this discussion, in TRIPS, National Treatment is 
not the stand-alone provision for non-discrimination.86 The “most-favoured nation” 
principle is a central principle of the WTO agreements, found in the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) 
as well.87 TRIPS is therefore one part of a larger trade agreement establishing the WTO 
as it stands today and, in this context, TRIPS unites its members towards a common goal 
of developing and harmonizing intellectual property law and enforcement.  
Article 3(1) of the TRIPS Agreement has a two-fold agenda: National Treatment and the 
obligation to protect intellectual property.88 Article 3(1) mandates that all foreign rights-
holders should be treated in a manner “no less favourable” than the domestic rights-
holders of that country. The provision prevents member states from adopting 
discriminatory measures for imported goods and eliminates any domestic barriers to trade 
among the members of the WTO community. The core interest is to successfully 
maintain a competitive multi-lateral trading system, which was made evident when the 
WTO refused to grant a transition period for member states to adopt Articles 3, 4 and 5 of 
TRIPS.89  
A striking difference can be noted between the National Treatment principle embodied in 
Berne and the one in TRIPS. Berne grants, without prejudice, equal treatment to domestic 
and foreign authors. TRIPS, however, mandates the treatment of foreign authors being 
“no less favourable than” domestic authors.  
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Can it be said then that TRIPS focuses on the rights of foreign authors entirely, while 
leaving the rights of domestic authors up to the individual national legislators? Or is the 
TRIPS provision aimed at broadening the scope of National Treatment beyond what 
Berne intends under Article 5? In practice, the difference in these provisions will not 
affect the rights of foreign authors unless the domestic authors’ rights have been changed 
in the national legislation. There may also be situations where the rights of only domestic 
authors are affected, resulting in a scenario where foreign authors are granted certain 
rights that domestic authors may not be granted. In such a case, neither the domestic 
author nor the foreign author would find that the member state was in violation of either 
Berne or TRIPS.  
Another core differentiation between Berne and TRIPS is the lack of flexibility that 
TRIPS offers to member states. Berne requires member states to adopt certain minimum 
standards of protection, but leaves it up to the concerned Union members to decide how 
to implement or enforce them. As described above, Berne has been amended multiple 
times since it was first signed into force while members of the WTO have struggled, and 
failed, to introduce any amendments to TRIPS over the last two decades – which 
probably reflects the flexibility of the former and rigidity of the latter.  
3.5.3 WIPO Copyright Treaties, 199690  
TRIPS notably failed to address the “digital agenda” which has proven, in the eyes of 
some, at least, to be a major drawback as it has been said to ignore the rising potential of 
the Internet as a hotbed of copyright infringement.91 As mentioned above, further 
changes to TRIPS have proven elusive.  Those seeking such changes focused their 
attention back on the public international law environment of WIPO. The result was the 
WIPO Treaties of 1996, which were adopted to add additional protection in copyright for 
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activities affected by advancements in technology not covered by TRIPS. To this end, one 
of the WIPO Treaties, the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) gave the status of “literary 
works” to computer programs,92 afforded protection to databases,93 gave authors rental 
and distribution rights,94 and contained provisions against circumvention of technological 
protection measures and modification of rights management information.95 The other of 
the WIPO Copyright Treaties, the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT) 
granted performers and producers of phonograms rights additional to those contained in 
the Rome Convention, and included provisions similar to Articles 11 and 12 of the 
WCT.96 
Both WIPO Treaties refer to the National Treatment principle directly, much like the 
conventions before them. Article 1 of the WCT seeks to adopt the Berne Convention’s 
established principles by stating that “nothing in this Treaty shall derogate from existing 
obligations that Contracting Parties have to each other under the Berne Convention for 
the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works.” It further commits to the National 
Treatment principle in Article 3 by recognizing and encouraging the implementation of 
Articles 2 to 5 of the Berne Convention with respect to protection provided for 
copyrighted works. The scope of national principle under this Treaty can therefore be 
directly connected to that in the Berne Convention. Articles 3 and 4 of the WPPT, the 
other of the WIPO Treaties, refers to the National Treatment principle as the obligation of 
a contracting party to provide to nationals of other contracting parties the same 
“treatment it accords to its own nationals with regard to the exclusive rights specifically 
granted in this Treaty, and to the right to equitable remuneration provided for in Article 
15...”, and refers to the definition of national principle in Article 3(2). The Article limits 
the principle to only performers or producers of phonograms who would meet the criteria 
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of eligibility as under the Rome Convention. In this respect, the WPPT also calls forward 
principles already enshrined in the Rome Convention, which in turn refers to the same 
principles noted in the Berne Convention.  
3.6 National Treatment as a Private International Law 
Rule in Copyright 
The question of whether the principle of National Treatment is to be interpreted as a 
definitive international norm or as a choice-of-law rule has troubled legal luminaries 
since its introduction in the Berne Convention. The National Treatment rule and Berne’s 
subsequently adopted requirement that no formalities be a necessary part of copyright 
protection implicate the rule of territoriality: they do so in a complementary fashion. 
National Treatment under Article 5(1) ensures that foreign authors are not discriminated 
against when they seek remedies in another country, while the “informality” provision 
under Article 5(2) ensures that there are no administrative hurdles in implementing 
National Treatment effectively. 
At the time of drafting the Berne Convention in 1883, National Treatment was a simple 
and effective way of addressing the global angle to copyright authorship and ownership, 
without engaging in a tangled web of private international law rules.97 The National 
Treatment principle ensures that foreign copyright owners are on an equal footing with 
nationals of a member country, thus accepting, broadly speaking, the private international 
law rule of lex fori.98 Article 5 of the Berne Convention, however, refers to both the 
National Treatment principle99 and the country of origin of a work. If a court refers to the 
country of origin of a work, the lex loci or lex originis principle comes into the picture. 
Therefore, both these principles must be assessed. Moreover, private international law 
rules in intellectual property have expanded to adopt the rule of lex loci protectionis or 
the law of the country where protection is claimed. To determine whether the National 
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Treatment principle should be read differently from these rules or whether the principle 
encompasses these rules is the objective of the literature reviewed in this part of the 
chapter.  
3.6.1 National Treatment and Reciprocity 
The principle of National Treatment can be limited by the rule of reciprocity.100 Scholars 
in the area have noted that the principle of non-discrimination embodied in National 
Treatment is to be applied without the condition of reciprocity, making it a fundamental 
principle of international copyright law instead of setting up parallel systems where states 
offer each other’s authors some mutual protections.101 When the relationship between 
two countries is based on reciprocity, one state grants certain rights or favours to the 
other in exchange for rights or favours from the other state. The principle of National 
Treatment would not require reciprocity, as it is an international copyright norm 
enshrined in a convention. However, exceptions to National Treatment by way of 
reciprocity between states was allowed under the Berne Convention, to preserve the 
sovereign powers of member states to enter into bilateral and multilateral trade 
agreements.102 Further, it must be noted that Article 5(1) of Berne in no way signifies 
that National Treatment requires the enjoyment of all national rights by a foreigner 
without limitation. National Treatment remains conditional and the extent to which it 
applies to an author can vary if the states in question have undertaken bilateral treaties or 
signed onto any regional instruments. 
Another benefit to the adoption of the National Treatment principle was that the courts of 
member countries to the Berne Union were now united, by the domestic legislations in 
their respective jurisdictions, in a common approach to cross-border infringement issues. 
Courts are skilled at applying their own domestic law – it is the law with which they are 
                                                
100 Stewart, supra note 13 at 3.20. 
101 Paul Goldstein, International Copyright Principles, Law and Practice (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2001) at 72 (“National Treatment provides for the complete assimilation of foreigners to nationals, 
without condition of reciprocity”); Stewart, supra note 13 at 3.20. 
102 Explored in the analysis of National Treatment under the TRIPS Agreement. 
  
61 
intrinsically familiar -- which National Treatment recognizes. For this reason, the 
principle has been praised for its administrative convenience, since its application in 
domestic copyright law allows a member country and its courts to apply its own laws to 
foreign authors claiming remedies in these domestic courts.103  
Private international law addresses issues that arise in disputes with a “foreign element” 
where there is conflict in the application of the laws of two or more legal systems.104 The 
question of whether or not a court has the jurisdiction to apply its domestic law in a 
dispute reflects the territorial nature of legal systems.  
3.6.2 Exploring the Private International Law Rule Embedded in 
the National Treatment Principle 
The Berne Convention under Article 5(3) clearly specifies the domestic law that governs 
protection of a copyrighted work in the country of origin of the work. However, the same 
degree of clarity is not seen in Article 5(1) providing for National Treatment.  
Scholars have argued that a defining feature of Berne is that it does not tell member states 
which law is to be applied for the purpose of resolving a copyright dispute. Others have 
promoted the view that the National Treatment principle is a conflict rule.  The foremost 
advocate for the use of the National Treatment principle as a private international law 
rule is Melville Nimmer.105 Nimmer relies on the Berne Convention and the Universal 
Copyright Convention106 to assert that “an author who is a national of one of the member 
states of either Berne or the U.C.C., or one who first publishes his work in any such 
member state, is entitled to the same copyright protection in each other member state as 
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such other state accords to its own nationals.”107 Nimmer believes that the extension of 
the National Treatment principle has ensured that private international law issues “have 
rarely proved troublesome in the law of copyright”.108 To quote the specific rule in the 
National Treatment principle: “the applicable law is the copyright law of the state in 
which the infringement occurred, not that of the state of which the author is a national, or 
in which the work is first published.”109 Nimmer asserts that the codification of National 
Treatment in copyright treaties indicates a territorial private international law provision, 
which implies that the law applicable to copyright infringement is the law of the country 
in which the infringing activity occurred.110 Nimmer therefore advocates a lex fori 
approach to the principle of National Treatment.   
Upon the first reading of Article 5(1) of the Berne Convention, Nimmer’s interpretation 
might seem obvious. Nimmer himself approaches this question about the principle with 
the same apparent attitude of its obviousness and provides no actual explanation about his  
interpretation. Paul Edward Geller, on the other hand, examines the principle more 
closely.111 Geller connects the treaty principles that have been established in Berne with 
the current trend of conflict rules that courts have established.112 He uses an example: if 
it is assumed that a work qualifies for protection under the Berne Convention, the work 
either has an author who is a national of a signatory country to the Convention, or the 
work satisfies some criteria of eligibility such as registration or first publication in a 
signatory country. Under the principle of National Treatment, any signatory country (the 
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protecting country, here) must treat the copyright claims of the foreign author as if he 
were one of its own nationals.113 Simply put, domestic law or lex fori would govern the 
copyright claims for infringement occurring in that country. The principle of National 
Treatment therefore “constrains the choice of copyright laws applicable to these 
claims.”114 A private international law rule performs the same function – it determines 
which law is applicable to a given dispute, whether domestic or foreign. By assuring that 
national and foreign authors are treated equally, the court applies the lex fori, which is 
both the law of the forum and the law of the protecting country because copyright laws 
are territorial in nature.  
Geller also analyzes whether, by removing the principle of National Treatment from the 
context of the Berne or TRIPS regimes, the treaties would still effect the application of 
lex fori.115 He asserts, however, that looking at copyright law only from this second angle 
misses the overall objective of National Treatment entirely – National Treatment will 
always remain a core part of copyright law, both international and domestic,116 because it 
compels states and courts of signatory countries to claim not just the rights available to 
them under domestic copyright law but also the exceptions and limitations. Thus, to 
quote Geller: “the reliability of the Berne/TRIPs regime, as well as the global balance 
that it maintains between copyright laws, precludes picking and choosing more or less 
favourable national laws on this or that issue or in this or that case.” National Treatment 
thereby also prevents parties from approaching a forum in a country with lower 
protection standards (although still complying with minimum standards) and seeking the 
application of copyright laws of a country with higher protections.117 If such an option 
were available to foreign authors, they would seek the court to apply the laws most 
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beneficial to them, which generally translates to the place that would guarantee the 
highest compensation. 
Geller reads into the objectives of the Berne Convention to further support his 
position.118 The Berne regime aims at enhancing international standards for protection 
and exploitation of copyright works and providing a base for national laws to build 
upon.119 National Treatment’s role in this objective is to provide a mechanism to address 
the difficulties that various national policies of the signatory countries have.120 National 
Treatment therefore “assures stability among decisions in that it requires the law of any 
one protecting country to apply to domestic and foreign authors’ claims alike, subject to 
the same defenses.”121 The national copyright law of each country will govern 
infringements taking place in that country. The National Treatment principle, along with 
minimum rights, therefore “tend to make results more uniform among countries, thus 
mooting conflicts of laws.”122 Application of private international law rules to copyright 
infringement disputes only serves to complicate a relative simple principle: the applicable 
law for infringement of copyright is that of the protecting country.  
Stephen M. Stewart also agrees with Nimmer’s assessment of National Treatment and 
adds to the discussion.123 He begins his analysis by separating the two possible 
interpretations that he identifies private international law can provide for copyright 
disputes: lex fori or lex originis (he refers to this as lex loci as well).124 Under lex fori, the 
National Treatment principle would be evoked, thereby applying the law of the state 
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where the author seeks protection.125 Under lex originis, the nationality of the author 
becomes relevant as the work is treated as “acquiring” a nationality as well.126 The 
advantage of applying lex originis is that the work will be treated the same way in all 
countries signatory to the Berne Convention, irrespective of which forum is approached 
by the author.127 The clear disadvantage to this, however, is that courts will have to 
consistently seek application of the law of the place of origin, requiring expertise in the 
various national copyright laws and the interpretation of those laws in their respective 
local courts. For the lex fori principle, courts will apply the law they know best: their 
own, with the disadvantage being that the same work will get different degrees of 
protection in different countries.128 However, since the adoption of the Berne Convention 
requires that signatory countries also adopt certain minimum standards of protection, 
these minimum rights will be guaranteed to all authors irrespective of nationality. The 
extension of minimum rights to this discussion, Stewart asserts, is essential to National 
Treatment as, without the minimum rights, National Treatment would produce a serious 
imbalance among the signatory states.129  
Stewart therefore considers the National Treatment principle a viable private international 
law rule that tells courts the law of the forum must be applied. To quote: “The general 
application of the principle of National Treatment is international copyright means that 
the major problem arising in almost all other areas of private international law: ‘which 
law is a court to apply in a situation with foreign elements?’ hardly ever arises in 
copyright law.”130 Any rights owner who is a national of a signatory country to the Berne 
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Convention would therefore be entitled in every other signatory state to the same 
protection as the nationals of that state.  
James Fawcett and Paul Torremans agree with the analysis of Nimmer and Stewart, but 
disagree on the point that the National Treatment principle implicates the rule of lex 
fori.131 They state that all the provisions of Berne must be interpreted as adhering to the 
rule of territoriality that is enshrined in National Treatment, which states that the law of 
the protecting country is the applicable law to a copyright dispute.132 They characterize 
National Treatment as specifically being lex loci protectionis, a special rule meant for 
intellectual property disputes, thereby excluding lex fori and lex originis.133  
Among more recent literature, Sierd J. Schaafsma is of the opinion that the view that 
disregarding National Treatment as a private international law rule symbolizes a failure in 
understanding how private international laws came to be codified in international and 
national instruments.134 He argues that private international law rules evolved from 
statutes, which created certain boundaries for the application of a law. These statutes 
would elaborate on how a specific law would apply to those people within the boundaries 
of the country. When a question is eventually raised about a foreigner claiming protection 
under that law, there would be no law to protect him, for the law would only be 
applicable to nationals of that country. The legal vacuum that was created required a rule 
or principle to either extend the law to protect the foreigner or deny him protection.135 
The principle of National Treatment states that the foreigner should be treated in the same 
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way that the national author would be treated. If the foreigner appears before a court in 
that country, the court would have to decide whether or not to apply the domestic 
copyright law.136 If the foreigner seeks remedies that come within the ambit of those 
which the domestic author would receive, the court would be bound to grant the same 
rights and remedies to the foreigner as well. There is, however, no requirement upon the 
court to grant rights and remedies that the national author would not receive under the 
domestic law. Schaafsma therefore promotes a connection between the principle of 
National Treatment in the Berne Convention and the private international law rule of lex 
loci protectionis.  
Graeme B. Dinwoodie also believes that the National Treatment principle, as contained in 
the text of the Berne Convention, refers to a private international law rule.137 He states 
that while Article 5(1) upon bare reading does not signify any such rule, Article 5(2) does 
contain a private international law rule. A convincing argument from this position can be 
made that the principle of National Treatment is, in itself, not a complete private 
international law rule since it does not address which law is the applicable one in the case 
of a dispute.138 To Dinwoodie, the language of the Article 5(2) resembles a private 
international law rule, asserting that “it provides that the extent of protection, as well as 
the means of redress afforded to the author to protect his rights, shall be governed 
exclusively by the laws of the country where protection is claimed.”139 This provision 
therefore subscribes to the lex loci protectionis rule. However, Dinwoodie does not 
entirely rule out the possibility of a private international law rule in the National 
Treatment principle. He does not provide reasoning for this (other than citing Fawcett and 
Torremans), but does agree that “if the general principle of national treatment did impose 
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a particular choice-of-law rule, this could be of broad significance.”140 Since the National 
Treatment principle was affirmed in the TRIPS Agreement as well, the objective of the 
provision may be to restrict the private international law rules that domestic forums apply 
to copyright disputes.141 Dinwoodie acknowledges this, but does not accept it entirely.  
3.6.3 Against the Application of National Treatment as a Private 
International Law Rule 
Sam Ricketson and Jane Ginsburg view the National Treatment principle solely as an 
international norm that designates how foreign rights holders are to be treated before 
domestic forums.142 To quote: “the principle of national treatment is really not a conflicts 
rule at all; it does not direct application of the law of any country. It simply requires that 
the country in which protection is claimed must treat foreign and domestic authors 
alike.”143 Ricketson and Ginsburg assert that the minimum standards in the Berne 
Convention do not directly address or affect questions of private international law as both 
National Treatment and minimum rights only affirm the principle of territoriality as a 
substantive aspect of copyright law.144 That National Treatment and minimum rights are 
both important international copyright norms is not contested; but National Treatment 
specifically does not constitute a private international law rule. To justify this, Ricketson 
and Ginsburg state that the Berne Convention provides that the law of the country where 
the protection is claimed will define “the rights that are protected, the scope of protection, 
and the available remedies” and therefore the Convention does not provide a choice-of-
law rule for determining authorship.145 They therefore argue that the National Treatment 
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principle is merely a tool for foreigners to use, and does not embody the principle of 
territoriality.  
The views of Ginsburg and Ricketson, however, do not consider the fact that, apart from 
the treaty regime governing copyright law, there is no other mechanism for interpreting 
choice-of-law rules in a uniform way. Under the Berne Convention, any foreign author 
would enjoy the same rights as a national would under domestic law. This means they 
will be entitled to minimum rights under the domestic law, should they choose to seek 
remedies in a local forum. This forms the basis of a time-tested conflict rule used in tort 
law, that is, the forum will apply the law of the place of the infringing acts.  
Mireille van Eechoud has a similar approach to that of Ricketson and Ginsburg on the 
question of the relationship between the principle of National Treatment and private 
international law rules.146 While she agrees with Goldstein and Stewart’s understanding 
of National Treatment as a rule that requires a country to apply the same law to works of 
foreign origin as it does to its nationals, she notes that this would not make National 
Treatment a private international law rule.147 Instead, she sees National Treatment as “a 
mere non-discrimination rule, belonging to the law of aliens, not choice of law.”148 She 
credits this to the birth of the Berne Convention, as the Convention was drafted at a time 
when private international law was not a direct concern for drafters.149 The problem with 
this assessment is that it ignores the international climate surrounding the drafting of the 
Berne Convention: the need to codify certain principles that would ensure that authorship 
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and authors’ rights were globally recognized and uniformly adopted.150 The Berne 
Convention exists purely due to this vacuum that states noted in the 19th century and 
discrediting the influence of National Treatment on the Berne Convention drafters does 
disservice to a core international copyright norm.  
It is also noted that other authors do not have a definite stance on the question of whether 
the principle of National Treatment is a private international law rule or merely a 
copyright norm. Richard Fentiman argues that, on close inspection, the principle of 
National Treatment has no impact on choice-of-law at all.151 He notes that the function of 
National Treatment is to determine the “scope of domestic law of copyright and related 
rights of the protecting country, however that country may be located in choice-of-law 
terms.”152 He goes on to say that the principle of National Treatment limits the scope of 
domestic law by “ensuring that the law of the protecting country applies as much to 
foreign right-holders as to nationals, implicitly excluding a role for lex originis.”153 He 
uses an example to highlight this point: if a copyright owner from country X approaches 
a forum in country Y for infringement occurring within the borders of that country, the 
national copyright law of country Y would apply to the dispute and not country X, from 
where either the work originated or where the copyright owner is a national.  
However, Fentiman also expresses doubt as to whether the principle of National 
Treatment is entirely ambivalent as to matters of private international law. Although 
National Treatment advocates the application of lex fori and excludes the use of lex 
originis, it does not elaborate on the application of lex loci delicti.154 Further, since the 
Berne Convention does not expressly state that National Treatment is a private 
international law rule, national laws have incorporated the principle without reference to 
                                                
150 Berne Convention, supra note 106, preamble. 
151 Richard Fentiman, “Choice of Law and Intellectual Property” in IIC Studies in Industrial Property and 
Copyright Law (Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2005) at 13. 
152 Ibid. 
153 Ibid. 
154 Ibid. 
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the private international law angle.155 Therefore, Fentiman recognizes the National 
Treatment principle as being negative in nature – it explicitly refutes the application of 
lex originis but does not elaborate on the application of any other specific rule. He does, 
however, acknowledge that the lex fori rule would be the most appropriate one.156 In 
doing so, he rejects the idea that lex loci protectionis would apply because the territorial 
character of copyright requires that the forum that is approached would apply the law that 
it knows best: lex fori.  
3.6.4 Resolving the Debate about National Treatment as a Private 
International Law Rule  
An analysis of the prevalent literature earlier in the chapter points towards the conclusion 
that the National Treatment principle is an example of the lex fori principle enshrined in 
an international public law convention and thus in the domestic legislation of every 
signatory. A bare reading of Article 5(1) of the Berne Convention shows that: 
(1) Authors shall enjoy rights granted by this Convention,  
(2) Authors shall enjoy these rights in respect of works which are protected by this 
Convention,  
(3) In consideration of countries other than the country of origin of the work,  
(4) The same rights in a country as the nationals of that country would enjoy.  
(5) “Countries” here referring to signatory countries of the Convention.  
Considering the three private international law rules discussed earlier – lex fori, lex 
originis and lex loci protectionis – the text of the Berne Convention clearly points to lex 
fori. As noted earlier, the lex loci protectionis principle is enshrined in Article 5(2), 
which states that copyright protection “shall be governed exclusively by the laws of the 
country where protection is claimed.” Lex originis is specifically excluded from Article 
5(1) in its text, but is embodied in Article 5(3) instead, stating “protection in the country 
of origin is governed by domestic law.” Article 5(1), however, points to the law of the 
                                                
155 Ibid at 135. 
156 Ibid at 146. 
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forum as the applicable law in a copyright dispute. As copyright laws are governed by 
national statutes and are required to abide by Article 5, these statutes have incorporated 
the principle of National Treatment and the private international law rules that it contains 
as well. Therefore, in deciding which law to apply to cross-border copyright disputes, 
domestic courts need not look beyond their own national legislation enshrining Article 
5(1) of the Berne Convention.  
3.7 Conclusion  
This chapter began with the intent of mapping out the evolution of copyright law, both 
national and international, describing how the principle of National Treatment was 
developed, and analyzing how the major copyright treaties have dealt with the principle. 
Further, the chapter aimed at reviewing relevant literature to determine whether the 
principle of National Treatment can be considered to embody a private international law 
rule.  
The chapter therefore provided an overview of the development of national copyright 
laws in England, the United States and France, proving that the concept of territoriality is 
elemental to copyright law. As copyright law evolved from national concepts of 
authorship and protection, the conversation before the 19th century in each of these 
countries was limited to how the national laws interpreted authors’ rights. For that matter, 
authors’ rights did not even develop in jurisdictions such as England until the 1800s, 
while in France an author’s work was considered an extension of his personality. The 
conversation about copyright in the U.S. during its early history as a nation was not 
stagnant, but American copyright failed to develop through the kind of trade interactions 
that pushed European countries into accepting that authorship may be a global right, 
therefore paving the way for bi-lateral treaties.  
As bi-lateral treaties in copyright law developed, the conversation in the late 19th century 
moved into the multilateral space as authors began to face unique challenges with respect 
to how their works were treated in other jurisdictions. As noted in the chapter, countries 
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began to include in their bilateral agreements provisions that each country would grant 
the same protection to citizens of the other country as it granted to its own citizens.157 
The recognition that authorship was a global right gave impetus to the first multilateral 
intellectual property treaty (Berne), and eventually all the other major copyright treaties.  
The major copyright treaties, and in particular the Berne Convention under Article 5(1), 
developed around the principle of National Treatment, which protects the economic and 
moral rights of authors in all signatory countries irrespective of their nationalities. This 
definition was prescribed in Berne, and over time, the Rome Convention, TRIPS and the 
WIPO Copyright Treaties built upon this principle by adding further minimum rights, 
enforcement mechanisms, and adapting the concept to new media such as the Internet. 
National Treatment is therefore the core copyright norm that governs the major copyright 
treaties and forms an essential part of national copyright statutes as well.  
Finally, the chapter considered the question of the relationship, if any, between private 
international law rule and the National Treatment principle. While older literature looks 
at the National Treatment principle as the private international law rule of lex fori, more 
recent works have either denounced this entirely or attempted to add other private 
international law rules to the discussion, such as lex loci protectionis or even lex loci 
delicti. Those who advocate the lex loci principle have relied largely on the historical 
circumstances that influenced the Berne Convention and focused on interpreting the text 
of Article 5(1) as it stands. This assessment is necessary; the major concern of drafters at 
the time was to develop a codified set of provisions for copyright law that protected all 
authors irrespective of their nationality. However, the drafters did seem to acknowledge 
that this could only be done if signatory countries committed to applying their national 
laws to foreign authors as they would to their nationals. Article 5(1) therefore instructs 
domestic forums to (1) take jurisdiction of copyright disputes where infringement occurs 
within their jurisdiction, and (2) apply the law of the forum to such instances of 
infringement, without prejudice. The text of the Convention and the literature therefore 
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both point towards the incorporation of the lex fori rule into the principle of National 
Treatment.  
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4.5 Analyzing the Pre-Internet Cases 
4.6 Conclusion 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes case law in three jurisdictions – the United Kingdom, France and 
the United States. As discussed in Chapter 3, the development of copyright law in these 
three countries is key to understanding the effect and implications of the principle of 
National Treatment as the first instances of copyright legislation evolved from these 
countries. The cases in this chapter reflect the pre-Internet context of copyright 
infringement cases in the sense that it contains the cases of cross-border copyright 
infringement reported in these jurisdictions that answered infringement with principles of 
private international law. It is key to note that no such cases were discovered before 1953 
and, with the exception of the 1953 case, all have occurred since 1986.  As described 
immediate below, the 1953 case cannot form any part of the core of this analysis because 
it involved a non-Berne party and therefore the principle of National Treatment was not 
available to the courts involved. It is thus key to note these cases all contain facts that 
concern cross-border copyright infringement without the involvement of the Internet.  
The findings in each case will reflect three core questions, which are:  
(1) Whether the domestic court took jurisdiction of the case, 
(2) Whether the court applied domestic or foreign law, and 
(3) Whether the court uses a private international law rule or refers to the principle of 
National Treatment, or both, when deciding the applicable law.  
This chapter will conclude by consolidating the findings and assessing the general private 
international law rules that were developed in these cases.  
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4.1.1 Societe Le Chant du Monde v. Societe Fox Europe and 
Societe Fox Americaine Twentieth Century1 (France, 1953)  
In this case, the plaintiffs were four Russian music composers. The key to understanding 
and analysing this case in the context of this thesis is to remember that, in 1953, Russia 
was not a Berne country. Russia joined Berne in March, 1995. The defendants, on the 
other hand, were French production studios who used the plaintiffs’ musical 
compositions in an anti-communist film created and distributed in France called ‘Le 
Rideau de Fer’.2 Under Russian copyright law at the time, musical compositions were 
not protected and such works were part of the public domain.3 The plaintiffs were not 
compensated monetarily but were credited in the film as being the original composers. 
The plaintiffs therefore sued for infringement of their moral rights as composers of the 
musical work because they were Communists and the film had an anti-Communist 
agenda.4  
The dispute proceeded through two levels of the French courts.  
4.1.1.1 Paris Court of First Instance5 
The issues before the lower court were two-fold: whether the French court could take 
jurisdiction in the case and whether the French law regarding moral rights should be 
applied to the dispute.6 The lower court took jurisdiction of the dispute on the ground that 
the plaintiffs approached the forum for an alleged act of infringement occurring in France 
and the parties therefore should be heard. On the question of moral rights, the lower court 
found that Russian law would apply. The lower court therefore held that since Russian 
                                                
1 (1960) 28 R.I.D.A. 120; Cour d'appel, Paris, Jan. 13, 1953, D.A. 1954, 16, 80. 
2 Ibid. at 121. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Note that an English-translated copy of this judgment is unavailable. However, the judgment at the Court 
of Appeal level discusses the lower court’s decision. 
6 Societe Le Chant du Monde v. Societe Fox Europe and Societe Fox Americaine Twentieth Century, supra 
note 68 at 121. 
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law did not recognize musical works as protected under copyright law, no rights of the 
plaintiffs were violated, thereby rejecting their claim. As per the plaintiffs’ complaint, 
French police seized all copies of the film running in French theatres. The private 
international law rule applied by the Court was therefore lex originis.  
4.1.1.2 Paris Cours d’appeal  
On appeal, the Court of Appeal considered the same questions as the lower court had: 
whether the lower court aptly took jurisdiction of the case and whether French law would 
apply to resolve the issue of moral rights.7 The Court affirmed that French courts would 
have jurisdiction over disputes where the alleged infringement occurred in France.8 It 
held that that the plaintiffs were entitled to sue in France for copyright infringement since 
a Russian rights holder would receive the same protection in France as a Frenchman.9 
This meant that they had the right to appear before a French Court for claims of copyright 
infringement.  
On the question of applicable law, the Court reversed the decision of the lower court.10 It 
held that since the Russian plaintiffs were to be treated as if they were Frenchmen, they 
would be entitled to the same protections under French law that any other Frenchman 
received.11 This would mean that while a Russian right holder would be entitled to 
remedies as laid out under French law and not under Russian law. Therefore, even though 
the musical compositions had entered the public domain in Russia, this fact was 
irrelevant, as Russian law would not influence the application of French law for 
infringement occurring within France. Lastly, the Court also noted that French courts 
could only refrain from extending this right to the Russian plaintiffs if the French 
                                                
7 Ibid at 122. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid at 122, 123. 
10 Ibid at 123. 
11 Ibid. 
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copyright code “explicitly excluded them from protection”, and it did not.12 The Court of 
Appeals therefore applied French law on moral rights, holding that the right of integrity 
in his or her work should allow the creator to prevent the use of the work in a manner that 
would change the meaning of the work or harm the creator’s reputation – in this case, the 
use of the work “implied that the plaintiffs were disloyal to their government.”13 The 
Court granted an injunction preventing the defendant from further use of the plaintiffs’ 
musical works in the film.  
The question before the Court therefore was whether it could apply the law of the country 
of origin (Russian law) to this instance, while applying the law of the forum (French law) 
to only enforcement of the rights that are granted by the country of origin.14 Because 
Russia was not a member of Berne, the Court of Appeal, applied lex fori. The fact that 
Russia was not a signatory to the Berne Convention in 1953 differentiates this case from 
all the others in this chapter. 
4.2 The United Kingdom 
4.2.1 Deff Lep Music and others v Stuart-Brown and others15 
(1986) 
In this case, the plaintiffs were members of the English rock group Def Leppard and their 
associates, claiming that a tape recording of their musical works was copied and 
distributed by the defendants in Luxembourg and Holland.16 One of the defendants 
                                                
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid.; See Francesca Garson, “Before that Artist Came Along, It was Just a Bridge: The Visual Artists 
Rights Act and the Removal of Site-Specific Artwork” (2001) 11 Cornell J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 203 at 212; 
Sarah C. Anderson, “Decontextualization of Musical Works: Should the Doctrine of Moral Rights be 
Extended?”(2006) 16 Fordham Intell Prop Media & Ent LJ 869 at 873. 
14 See James Fawcett, Janeen Carruthers, Cheshire, North and Fawcett on Private International Law, 14th 
ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2008) at 706; See William Strauss, “The Moral Right of the Author” 
(1955) 4:4 Am J of Comp L 506 at 534. 
15 [1986] R.P.C. 273 (Ch.) (U.K.) 
16 Ibid at 273. 
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imported unauthorized copies of the recordings to the United Kingdom from the other 
defendants and subsequently sold them in the U.K. The other defendants who conducted 
their infringing activities outside the U.K. argued “acts done by them outside the U.K. 
could not constitute breaches of the U.K. copyright in the tape recording”.17 The 
plaintiffs, however, argued that the acts are actionable in the U.K. since “since the 
manufacture and sale of the records, if done in England, would have constituted 
infringements of U.K. copyright and under the laws of Luxembourg and Holland such 
manufacture and sale constituted legal wrongs.”18.  
The question brought before the High Court of Justice (Chancery Division) was regarding 
an application by those defendants conducting their activities outside the U.K. The 
questions before the Court were:  
(1) To determine whether the defendants or which defendants could be brought under 
the jurisdiction of the Court, and  
(2) Whether U.K. copyright law would apply to those defendants who conducted the 
infringing activities outside the U.K.19  
With regards to jurisdiction, the plaintiff claimed that the defendants who committed acts 
of infringement outside the U.K. should be brought before this Court because copyright 
infringement is actionable in the same manner as a tort under common law.20 The Court 
did not accept this reasoning, holding that among all the defendants, only those claims of 
infringement of copyright by acts performed in England are justiciable.21 Specifically, the 
Court noted: 
It is clear that copyright under the English Act is strictly defined in 
                                                
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid at 273, 274. 
19 Decided by a single-judge bench constituted by Sir Nicholas Browne-Wilkinson VC. 
20 Ibid at 276. 
21 Ibid at 275. 
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terms of territory. The intangible right which is copyright is merely 
a right to do certain acts exclusively in the United Kingdom: only 
acts done in the United Kingdom constitute infringement either 
direct or indirect of such right.22 
And, 
If under English law the plaintiffs right is to complain of acts done 
in England alone (the place of the doing of the act being of the very 
essence of the claim) it could not be right for the judge to proceed 
on the footing that acts in fact done abroad were done in the United 
Kingdom. In other words, although for the purpose of establishing 
what is the appropriate law the acts may have to be deemed to have 
been done in England, on the trial of the substantive case the court 
must be bound to have regard to the actual facts not to any deemed 
facts.23 
 
Hence, the Court held that due to the territorial nature of copyright law, the court only has 
jurisdiction over the dispute in relation to acts of infringement occurring within the 
U.K.24 Further, any claim against the defendants who did not conduct activities in the 
U.K. based on breach of the plaintiffs’ U.K. copyright is bound to fail.25 Further, the 
Court noted that copyright law confers statutory rights to parties and is not a common law 
tort.26 Therefore, no common law rule based on tort can grant a party rights under a 
statutory provision.  
                                                
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid at 276. 
24 Ibid at 275. 
25 Ibid at 277 (Browne-Wilkinson VC refers to Dicey’s text on private international law to make this 
assertion). 
26 Ibid at 275. 
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Once the question of jurisdiction was answered, the Court found that the applicable law 
would therefore be the U.K. Copyright Act, but would only apply to those defendants that 
committed infringing acts in the U.K.27 However, as the application before it did not 
include these defendants, the Court did not elaborate further on the issue. The Court 
dismissed the case as against the defendants from outside the U.K.  
The High Court in this case had the question of jurisdiction before it and answered the 
same by abiding by the territoriality principle that forms the basis of copyright law. The 
Court did not make any references to the principle of National Treatment, but the express 
references to territoriality signify the intention of the Court to commit to the same. More 
importantly, the Court refused to accept that common law principles of tort may be 
applied to copyright disputes. As noted in Chapter 3, some cases in the United States 
have interpreted common law principles of tort in the case of  copyright issues, 
developing the rule of lex loci delicti for application in copyright disputes. The Court in 
this case found that tort law could not be extended to develop private international law 
rules that will dictate the application of copyright laws. The Court therefore 
acknowledged in addressing issues of jurisdiction and applicable law in copyright 
disputes, it need not look beyond the territoriality principle (which, in this analysis, 
would include National Treatment).28 
4.2.2 Lucasfilm Limited and others v Ainsworth and another29 
(2011) 
In this case, the plaintiffs were American production studios, collectively referred to as 
“LucasFilm”, which produced the Star Wars franchise and created the character and 
designs of “Imperial Stormtroopers”.30 The defendant, a British national, had been hired 
by the plaintiffs to design helmets as part of the costume for the character, based on a 
                                                
27 Ibid at 276. 
28 See Chapter 3. 
29 [2011] UKSC 39; [2012] 1 AC 208. 
30 Lucasfilm Limited & others v Ainsworth & another [2008] EWHC 1878 (Ch) at para 1. 
  
83 
model created earlier by the plaintiffs.31 The defendant retained the model and produced 
copies of the helmets and sold the same in the U.K.32 The plaintiffs’ production houses 
claimed copyright in the model provided to the defendant Ainsworth, and brought two 
separate suits for infringement against him: one before the District Court in California in 
the U.S. where the plaintiffs were granted monetary relief, and the other, this one, in the 
U.K. for establishing infringement and additionally the recognition and enforcement of 
the American decree.33 It is relevant to note that the defendant in this case had admitted 
infringement of U.S. copyright law, but did not submit himself to the jurisdiction of the 
American courts, refusing to appear before the District Court in California.  
The cases proceeded through three levels of court in the U.K. to the Supreme Court.  
4.2.2.1 England and Wales High Court (Chancery Division)34 
The plaintiffs approached the High Court on the issue of copyright infringement, 
claiming the following: 
(1) That the reproduction of the helmets constituted an act of copyright infringement 
under the U.K. Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, claiming that the helmet was 
a “sculpture”,35  
(2) That the U.K. Court should enforce the American monetary judgment.36  
(3) Should the American judgment not be enforced, American law should be applied 
to determine the rights of the plaintiffs in the U.K.37 
                                                
31 Ibid at para 2. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Lucasfilm, supra note 30 (decided by a single-judge bench constituted by Justice Mann). 
35 Supra note 30; See Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988 c. 48, section 4(1) (“"artistic work" means, 
(a) a graphic work, photograph, sculpture or collage, irrespective of artistic quality, (b) a work of 
architecture being a building or a model for a building, or (c) a work of artistic craftsmanship."); Ibid at 
para 8; See Lucasfilm Limited & ors v Ainsworth & anr  [2009] EWCA Civ 1328, [2010] Ch 503. 
36 Lucasfilm, supra note 30. 
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The defendant in turn argued that:  
(1) That “helmets” were not “sculptures” under the U.K. Copyright, Designs and 
Patents Act and manufacturing of the helmets did not did not take place in the 
U.K., and therefore, the suit was not maintainable before this Court.  
(2) That the defendant did not submit himself to the jurisdiction of the American 
court and therefore the foreign judgment could not be enforced in the U.K.  
(3) A counter-claim against the plaintiffs to enforce his own copyright in the helmet 
should be upheld.38   
The Court framed these two issues from the angles of jurisdiction and applicable law. 
The Court held that there was no reason to suggest that the defendant had submitted 
himself to the jurisdiction of the American court, and hence the monetary judgment 
would not be enforceable in the U.K. With respect to whether the American plaintiffs 
could approach the Court for relief, the Court held that it had the jurisdiction to preside 
over the dispute and that English courts in general could hear the claims of foreign 
plaintiffs.39 To quote Justice Mann: “I am therefore prepared to conclude that an English 
court can, and in an appropriate case should, determine at least questions of infringement 
of foreign copyright cases.”40 This holding was based on a similar private international 
law principle called the Moçambique rule, which applied to property or land situated 
outside the jurisdiction of a domestic forum.41 The Moçambique rule states: “An English 
court has no jurisdiction to entertain an action for the determination of the title to, or the 
                                                                                                                                            
 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid at para 88. 
 
40 Ibid at 266. 
41 See British South Africa Co v Companhia de Moçambique [1893] AC 602. 
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right to possession of, foreign land, or the recovery of damages for trespass to such land, 
was an example of a general principle which applied not only to foreign land.”42  
However, the Court held, a more flexible approach should be preferred in copyright 
cases.43 The difference between a question of title in property (as in the Moçambique 
case) and copyright in this specific case was that in this case, without the jurisdiction of 
an English court, the defendant could never be sued for his acts of infringement, 
especially since he did not even submit himself to the jurisdiction of the California 
court.44 Further, the Court found it more appropriate that the defendant be sued in the 
U.K. than in the U.S., and that the defendant cannot escape being sued entirely by 
claiming that the U.K. courts did not have jurisdiction and that the American judgment 
was not enforceable. The Court did not see why the defendant “should be able to assert 
that as a reason for not being sued here while at the same time saying that he cannot be 
effectively sued there.”45 The Court concluded its reasoning by stating: 
Logically this approach means that, at least so far as copyright is 
concerned, the whole of a foreign copyright claim, no matter how 
fundamental the points, might be capable of being litigated here. 
While I do not think I would shrink from that conclusion if it was 
necessary to reach it, I do not believe I have to go that far. What I 
need to consider is whether, in the light of my conclusions (which I 
reach) that infringement issues are certainly justiciable here in an 
appropriate case, and that at least other incidental issues are as 
                                                
42 Lucasfilm Limited & others v Ainsworth & another [2011] UKSC 39 at para 52. 
43 Lucasfilm, supra note 30 at para 270. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid at para 271. 
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well, the actual claims that are made can be brought here and, if so, 
whether they are made out.46 
The Court thereby found it had jurisdiction over the claims made by the American 
plaintiffs and suggested that the parties apply for trial again in the U.K. In addition, the 
Court also looked into the Brussels I Regulation, holding that it did not expressly bar 
English courts from exercising jurisdiction under the Brussels I Regulation for non-EU 
parties (unless the question before it concerned registration of validity of the intellectual 
property in dispute).47 This point, however, was not elaborated further.  
On the question of the American judgment, the Court held that since it was a summary 
judgment and the defendant did not submit himself to the California court,48 therefore, 
the American monetary decree could not be enforced in the U.K. After this declaration 
(as it was obiter), quite unusually, the Court then decided to consider whether it could 
apply American copyright law in this dispute.49 The Court held that American law could 
be applied in this case because the infringing acts occurred in the U.S. and the helmets in 
question were recognized as creative works under American copyright law.50 However, 
the Court did not speculate on the actual application of American law beyond this.  
Lastly, the Court considered the counter-claim of the defendant, holding that the helmets 
were not “sculptures” under U.K. copyright law, as they were created for a functional 
purpose and not for artistic purposes.51 As they did not fall under the category of “work” 
under the Act and there was no instance of “artistic craftsmanship”, no copyright 
subsisted over them and the plaintiffs could not make a claim for copyright infringement 
                                                
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid at paras 107 – 109. 
48 Ibid at paras 211, 212. 
49 Ibid at para 232. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, supra note 20, s. 4(1)(2)(b) (“’sculpture' includes a cast or model 
made for purposes of sculpture”); Ibid at 131 – 134, 141. 
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before this Court. However, the Court did hold that the defendant would have been 
contractually obligated to assign the copyright in the work to the plaintiff, but since no 
copyright subsisted in the helmets at all, this question was moot to the issue at hand.52   
4.2.2.2 High Court Court of Appeal (Civil)53 
The Court of Appeal considered on appeal the same questions before the High Court: 
(1) Whether the claims before the Court were justiciable, 
(2) Whether the Court should enforce American copyright law against the defendant, 
(3) Whether the works in question were “sculptures” under the U.K. Copyright, 
Designs and Patents Act,54  
(4) Whether the American monetary judgment could be enforced in the U.K. 
The Court of Appeal held that the claims could not be brought under the jurisdiction of 
the Court, reversing the lower court’s decision. Further, it disagreed with the lower court 
and held that American copyright law could not be enforced against the defendant. The 
Court of Appeal also held, like the lower court, that the American judgment could not be 
enforced in the U.K. Lastly, on the counter-claim, the Court upheld the decision of the 
lower court that the helmets were not “sculptures” under the Act and were therefore not 
entitled to copyright protection.  
For the first question, the Court examined leading authorities in English law, referring to 
private international law principles developed by various courts and scholars, and 
eventually holding that there is “no binding authority” that reflects the questions specific 
to intellectual property.55 The Court of Appeal hence agreed on the High Court’s finding 
that English courts did not have jurisdiction over such claims. The Court of Appeal found 
                                                
52 Lucasfilm, supra note 30 at para 181. 
53 Lucasfilm Limited & others v Ainsworth & another [2009] EWCA Civ 1328 (before Lords Justice Rix, 
Patten and Jacob, with Justice Jacob delivering the judgment). 
54 Ibid at para 16. 
55 Ibid at para 174. 
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that English courts may take jurisdiction of a copyright dispute in the following manner: 
(1) under in personam jurisdiction, or (2) under subject matter jurisdiction.56 Under in 
personam jurisdiction, an English court would ideally have jurisdiction over the present 
dispute.57 However, under this, an English court could not hear claims beyond its 
competency.58 Under subject matter jurisdiction, specifically bestowed upon English 
courts under Article 22 of the Brussels I Regulation, the scope of jurisdiction is much 
higher.59 However, since this case includes a non-EU party, the question of subject 
matter jurisdiction is moot.60 In personam jurisdiction in the U.K., the Court held, is to be 
determined under the ambit of the Mocambique principle, and would therefore be 
confined to only property disputes. The determining factor of justiciability as per the 
Moçambique rule was that is a matter is “local” to a foreign court, then English courts 
cannot take jurisdiction over those disputes.61 The Court of Appeal therefore extended 
this principle to claims of infringement for copyright disputes. The Court asserted that, 
“infringement of an IP right (especially copyright) is essentially a local matter involving 
local policies and local public interest. It is a matter for local judges.”62 
While discussing jurisdiction, the Court of Appeal also analyzed Article 5 of the Berne 
Convention that contains the principle of National Treatment. It held that while Article 5 
does state that copyright disputes “shall be governed exclusively by the laws of the 
country where protection is claimed”, this principle is not clear enough to determine 
which law to apply. The Court found that “Berne is neutral as to questions of jurisdiction 
over foreign infringements of copyrights”63 and that “those concerned with international 
                                                
56 Ibid at paras 99, 107. 
57 Ibid at paras 99, 105. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid at para 107. 
60 Ibid at paras 107, 109, 110. 
61 Lucasfilm, supra note 30 at para 248. 
62 Lucasfilm, supra note 53 at para 179. 
63 Ibid at para 153. 
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agreements about copyright have refrained from putting in place a regime for the 
international litigation of copyrights by the courts of a single state”.64 
The Court, in summarizing the issue of jurisdiction, therefore noted the following 
relevant points: 
Firstly we think that the two-fold rule in Moçambique applies to such 
claims. Moçambique is not limited to claims about land, nor to claims 
about title or validity of the foreign right relied upon. Infringement of 
an IP right (especially copyright, which is largely unharmonised) is 
essentially a local matter involving local policies and local public 
interest. It is a matter for local judges. 
Secondly enforcement may involve a clash of the IP policies of 
different countries. This case is a good example. The effect of the 
injunction granted by Mann J is that the defendant is restrained from 
doing acts in this country which by the laws of this country are lawful. 
This is because American law says they are not lawful. 
Thirdly, extra-territorial jurisdiction will involve (and does here) a 
restraint on actions in another country – an interference which prima 
facie a foreign judge should avoid. True it is that in this particular case 
the defendant has no intention of actually going to the US and doing 
acts there, but if the jurisdiction exists one could easily imagine such a 
case. 
Fourthly if national courts of different countries all assume 
jurisdiction there is far too much room for forum-shopping, 
applications for stays on forum non conveniens grounds, applications 
for anti-suit injunctions and applications for declarations of non-
infringement. 
                                                
64 Ibid at paras 167, 179. 
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Fifthly it is quite clear that those concerned with international 
agreements about copyright have refrained from putting in place a 
regime for the international litigation of copyrights by the courts of a 
single state. As we have said we do not consider whether Art 5(2) of 
Berne precludes it. A system of mutual recognition of copyright 
jurisdiction and of copyright judgments could have been created but it 
has not.65 
On the issue of the counter-claim of the defendant, the Court held that the defendant had 
not committed copyright infringement, agreeing with the lower court’s assessment. The 
Court of Appeal noted that a work could not be a “sculpture if it has some function, 
despite being visually striking and created as part of a fictional or fantasy work.66 Under 
the Act, only if the “sculpture” is an artistic work can it attract copyright protection in 
favour of the plaintiffs.67 The Court noted that in the fantasy world created by the films 
made by the plaintiff, the purpose of the helmets was in fact functional and utilitarian.68 
Therefore, they are not “sculptures” and would not receive copyright protection.  
Lastly, the Court agreed with the lower court that the American judgment is 
unenforceable in the U.K.69 The Court of Appeals held that it was under no obligation to 
recognize and enforce the U.S. court’s decree and that copyright law was territorial in the 
sense that the infringement, should it have occurred in the U.K., would be determined by 
the law in the U.K. only.70  
                                                
65 Ibid at paras 174 – 179. 
66 Ibid at paras 72 – 80. 
67 Ibid at paras 73 – 75. 
68 Ibid at para 80. 
69 Ibid at paras 187 – 194. 
70 Ibid at para 191. 
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4.2.2.3 United Kingdom Supreme Court71 
There were three issues before the U.K. Supreme Court in this case, at the final stage of 
appeal:  
(1) Whether an English court can exercise jurisdiction over a claim of infringement 
committed in the U.S., 
(2) If yes to (1), whether American copyright law can be applied against a person 
domiciled in the U.K., and 
(3) Whether Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 would be applied to determine 
if the helmet was a “sculpture” and thus an artistic work under the Act. 
On the first issue, the Supreme Court held that English courts could hear claims for 
breach of foreign copyrights against defendants domiciled in the U.K. On the second 
issues, U.K. law would be applied to determine whether infringement has occurred. On 
the third and final issue, the Court held that helmets were not “sculptures” under the 
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 and therefore the defendant was not liable for 
copyright infringement. 
Elaborating on the first issue, the SC reversed the opinion of the HC Court of Appeal, 
ruling that the claim for infringement of an American copyright is a claim over which an 
English court can accept jurisdiction as long as the defendant is domiciled in the U.K.72 
The majority reversed the Court of Appeal’s finding that the private international law 
principle used in the Mocambique case would apply, holding that the principle cannot be 
applied to copyright cases.73 To quote the Supreme Court:  
                                                
71 Lucasfilm Limited and others v Ainsworth and another [2011] UKSC 39 (before a five-judge bench, 
majority opinion by Lord Walker and Lord Collins with Lord Phillips and Lord Hale agreeing, minority 
opinion by Lord Mance). 
72 Ibid at para 51 (majority opinion), para 116 (Lord Mance in agreement with this opinion) 
73 Ibid at para 102. 
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Mr Ainsworth argued that the principle behind the Moçambique rule 
still subsists and applies to claims for infringement of all foreign 
intellectual property rights, including copyright, because such claims 
are essentially “local” and must be brought in the place where the 
rights have been created, irrespective as to whether there is any claim 
to title. But to describe the claims as “local” is simply to beg the 
question whether as a matter of law they must be brought in the place 
where the rights originate and are effective. We have come to the firm 
conclusion that, in the case of a claim for infringement of copyright of 
the present kind, the claim is one over which the English court has 
jurisdiction, provided that there is a basis for in personam jurisdiction 
over the defendant, or, to put it differently, the claim is justiciable.74 
In essence, the Supreme Court held that the copyright claim in this case could be brought 
before an English court by accepting in personam jurisdiction over defendants that reside 
in the U.K. The Court also noted that this is the only manner in which the Court could 
take jurisdiction of the dispute as there is “no international regime for the mutual 
recognition of copyright jurisdiction and of copyright judgments”.75 Further, the claim 
that an international regime does not currently exist could not be a reason for an English 
court to refuse to take jurisdiction over an English defendant.76 The Court therefore 
found that there was no barrier, either in international or national copyright law, for 
English courts to take jurisdiction of a copyright dispute as long as the defendant was 
domiciled in the U.K.  
The Supreme Court also cited two recent developments in U.K. law that would rendered 
the decision of the Court of Appeals inapplicable. Firstly, the adoption of the Brussels I 
                                                
74 Ibid at para 106. 
75 Ibid at para 110. 
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Regulation has changed the way U.K. courts apply conflict rules.77 Article 22(4) 
specifically provides for courts to be able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction in cases 
concerning intellectual property, irrespective of where the defendant is domiciled.78 
Secondly, the Rome II Regulations on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations 
direct that an action may be brought in Member States for harm or tort committed 
anywhere in the world.79 The Supreme Court thereby assumed jurisdiction over the 
appeal. Therefore, the defendant’s claim that the jurisdiction of the U.K. courts could not 
be extended for infringement committed abroad was struck down.  
Simultaneously, the Supreme Court decided the issue of whether a “sculpture” from a 
fictional world (not being an artistic expression) could be protected under U.K. copyright 
law. The court unanimously agreed that the visual models of the helmet did not fit into 
the definition of “sculpture”.80 Moreover, it was held that reproduction of the helmets 
itself would be an exception to infringement under Sections 51 and 52.81  
The Supreme Court in this case is therefore advocating the application of lex loci 
protectionis or the law of the place where the protection is claimed.82 Since the place 
where the protection was claimed was the U.K., where registration was not mandatory, 
the applicable law would be the copyright law of the U.K. and not the U.S. The precedent 
set in Lucasfilm is ensures that adoption of lex loci protectionis results in the 
inapplicability of the law of the country where the infringement occurred (lex loci delicti) 
or the work originated from (lex originis). 
                                                
77 Ibid at paras 88, 89. 
78 Ibid at para 88. 
79 Ibid at para 91. 
80 Ibid. at para 9. 
81 Ibid. at paras 10 - 13. 
82 Regulation (EC) No 864/2007, art 8(1); Note that this was obiter and the primary argument of the court 
was regarding in personam jurisdiction over defendants that were domiciled in the U.K. 
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4.3 France 
4.3.1 Jean Lamore v Universal City Studios and others83 (2007)  
In this case, the plaintiff was an author of a novel named ‘Tideworks’ and was an 
American national. The novel was first published in the U.S and no publication or 
authorization of publication was given for distribution in France.84 The defendants 
distributed a film titled ‘Waterworld’ in France based on the novel (at the time 
unpublished in France).85  
Three levels of French courts considered this case. 
4.3.1.1 Paris Court of First Instance 
The plaintiff contended that the publication of an unauthorized copy of his book and the 
release of the movie based on that book, both of which were first created and published in 
the U.S., infringe his rights as an author in France. The plaintiff further contended that 
even though there was no subsequent publication in France, his rights as the author in the 
U.S. would grant him the status of an author in France as well.86 As per the plaintiff, 
since the infringing act of distribution of the movie occurred in France, the domestic 
forum must apply French law to that specific instance of infringement occurring within 
its borders. There was no question of jurisdiction before the court as the defendants had 
submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the Court.87 
The issue of applicable law was resolved by looking towards the Berne Convention. The 
Court analyzed Article 5 to come to the conclusion that French law should be applied to 
determine copyright infringement. To quote: “the protection due to the author of any 
Unionist country is exclusively vested in the legislation of the country where it is 
                                                
83 (2007) 212 R.I.D.A. 261. 
84 Ibid at 262. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Ibid at 264, 265. 
87 Ibid. 
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claimed, it means the law of the State on whose territory the products are criminal acts, 
not the country where the damage was suffered”.88 The relative short judgment of the 
Court did not elaborate on this finding, however.  
4.3.1.2 Paris Cours d’appeal 
The Court of Appeal took agreed that the lower court had jurisdiction, but disagreed on 
the application of French law, opting to apply American law instead. As per the Court, 
Article 5 of the Berne Convention stated, “the protection due to the author of any Union 
country is exclusively vested in the legislation of the country where it is claimed”, and 
that this referred to “where it the criminal acts about which the author claims the 
protection of his work” had occurred.89 The infringement action sought by the 
distribution and publishing of the works in the France, as per the Court, should be subject 
to American law as “it was originally produced, adapted in the United States.”90  
As per the U.S. law therefore, the applicant for infringement was required to demonstrate 
that the alleged infringer could reasonably have has access to the previous work before 
creating his own, and that the similarities between them are assessed on the basis of their 
original expression.91 With that finding, the Court held that the plaintiffs were liable for 
infringement under American law. The Court of Appeal therefore held that the law of the 
origin of the work (lex originis) would be the law applicable to the dispute.  
4.3.1.3 Cour de Cassation, Civil Division 
The issue before the Cour de cassation was whether to apply American or French 
copyright law to this dispute.92 The private international law issue on applicable law was 
therefore whether the law of the place of origin is to be considered or the law of the place 
                                                
88 Ibid at 265. 
89 Ibid at 267. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Ibid. at 269 (Before Mr. Ancel, presiding over proceedings and delivering judgment, and Mr. Gridel, 
advisor rapporteur). 
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where the infringement occurred and the protection is claimed. The former would apply 
lex originis and the latter lex loci protectionis.  
The Court of Cassation overturned the Court of Appeal’s ruling, holding that in this case, 
all the infringing activities took place in the U.S., including where the movie was 
scripted, filmed and released.93 The Court further added that the infringement occurring 
in France was merely a consequence of the infringing activity that occurred in the U.S.94 
To explain this position further, the Court looked towards Article 5 of the Berne 
Convention, interpreting the provision as a private international law rule indicating the 
applicable law was the place where the infringement or wrongdoing occurred and not the 
place where the effects of infringement or harm was suffered.95 In assessing copyright 
infringement, the Court considered it appropriate to refer to the law of the country in 
whose territory the infringing acts occurred because the nature of infringement can only 
be understood under the scope of the law of that country. In essence, the court held that if 
an infringing activity occurred in the U.S., American Law would govern any further 
infringing activity occurring in France as well. It may be noted that this approach is 
similar to that of courts in tort disputes, where the court relies on the place of origin of 
the fact (lex loci delicti) and not the place where the protection is sought.  
4.4 United States 
4.4.1 Subafilms, Ltd. v MGM-Pathe Communications Co. (1994)96  
Subafilms was one of the first American cases to consider the implications of 
communication and dissemination of creative works across borders. It was decided by the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.97 The plaintiffs in this case were the 
                                                
93 Ibid. at 270. 
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96 24 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 1994). 
97 See Paul Edward Geller, “Conflicts of Laws in Copyright Cases: Infringement and Ownership Issues” 
(2004) 51 J. Copyright Society U.S.A. 315. 
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U.K. musical group The Beatles and the production house Subafilms. In 1966, the 
plaintiffs entered into a joint venture to produce an animated motion picture titled 
“Yellow Submarine”.98 In 1967, the Hearst Corporation, on behalf of the producers, 
entered into a licensing agreement with United Artists Corporation for distribution of the 
film, both on television and in theatres. In the 1980s, United Artists planned to enter the 
home video market and produce videocassettes of the film. United Artists’ licensing 
agreement with Hearst, however, did not expressly include clauses dealing with 
production of videocassettes due to none of the parties anticipating the meteoric rise of 
home video market. Both Hearst and Subafilms denied United Artists licensing and 
distribution rights for production of videocassettes. In 1987, United Artists and the 
American company MGM were involved in a merger, resulting in MGM/UA (the 
defendants), which gave the green light for videocassette production of “Yellow 
Submarine” by domestic third parties and subsidiaries. Further, defendants entered into 
an agreement with Warner Brothers for distribution of “Yellow Submarine” 
videocassettes abroad as well.  Since the parties of the joint ventures did not provide for 
video distribution rights, the ownership of these rights was unclear. Despite this, the 
defendants authorized third parties for distribution of the videocassettes.  
 
The case was heard before three levels of American courts. 
4.4.1.1  Special Master99 
The plaintiffs brought a suite before the Special Master claiming ownership over the film 
and to retain the exclusive right to distribute the videocassettes. The Special Master 
investigated the content of the agreements between the parties and heard witnesses for 
                                                
98 Ibid at para 2. 
99 Unpublished decision by retired California Superior Court Judge Lester E. Olson, discussed in the 
District Court and 9th Circuit Court decisions. Note that the Special Master’s findings are not appealed to 
the District Court, but are reviewed on the ground of error in law.  A Special Master is considered an 
adjunct to a federal court who conducts enquiries and decides questions in civil disputes; See Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure for the United States District Court, U.S C. Title VI, s. 53. 
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both sides explaining the terms.100 The Special Master did not determine questions of 
jurisdiction pertaining to the case and instead focussed on the applicable law to the 
dispute. The Special Master held that American copyright law would be applicable in this 
case, reasoning that since the acts of infringement occurred within the U.S., that is, the 
act of illegal authorization by the defendant.101 Since the defendant was a “direct 
infringer” under the U.S. Copyright Act, the same would apply to it. The Special Master 
therefore award damages to the plaintiffs.102  
4.4.1.2 United States District Court for the Central District of 
California103 
The District Court found that it had jurisdiction of the dispute under American law and it 
applied American law to affirm the finding of copyright infringement by the Special 
Master.104 Regarding jurisdiction, the Court held that  “Section 106 of the Copyright Act 
gives the copyright owner the exclusive rights "to do and to authorize" the reproduction, 
preparation of derivative works, distribution, performance and display of the copyrighted 
work.”105 The Court also added that any act of infringement that occurs outside the 
jurisdiction of the U.S. is not actionable under the Act.106 
 
The District Court therefore found defendants liable for copyright infringement and 
awarded the plaintiffs compensation of $2.2 million, accounting for both the production 
of the videotapes and for the distribution of the film abroad.107 The defendant was hence 
                                                
100 Subafilms, Ltd. v MGM-Pathe Communications Co., supra note 96 at para 4. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Ibid. 
103 785 F.Supp. 854, 863 (E.D.Cal.1992) (before presiding District Judge John G. Davies). 
104 Ibid at 2. 
105 Ibid at para 33. 
106 Ibid (referencing 3 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright (New York: M. 
Bender, 2003) at at 17.02). 
107 Ibid at para 37. 
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made liable for revenue made by the third parties and subsidiaries that distributed 
“Yellow Submarine” both in the U.S. and abroad. 
4.4.1.3  United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit108 
The decision of the 9th Circuit Court was delivered in two parts: the first was an 
unpublished opinion delivered in 1993 that affirmed the District Court's decision on the 
ground that both the domestic and foreign distribution of the Picture constituted 
infringement under the Copyright Act.109 The second was the judgment released in 1994 
that reversed the District Court ruling in favour of the defendants.  
 
The Court took jurisdiction of the dispute as the parties claimed that the alleged 
infringement occurred in the U.S. However, on the question of applicable law, the Court 
was clear that “wholly extraterritorial acts of infringement cannot support a claim under 
the Copyright Act”.110 Extra-territorial reach of the U.S. copyright law was denied in this 
case, affirming that if part of the copyright infringing activity takes place in the U.S., the 
copyright law will apply to that part only.111  The Court also noted that the Copyright Act 
does not in any way mention whether the Act applies extra-territorially.112 This is 
keeping in line with the concept of territoriality contained in the principle of National 
Treatment. To quote: 
 
It is commonly acknowledged that the National treatment principle 
implicates a rule of territoriality […] Indeed, a recognition of this 
principle appears implicit in Congress's statements in acceding to the 
Berne Convention that "the primary mechanism for discouraging 
                                                
108 24 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 1994). 
109 Subafilms, Ltd. v MGM-Pathe Communications Co., supra note 95 at para 16. 
110 Ibid at para 25. 
111 Ibid at para 9. 
112 Ibid at paras 36, 37. 
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discriminatory treatment of foreign copyright claimants is the 
principle of national treatment," and that adherence to the Berne 
Convention will require "careful due regard for the values" of other 
nations.113 
 
The Court in this case hence confirmed National Treatment as the rule that it affirms 
whether or not the Copyright Act applies to a copyright infringement dispute. It also 
noted that the National Treatment principle is extended to the Copyright Act, stating that 
‘"it is a long-standing principle of American law that legislation of Congress, unless a 
contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the 
United States."114 By reconciling both the international and national implications of the 
Berne Convention, the Court acknowledged that the principle of comity also plays an 
important role in the discussion. The Court of Appeals thereby held that it was the intent 
of the legislature for American copyright law to not have extra-territorial effect, unless 
the infringing act occurred within the U.S. The Court therefore did not apply any foreign 
law.115 
The Court therefore ruled that the reach of the American law could not be extended for 
copyright violations that occurred outside the U.S. The Court of Appeals cited Melville 
Nimmer, stating that U.S. copyright law cannot does not have extraterritorial application 
and a primary activity occurring outside U.S. borders cannot be held to be a violation of 
the U.S. Copyright Act.116 To quote Nimmer: “Given the undisputed axiom that United 
States copyright law has no extraterritorial application, it would seem to necessarily 
follow that a primary activity outside the boundaries of the United States, not constituting 
an infringement under the Copyright Act, cannot serve as the basis for holding liable 
under the Copyright Act one who is merely related to that activity within the United 
                                                
113 Ibid at para 45. 
114 Ibid at para 41. 
115 Ibid at para 45. 
116 Ibid. quoting Nimmer, supra note 105 at 12.04[A][3][b]. 
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States.”117 Further, if the Court had found the defendants liable on the basis of 
authorization of the acts, it would imply that extra-territoriality forms part of the 
legislative intent behind the Copyright Act.118 The Court therefore reasoned that if the 
defendants’ liability was based solely on the act of authorizing the infringing acts, it 
would “produce the untenable anomaly, inconsistent with the general principles of third 
party liability, that a party could be held liable as an infringer for violating the 
'authorization' right when the party that it authorized could not be considered an infringer 
under the Copyright Act.”119  
On the question of infringement, it was held that the defendant was liable for contributory 
infringement is a common law doctrine imposing liability and has developed from the 
tort and contract implications of copyright law. MGM, in the rehearing, cited Lewis 
Galoov Toys, Inc. v Nintendo of America, Inc.,120 which held that since if the authorizing 
party does not directly engage in an infringing act, the mere act of authorizing would not 
violate the Copyright Act.121 The decision in Galoob Toys did not consider extra-
territorial copyright infringement, however the Court of Appeals in Subafilms considered 
it relevant for discussion. Therefore, for the defendant to be made liable for contributory 
infringement and for the U.S. copyright law to be applied to it, some act of direct 
infringement must have occurred within U.S. boundaries.122 Since the defendant’s 
actions were limited to authorizing domestic and foreign distributors, the mere 
authorization cannot form the basis for direct infringement. Therefore, the defendant 
could only be held liable as a contributory infringer.  
                                                
117 Ibid at 12.04[A][3][b]); Subafilms, Ltd. v MGM-Pathe Communications Co., supra note 96 at para 31. 
118 Ibid at para 41. 
119 Ibid at para 35. 
120 Ibid. at 1090, citing Lewis Galoov Toys, Inc. v Nintendo of America, Inc, 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992). 
121 Lewis Galoob, supra note 120 at 970. 
122  Subafilms, Ltd. v MGM-Pathe Communications Co., supra note 96 at paras 23, 24. 
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Additionally, the Court of Appeals suggested that the application of Article 5(1) of the 
Berne Convention – the principle of National Treatment – refers to a choice-of-law rule. 
In the words of the Court, “although the treaties do not expressly discuss choice-of-law 
issues, it is commonly acknowledged that the National Treatment principle implicates a 
rule of territoriality.” Such an approach acknowledges that the National Treatment 
principle suggests a choice-of-law rule for courts, with the relevant law to be applied 
being the lex fori. 
4.4.2 Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v Russian Kurier, Inc. 
(1998)123   
The plaintiffs in this case, collectively represented by the Itar-Tass Russian News 
Agency, included several Russian parties – newspapers, magazines, wire service and a 
union for writers.124 Russian Kurier, the defendant, was a New York City-based 
newspaper published in the Russian language that had published written and 
photographic work originally published by the plaintiffs in Russia. The plaintiffs sued the 
defendant in the U.S., and the defendant conceded that unauthorized copying of over five 
hundred articles had taken place. The defendants did not dispute the mode of copying 
either, which involved physically cutting out the concerned articles and photos and 
pasting them on layout sheets, which were then sent to the printing house. 125  
This case was heard by two levels of the American courts. 
                                                
123 153 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 1998). 
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4.4.2.1 District Court for the Southern District of New York126  
The plaintiff claimed before the District Court that they owned the copyright in the 
copied works and pictures, and that the District Court should apply Russian law to 
resolve the dispute.127 The defendants conceded that the articles and photographs were 
used without authorization from the plaintiffs, and also claimed that Russian law should 
be applied to Russian plaintiffs. However, under the relevant Russian law, the defendant 
claimed that only individual authors could claim copyright infringement and not 
organizations or corporations (as the plaintiff is a news organization).128 
The primary issues before the District Court thus was not jurisdiction, but the applicable 
law – would Russian law or American law apply to the dispute? Further, if Russian law 
did apply to the dispute, how can the Court rationalize the application of substantive 
provisions of a foreign law within the U.S.?129 The Court decided that Russian law must 
be applied to resolve the dispute, as the work originated from Russia and the nature of the 
works is to be determined as per Russian law.130 The Court noted that the U.S., under its 
obligations towards Berne, recognized that works that were not registered in the U.S. 
would be considered “Berne Convention works”, and the Court should therefore apply 
Russian law to determine the nature of the copyright as well as the remedies for copyright 
infringement (lex originis).131 In order to apply the relevant Russian law, the Court 
                                                
126 Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v Russian Kurier, Inc., 886 F. Supp. 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (in a single-
bench decision delivered by Judge John G. Koeltl). 
127 Russian Federation Law on Copyright and Neighbouring Rights (1993) (“Russian Copyright Law”), art 
14(2) (concerning what the U.S. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) refers to as “works made for hire”); 
Ibid at 1122. 
128 Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v Russian Kurier, Inc, supra note 126 at 1122 (note that the parties cite 
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appointed two experts in Russian law to assist the Court.132 With the opinions of the 
experts, the Court came to the conclusion that “the plaintiffs have shown a likelihood of 
success on their claim that they possess a copyright interest under Russian law that has 
been violated by the defendants.”133 With this finding, the Court applied the Russian 
Federation Law on Copyright and Neighbouring Rights, coming to the conclusion that 
although on registration of the work was done, there was copyright vested in the works, 
and thereby ordered preliminary injunction and damages in favour of the plaintiffs.134 
4.4.2.2 United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit135 
The Court of Appeals considered the same issue that was before the District Court: 
whether American or Russian law is to be applied in the dispute. However, it split the 
issues into two parts, so as to discuss ownership and infringement separately.136 On the 
issue of applicable law, the Court decided that Russian law determines “ownership and 
the essential nature of the copyrights alleged to have been infringed” and the American 
law determines “whether those copyrights have been infringed in the United States, and, 
if so, what remedies are available.”137 The Court hence held that since Russian law 
explicitly excludes news organizations from retaining copyright in the works of 
journalists who work for them (“work-for-hire doctrine”), the journalists retain the right 
to sue and not the news organizations that compile their writing.138 Therefore the Court 
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reversed the decision of the District Court to the extent that it granted the defendants 
relief for copying the articles and photographs.  
In its analysis of the remedies available to the plantiff, the Court of Appeals extensively 
discussed the Berne Convention and its effect on the U.S. Copyright Act, while 
simultaneously distinguishing between private international law rules and the situations 
they apply in. As per the Court of Appeals, since international norms such as National 
Treatment only ensure that the domestic copyright laws are applied without 
discrimination to foreigners in the same manner as they are applied to nationals, it does 
not reflect on who owns the work.139 Further, as there currently exists no extensive set of 
rules either in the Copyright Act or other federal statutes regarding application of conflict 
rules by courts, the Court must apply principles already established in jurisprudence, 
selected by the judges as they are appropriate “to effectuate the policy of the governing 
Act.”140  
The application of traditional private international law rules, therefore, would lead to two 
outcomes. Firstly, the ownership of the work would be determined by the law of the place 
of origin of the work, generally referred to at lex originis. Secondly, the issue of 
infringement would be addressed through American law, as the actual infringement took 
place within U.S. borders, commonly referred to as lex loci delicti or where the harm took 
place. To explain this reasoning, the Court divided copyrighted works into two groups: 
(1) works as under the Berne Convention, and (2) works registered under the U.S. 
Copyright Act.141 For cases concerning the latter, the only law applicable would be 
American Law. For the former, however, protection of the works in Russia would entitle 
those works to protection under American Law as well. As per the Russian law, 
interpreted with the assistance of experts in Russian law, ownership of newspaper articles 
is vested in the Russian writers and the Russian publishers have ownership interest in 
                                                
139 Ibid at para 90. 
140 Ibid. (citing D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v FDIC, (1942) 315 U.S. 447 at 472). 
141 Ibid. at para 90 – 92. 
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compilation of the works in the newspaper. The Court of Appeals therefore agreed to the 
treatment of the Russian works in its decision and provided additional reasoning for the 
choice of Russian law as the applicable law, stressing that the ownership and nature of 
works are to be derived from the relevant Russian law.  
The Court therefore held that the principle of National Treatment is a non-discrimination 
device that prevents a Berne signatory country from treating foreign rights holders 
differently from national rights holders.142 The decision of the Court of Appeals 
additionally determined that the applicable law to the dispute could be the foreign 
country in question, if that country has a significant relationship to the parties or the 
work. Further, the Court of Appeals specifically rejected Melville Nimmer’s position on 
National Treatment (that the principle contains the private international law rule lex fori 
to be applied if the infringing activity occurred in that jurisdiction), holding that foreign 
law may be applied if a significant relationship can be established.143 Therefore, unlike 
the Subafilms decision, the decision in identified the National Treatment principle as 
relevant to the discussion at hand, but expressly rejected its potential as a private 
international law rule, opting for a tort-related rule instead (lex loci delecti). By the 
application of this rule, the Court effectively denied to Russian creators the right to sue in 
the U.S. for infringement occurring in the U.S. and also ignored the effect of the National 
Treatment principle in light of the Court’s treatment of the foreign creators.  
4.4.3 L.A. News Service v Reuters Television International, Ltd. 
(1998)144 
The plaintiff in this case, the Los Angeles News Service (LANS), was an independent 
American news organization that had entered into licensing agreements with certain news 
and media outlets for use of its news reports, pictures and other media.145 In 1992, the 
                                                
142 Ibid at para 30, 33. 
143 Ibid at para 30. 
144 149 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 1998). 
145 Ibid at para 5. 
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plaintiff covered the Los Angeles riots in detail, with several of its news reports having 
an effect on the media and consumers. The plaintiff produced two videotapes with 
content covering the riots and licensed them to certain television and broadcasting 
companies in the U.S. The defendant, Reuters Television International, obtained the 
plaintiff’s footage by recording the broadcasted video reports that were licensed by the 
plaintiff and transmitted them to several affiliates, including the New York office of the 
European Broadcasting Union, which in turn transmitted it to London and eventually 
televising the footage for a European audience.146  
The plaintiff brought a suit for copyright infringement against the defendants and moved 
the District Court for summary judgment on several grounds.147 The defendants claimed 
the following: 
(1) Extraterritorial infringement does not violate American copyright law,  
(2) The plaintiff had no evidence of damage occurring within the U.S., and  
(3) The fair use doctrine precludes finding of infringement.148  
The case was brought before two levels of the American courts. 
4.4.3.1 United States District Court for the Central District of 
California149 
The District Court held that the American copyright law does not apply extra-territorially, 
even if the extra-territorial infringement arose because of a domestic infringement. 
Further, it held that the doctrine of fair use does not preclude the liability of the defendant 
                                                
146 Ibid at para 6 – 9. 
147 Ibid at para 8 
148 Ibid. 
149 942 F.Supp. 1265 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (decision rendered by presiding District Judge Kim McLane 
Wardlaw). 
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for domestic copyright infringement. To come to this ruling, the District Court identified 
the following questions relevant to disputes: 
(1) Whether the infringement occurred outside the U.S., 
(2) If the infringement occurred outside the U.S., would the U.S. Copyright apply, 
and  
(3) What would be the findings of the Court on the claim of “fair use”.150 
The District Court noted that the infringement did occur outside the U.S., and granted the 
defendant’s motion regarding extra-territorial application of the Copyright Act.151 By 
doing so, the Court also held that the dispute would come under its jurisdiction. The 
Court referred to the decision in the Subafilms case to come to this conclusion, holding 
that “United States copyright laws do not have extraterritorial effect, so infringing actions 
that occur entirely outside the United States are not actionable under the Copyright 
Act”.152 The Court found that since the defendant’s subscribers (and therefore the 
audience of their broadcasts) were in Europe, the infringement clearly occurred outside 
the U.S.153 The Court quoted Melville Nimmer, as Subafilms had done as well, finding 
that “copyright laws do not have any extraterritorial operation, there [can be] no cause of 
action and hence no right to a recovery of damages under the Copyright Act for 
infringements occurring outside of the United States.”154 Domestic copyright law 
therefore could therefore not be applied to acts of infringement that occurred outside the 
U.S.  
However, the Court noted that it could not completely rely on the Subafilms decision as 
the dispute before it had a different circumstance to consider: “whether copyright holders 
                                                
150 Ibid at 1265. 
151 Ibid at 1269. 
152 Ibid. 
153 Ibid at 1270. 
154 Ibid. 
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are entitled to damages under the Copyright Act when they arise extraterritorially as the 
result of a domestic infringement”.155 In Subafilms the issue was regarding an extra-
territorial infringement caused by foreign parties, whereas in the dispute before this 
District Court, the ancillary question was whether an act of infringement occurring 
abroad that was effected by an act of infringement occurring within the U.S. could be 
brought under the jurisdiction of this Court.156 The Court held that under the U.S. 
Copyright Act, the defendants could only be held liable for infringement under two 
provisions: (1) recording the works on videotape, and (2) public performance.157 While 
the plaintiffs had provided evidence before the Court that the defendants had recorded the 
copyrighted videos, there was no adequate proof to conclude that the public performance 
of the transmitted works had taken place in the U.S.158 Therefore, the Court ruled out 
infringement on that claim. With respect to the videotapes, the Court applied the fair use 
doctrine, finding that the defendants could not seek protection under the doctrine.159 The 
Court found that the defendants did not satisfy the burden of proof upon regarding the 
innocent use of the copyrighted work, and thus were not entitled to the reduction in 
statutory damages under s. 504(c)(2). To that end, the Court ordered statutory damages 
based on the infringing actions of the defendant in the U.S. only.   
Therefore, the Court acknowledged that it had jurisdiction over the case only for acts of 
infringement occurring within the U.S., and the applicable law would be American law.  
                                                
155 Ibid. 
156 Ibid. 
157Ibid at 1272 – 1275 (applying U.S. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C., s. 101). 
158 Ibid at 1272. 
159 U.S. Copyright Act, supra note 157, s.107; This sections sets out factors that must be considered in 
determining whether a use is “fair”: 
(1) The purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for 
non-profit educational purposes; 
(2) The nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) The amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4) The effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. 
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4.4.3.2 United States Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit160 
The appeal before this Court was allowed to address two questions: 
(1) Whether the defendant’s acts of infringement occurring outside the U.S. could be 
brought under the ambit of the U.S. Copyright Act by applying it extra-
territorially, and  
(2) Whether the domestic acts of infringement would be covered under the fair use 
doctrine.161 
The Court of Appeal reversed the ruling that the U.S. Copyright Act cannot be applied 
extra-territorially and affirmed the District Court’s ruling that the acts of infringement by 
the defendant were not protected under fair use provisions.162 On the first issue, the Court 
of Appeal rejected the ratio in Subafilms that the District Court had applied, holding that 
such a decision would assume that the copying of the videotapes (which occurred in the 
U.S.) were not contributory acts of infringement that caused the foreign infringement to 
occur.163 The Court of Appeals reasoned that since the contributory acts of infringement 
occurred in the U.S., the U.S. Copyright Act would find extra-territorial application. To 
quote the judgment, “While the extraterritorial damages resulted from Reuters's overseas 
dissemination of the works received by satellite transmissions [from the plaintiffs], those 
transmissions were made possible by the infringing acts of copying in New York [the 
videotapes]. The satellite transmissions, thus, were merely a means of shipping the 
unlicensed footage abroad for further dissemination.”164  
The Court of Appeals therefore disagreed with the Subafilms and the District Court 
decisions on two grounds: (1) that the Subafilms decision ensures that American law 
                                                
160 149 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 1998)(Before Judges Schwarzer, Canby and Kleinfeld, unanimously decided). 
161 Ibid at para 6. 
162 Ibid at para 7. 
163 Ibid at para 12. 
164 Ibid at para 16. 
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could never be applied for acts of infringement taking place abroad, even if they are 
connected to the U.S. or relate to the interests of American rights holders, and (2) that an 
American rights holder has no other means to entitle extra-territorial damages if an 
infringing act occurred outside the U.S.165 The thrust of the argument of the Court was 
regarding the interests of American rights holders, finding that the literature that the 
Subafilms decision cited (the work of Melville Nimmer) failed to incorporate situations 
where an act of infringement occurring within the U.S. initiates further acts of 
infringement outside the U.S., causing American rights holders to be left without 
recourse.166 With this reasoning, the Court held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover 
damages arising from the exploitation of copyright works abroad that were caused by the 
domestic acts of infringement by the defendants.  
4.5 Analyzing the Pre-Internet Cases 
Upon looking back at each of the cases studied in this chapter, the following finding is 
noted: four out of the six cases where Berne was in force for the countries of all nationals 
involved (i.e. not the case of Fox-Europa), the courts took jurisdiction of cross-border 
copyright infringement and applied their national law extra-territorially,167whereas in two 
cases, the courts only took jurisdiction over infringement occurring within their national 
boundaries.168 
The first U.K. case of Deff Lep Music v Stuart-Brown, the court did not take jurisdiction 
over disputes since the infringement did not occur in the U.K., considering the principle 
territoriality an integral aspect of copyright. In Lucasfilm Limited v Ainsworth, however, 
the Supreme Court took jurisdiction of a dispute involving foreign infringement, holding 
that the fact that the defendant was domiciled in the U.K. was enough to determine the 
same and U.K. law would be applied to the dispute. In the Deff Lep case, the application 
                                                
165 Ibid at para 17. 
166 Ibid. 
167 In the cases of (1) LucasFilm, (2) Jean Lamore, (3) Itar-Tass, and (4) L.A. News. 
168 In the cases of (1) Deff Lep, and (2) Subafilms. 
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of lex fori was the only logical one to the court as the infringement did not take place in 
England with respect to six out of the eight defendants, and therefore U.K. copyright law 
would not apply to them. In the latter, the court moved closer to the interpretation of a 
private international law rule that established jurisdiction based on the place of domicile 
of the defendant and the applicable law based on the law of the place where the 
protection was sought (lex loci protectionis). The principle regarding domicile of the 
defendant would later apply in the case of the Brussels I Regulation after the U.K. 
adopted the same.  
Like the U.K. courts in the cases above, decisions of the French courts also come to no 
consensus on their approach to cross-border copyright infringement. In Societe Fox-
Europa v Societe Le Chant du Monde, the Court of Appeal applied the law of the forum 
(lex fori) to the dispute by recognizing that the infringement occurred in France and the 
plaintiffs were seeking remedies under French law only for the specific instance of 
infringement occurring within France. The short judgement does not detail how it came 
to this conclusion, however, it must be noted that the case involved Russian parties, and 
Russia was not a member of Berne at this time. Therefore, the court in this case found 
that no law (either in international conventions or national law) expressly barred the 
application of French law to the dispute, and therefore applied the same. In Jean Lamore 
v Universal City Studios, Inc, the court determined that the rights of the plaintiff would 
be determined by the place of origin of the work (lex originis) and not necessarily where 
the infringement occurred, thereby applying American law instead of French law. This 
opinion overlooks the very basis of Article 5 of the Berne Convention: the requirement 
that the law applied to foreign rights holders must be the place where they seek protection 
– the French law in this case. If the plaintiff seeking remedies has established that the 
infringement took place within the borders of France, as per the Berne Convention, 
French courts cannot discriminate against the foreign rights holders and must apply the 
local copyright law to them in the same manner as it would be applied to domestic rights 
holders. The movement of French courts from applying the law of the forum to applying 
foreign law for infringing acts occurring within France is a troubling development.  
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Lastly, there is no consensus in the reasoning of the courts in the U.S. cases as well. In 
Subafilms, Ltd. v MGM-Pathe Comm Co., relevant concern of the Court of Appeals at the 
time was the potential implications of a decision that held that contributory infringement 
had occurred, and its effects on international copyright relations.169 Prominent scholars 
such as Nimmer were considered, with the Court holding that it could not consider 
liability in cases where the actual infringement occurs outside American borders.170 This 
decision comes the closest towards interpretation of the Berne Convention and 
establishing that national copyright laws should abide by the principle of territoriality. In 
Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v Russian Kurier, Inc., the court separated the issues of 
ownership and infringement to determine which law should be applied to the dispute. An 
inherent problem with this differentiation is that it attributes “ownership” a status that the 
Berne Convention does not provide for at all. Berne does not define “authors” within the 
confines of a particular country’s jurisdiction because as per National Treatment, the aim 
of Berne is to move towards a system of global authorship. When the question before the 
Court of Appeal in Itar-Tass was to determine whether an infringing activity in the U.S. 
for a work owned by a Russian would invoke American Law, Article 5 clearly points to 
the place where the infringing activity takes place as the law to be applied. The 
assessment of infringement would therefore also require the Court to establish that the 
plaintiffs would be recognized as authors within the scope of American law and not 
Russian law. The Court’s treatment of the issues in this manner was therefore a puzzling 
one. In L.A. News Serv. v Reuters Television Int’l, Ltd, the lower court agreed with the 
decision in Subafilms, with the Court of Appeals overturning the finding. The Court of 
Appeals took an approach similar to the Supreme Court in Lucasfilms v Ainsworth, 
                                                
169 See Sean A. Monticello, “Subafilms Revisited: The Case for Imposing Liability on Domestic 
Authorizers of Extraterritorial Copyright Infringements” (1999) 1 Chi-Kent J IP 101; Jeffrey Lewis, “The 
Yellow Submarine Steers Clear of U.S. Copyright Law the Ninth Circuit Reexamines the Doctrine of 
Contributory Infringement” (1996) 18 Loy LA Int'l & Comp L Rev 371. 
170 Nimmer, supra note 105 at s. 12.04[A][3][b] (note that Nimmer does concede that where the 
authorization or any other contributory activity takes place abroad but the act of direct infringement takes 
place in the U.S., it would amount to a violation of the Copyright Act. However, in the case of Subafilms, 
no such activity contributing to infringement was noted). 
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holding that the American copyright law would apply on an extra-territorial basis to acts 
of infringement occurring abroad.  
The varying opinions of the courts in copyright disputes have shown that courts have 
deviated from considering only the private international law rule (lex fori), which can be 
interpreted as embodied in the National Treatment principle.171 
It is also important at this stage to refer to the comments of the various authors discussed 
in Chapter 3. Of these authors, only three have discussed the cases outlined in this 
chapter. Indeed, even these three discussed only the American cases.  
Paul Edward Geller has discussed all three American cases. In his opinion, he found that 
the Subafilms decision’s express reference to the Berne Convention is an indicator that 
the Court of Appeals wishes to “defer to the treaty regime in considering whether to 
apply U.S. copyright law or foreign copyright laws to cross-border cases.”172 He notes 
that this analysis is important because the decision recognized that the Berne Convention 
aimed at implementing “effective and harmonious copyright laws among all nations”, 
with the intention of creating a “stable intellectual property regime” and ensuring that 
states uphold the Berne principles to “avoid difficult choice-of-law problems”.173 He 
further noted that the Subafilms decision was clearly misinterpreted in the Itar-Tass case, 
where the Court of Appeals rejected Subafilms and decided to draw a distinction within 
the National Treatment principle for ownership and infringement issues.174 Geller finds 
this distinction “misleading” because by declaring that Russian law determines the 
essential nature of the copyrights alleged to have been infringe, the Court of Appeals 
effectively refused to apply American law to fulfil the obvious treaty goals of the Berne 
                                                
171 See Chapter 3 for analysis of the private international law rule embodied in the principle of National 
Treatment. 
172 Paul Edward Geller, “Conflicts of Laws in Copyright Cases: Infringement and Ownership Issues” 
(2004) 51 J Copyright Society USA 315 at 325. 
173 Ibid. 
174 Ibid at 335, 359. 
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Convention, which aims at applying the local law if the infringement within the local 
jurisdiction.175 Lastly, Geller finds the L.A. News case to be a victim of its own 
circumstances – since the parties did not provide evidence of the infringing activities 
occurring in the U.S., the Court of Appeals could not apply American copyright law to 
the dispute.176 However, it found that the ruling on the videotapes would be correct as 
that infringement was localized to within the U.S. only.177  
Graeme B. Dinwoodie agrees with the decisions of the Courts of Appeal in Subafilms.178 
The Subafilms decision, as per Dinwoodie, accurately predicted that by extending the 
U.S. Copyright Act to foreign infringements, the U.S. would be in contravention of its 
obligations towards international copyright treaties (specifically Berne and TRIPS).179 
Further, he notes that the Subafilms decision successfully limits international copyright 
litigation from reading American courts by ruling that the Act only applies to 
infringement occurring within the U.S.180 Dinwoodie states that if the Court of Appeals 
recognized “the deleterious effect of applying U.S. copyright law to domestic 
authorization of allegedly unauthorized acts abroad in light of Berne accession and 
TRIPS negotiations.”181 Dinwoodie is more ambivalent on the decision in Itar-Tass, 
finding that the decision allows U.S. to apply a foreign law to determine the nature of the 
copyright and apply American law to address infringement.182 While he does not outright 
disagree with this decision, he does note that the Court of Appeals opted to apply a 
                                                
175 Ibid at 359, 360; Geller does indicate that this confusion in the decision might be due to the lack of a 
definition for the term “author” in the Berne Convention, and the Court of Appeals instead embarked upon 
determining “ownership” first. 
176 Ibid at 334. 
177 Ibid at 335. 
178 Graeme B. Dinwoodie, “Developing a Private International Intellectual Property Law: The Demise of 
Territoriality?” (2009) 51 William & Mary L Rev 713. 
179 Ibid at 787. 
180 Ibid. 
181 Ibid. 
182 Graeme B. Dinwoodie, “The Development of International Norms in the Formation of Copyright Law” 
(2001) 62 Ohio St LJ 733 at 779. 
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copyright private international law rules for both issues of ownership and infringement, 
finding that such a position could complicate later decisions.183 Dinwoodie also states 
that since the Court of Appeals in Itar-Tass did not specify the rule it was using to 
determine infringement, it could be interpreted as either lex loci delicti or the application 
of the law with the most significant relationship to the infringement.184  
Jane Ginsburg discusses Subafilms as well, noting the reluctance of the Court of Appeals 
in extra-territorial application of the American copyright law.185 She notes that the 
Subafilms decision, though not necessarily inconsistent with the prevalent international 
treaties in copyright law, did not consider the “economic reality” of copyright dispute.186 
Ginsburg asserts that Article 5 of the Berne Convention directs application of the law of 
the country “where the protection is claimed” and this could be read as the forum country 
applying its laws to any instance of infringement that can be connected to the forum.187 
Further, she noted, under general American private international law principles, the place 
of domicile of the defendant is important to disputes because the place of domicile is 
“likely to be the same as the place from which defendant planned a series of unauthorized 
acts, many of them culminating abroad.”188 She therefore argues that the application of 
American copyright law to foreign instances of infringement is acceptable, as the 
domestic forum “has a strong interest in regulating the activities of the domiciliaries.”189 
                                                
183 Ibid. 
184 Ibid. 
185 Jane C. Ginsburg, "Copyright Without Borders? Choice of Forum and Choice of Law for Copyright 
Infringement in Cyberspace (1997) 15 Cardozo Arts & Ent LJ 153 at 170. 
186 Ibid. 
187 Ibid at 172. 
188 Ibid. 
189 Ibid; See Graeme W. Austin, “Domestic Laws and Foreign Rights: Choice of Law in Transnational 
Copyright Infringement Litigation” (1999) 23 Colum-VLA J L & Arts 1 at 27 (agreeing with Ginsburg’s 
analysis); See Anita B. Frohlich, “Copyright Infringement in the Internet Age - Primetime for Harmonized 
Conflict of laws Rules?” (2009) 24 Berkeley Tech L J 851 at 872: Frohlich agreed with Ginsburg on her 
assessment of Subafilms, further asserting that although there the Court of Appeals explained the principle 
of National Treatment correctly, it was eventually applied to the wrong issue. Frohlich states that conflict 
cases require a two-step analysis of both jurisdiction and the applicable law. Even if a court has 
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Ginsburg therefore finds that Subafilms did not approach the question of extra-territorial 
application of American copyright law in the correct manner.  
4.6 Conclusion 
This Chapter began with the intention of exploring three different jurisdictions – the 
United Kingdom, France and the United States – to see whether private international law 
rules have been used in non-Internet settings. Finding that they have, the Chapter went on 
to analyze the development of private international law rules relating to cross-border 
copyright infringement in the pre-Internet context. This analysis yielded some interesting 
results with respect to how different courts view the Berne Convention and the principle 
of National Treatment, and how their opinions have drastically changed, both with time 
and at the different levels of courts in each jurisdiction.  
In summary, the following rules of private international law were identified in the cases 
studied above:190 
i. Lex fori 
Translated to mean “law of the forum”, lex fori embodies the very territorial nature of 
copyright law. It postulates that the law to be applied at the time of deciding infringement 
is the law of the forum.191 In essence, the court would apply its own law to the case at 
hand. The National Treatment principle, it has been posited, directs Member states to 
apply lex fori in the case of a conflict situation. To understand whether lex fori will apply, 
however, difference between jurisdiction and applicable law must be expressed, as 
                                                                                                                                            
 
jurisdiction, it may not necessarily apply the domestic law to decide the subject matter at hand 
(“ownership” or “infringement”). This criticism does highlight that the reasoning in the case may be flawed 
in its lack of characterization of the issues. Without characterization, the position of the Court would be that 
for both jurisdiction and subject-matter conflicts, the lex fori will be applied). 
190 See Table 1 for consolidated table on the decisions in the pre-Internet case studies in this Chapter. 
191 Black’s Law Dictionary, 10th ed. (Eagan, Minnesota: West Publishing, 2005). 
  
118 
private international law involves a two-step approach. Firstly, the court must declare that 
it has jurisdiction over the suit, and then decide the law to be applied. Moreover, just 
because a court has jurisdiction, an assumption cannot be made that the law of the forum 
will apply.  
ii. Lex loci protectionis 
Lex loci protectionis refers to the law of the country in which protection is sought and has 
been known to “mirror” the territoriality principle covered under Article 5 of Berne.192 
The country in which the work is being exploited without the author’s or owner’s 
authorization has been accepted as the dominant judicial choice of law in order to respect 
the work of the author and the rights attached to his work. Lex loci protectionis has the 
effect of allowing each creative work to receive independent protection in the every 
country that protects it.193  
iii. Lex originis 
On the other side of the spectrum, the lex originis rule embodies a “universality” 
principle, requiring that the law of the country in which the first publication takes place to 
be applied to the dispute.194 Lex loci protectionis and lex originis face difficulties in 
application when the question of “initial ownership” arises, where either rule may be 
applied.195 
 
 
                                                
192 Ibid at 99. 
193 Ibid at 100; See Rita Matulionyte, Law Applicable to Copyright: A Comparison of the ALI and CLIP 
Proposals (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2011) at 2-3. 
194 Ibid at 3; Fawcett, supra note 85 at 100. 
195 Fawcett, supra note 85 at 100, 101. 
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iv. Lex loci delicti 
Certain conflict principles have been borrowed from common law jurisprudence in other 
fields of law. The common law concept of lex loci delicti has its roots in tort law and 
refers to the application of the law of the place where the “harm” has occurred or is 
expected to occur.196 “Harm” may include the place of performance, the place where the 
copyright owner is domiciled or the place where the infringer is domiciled.197 In order for 
the “harm” to be construed as a complementary tort arising from infringement, the 
infringement itself is necessary, although the infringement need not occur in the place of 
harm.198 Tort-related causes of action may include unfair competition, breach of 
confidence, defamation and passing-off.199 In cases where the parties agree to file 
lawsuits in certain identified jurisdictions, the lex loci delicti method would not apply.  
 
v. Law of the place of domicile of the defendant 
A defendant may be sued in the court of the place where the defendant is domiciled. This 
principle draws from the in personam jurisdiction that the court enjoys over the defendant 
or, as noted in the case of the European Union, if the local law or civil code specifies that 
the court has jurisdiction.  
 
 
  
                                                
196 Fawcett, supra note 85 at 449. 
197 Ibid at 450. 
198 Ibid at 449. 
199 Ibid at 449, 450, 478, 489. 
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Table 1: Consolidating the Decisions in the Pre-Internet Case Studies 
Private international law rules of domestic courts applicable to copyright infringement 
Case Studied Did the court 
take 
jurisdiction? 
Application 
of PIL 
rule? 
Application 
of National 
Treatment? 
Law applicable to 
Infringement 
Societe Fox-Europa 
(France, 1953) 
- Court of First 
Instance 
 
- Court of Appeal 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
Yes	  
 
 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
N/A 
 
 
N/A	  
 
 
Russian law (lex 
originis) 
 
French law (lex fori)	  
Deff Lep  
(U.K., 1986) 
- High Court (Ch.) 
 
 
No 
 
 
No 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
U.K. law (lex fori) 
Lucasfilm  
(U.K., 2011) 
- High Court (Ch.) 
 
- HC, Appeal Court  
 
- Supreme Court 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
 
U.K. law (lex fori) 
 
U.K. law (lex fori) 
 
U.K. law (lex loci 
protectionis) 
Jean Lamore 
(France, 2007) 
- Court of First 
Instance 
 
- Court of Appeal 
 
 
- Supreme Court 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
No 
 
 
No 
 
 
No 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
No 
 
 
French law (lex loci 
protectionis) 
 
American law (lex 
originis) 
 
American law (lex 
originis) 
Subafilms  
(U.S., 1994)  
- Before Special 
Master 
 
- District Court 
 
 
- Court of Appeals 
 
Yes
∗
 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
 
American law (lex fori) 
 
American law (lex loci 
delicti) 
 
American law (lex fori) 
                                                
∗ Taking jurisdiction but not elaborating on the fact. 
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Case Studied	   Did the 
court take 
jurisdiction?	  
Application 
of PIL rule?	  
Application 
of National 
Treatment?	  
Law applicable to 
Infringement	  
Itar-Tass  
(U.S., 1998) 
- District Court 
 
 
- Court of Appeals 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
No 
 
 
No 
 
 
Russian law 
(lex originis) 
 
Russian law for 
ownership issues (lex 
originis); 
American law for 
infringement issues 
(lex loci delicti) 
L.A. News  
(U.S., 1998 
- District Court 
 
 
 
 
 
- Court of Appeals 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
No 
 
 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
 
 
No 
 
 
American law only for 
acts of infringement 
occurring in the U.S. 
(lex fori) 
 
American law for 
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Chapter 5  
5 Private International Law in Cross-Border Copyright 
Disputes: Post-Internet Era  
 
5.1 Introduction 
5.2 Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v Canadian 
Association of Internet Providers [Tariff 22] (Canada, 2004)  
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5.2.2. Federal Court of Appeal  
5.2.3. Supreme Court of Canada  
5.3 Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v iCrave TV (United States, 2000) 
5.4 La Société des Auteurs des arts visuels et de L’image Fixe (SAIF) v Google France, 
S.A.R.L., and Google Inc. (France, 2011) 
5.4.1. Paris Civil Court of First Instance  
5.4.2. Paris Court of Appeal  
5.5 Analyzing the Post-Internet Cases 
5.6 Conclusion 
 
5.1  Introduction 
New media such as the Internet can be thought to expand the concept of territoriality to a 
breaking point as the parties can distribute and disseminate works across national borders 
in an almost instantaneous manner.1 In telecommunication, interactions occur at multiple 
points over the Internet, causing a “fluid situation” that requires a court to localize 
infringing transactions to within its jurisdiction before settling on the applicable law.2 To 
                                                
1 Paul Edward Geller, “Conflicts of Laws in Copyright Cases: Infringement and Ownership Issues” (2004) 
51 J Copyright Society USA 315 at 349. 
2 Ibid at 350. 
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that end, this chapter examines three leading cases decided by various levels of courts in 
Canada, the United States and France that have addressed the influence of the Internet in 
cross-border copyright infringement disputes and have involved, at least at one level, 
explicit consideration of private international law principles.  
The chapter looks at the decisions in each case at every judicial level and assesses how 
each court applies either a private international law rule or the National Treatment 
principle (or both) to take jurisdiction of the dispute and decide the applicable law to 
resolve the dispute.3 Lastly, in this chapter, the findings of the case analysis will be 
compared with the findings from Chapter 4, and will discuss whether the Internet has 
played the pivotal role in how courts have addressed cross-border copyright infringement. 
5.2 Society of Composers, Authors and Music 
Publishers of Canada v Canadian Association of 
Internet Providers [Tariff 22]4 (Canada, 2004)  
The party before the forum in this case was the Society of Composers, Author and Music 
Publishers of Canada (hereafter referred to as “SOCAN”). SOCAN was a collective 
copyright society recognized under Section 2 of the Copyright Act, representing Canadian 
composers, authors and publishers of musical works, and administering performing rights 
in their musical works.5 SOCAN was also affiliated with societies representing foreign 
composers and authors, whose interests are protected through reciprocal agreements 
between copyright societies in Canada and other countries.6 In 1995, under Section 67 of 
the Copyright Act, SOCAN applied to the Copyright Board of Canada for the approval of 
“Tariff 22” – a scheme of proposed royalties to be implemented from 1996 to 1998 for 
                                                
3 See Chapter 2 discussing the general rules of private international law, and Chapter 3 discussing National 
Treatment and the private international rule embodied in National Treatment. 
4 2 S.C.R. 427, 2004 SCC 45. 
5 Ibid at para 11. 
6 Ibid at para 11. 
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the “public performance” and “communication to the public by telecommunication” of 
musical or dramatico-musical works in Canada.7  
Tariff 22 referred to the “transmission of musical works to subscribers via a 
telecommunications service not covered under Tariffs No. 16 or 17”.8 Tariff 22 required 
that royalties must be paid for “the communication of musical works by means of 
computers or other devices connected to a telecommunications network where the 
transmission of those works can be accessed by a person independently of any other 
person.”9 The term “telecommunications service” is defined as including “operations that 
provide for or authorize the digital encoding, random access and/or storage of musical 
works for transmission via a telecommunications network, or that provide access to such 
a network”.10 The Board received the proposed tariffs and published the same in the 
Canada Gazette in 1995, calling for any objections against the Tariffs to be filed to the 
Board.11 
SOCAN appeared before the Copyright Board to seek royalties from Internet Service 
Providers (ISPs),12 contending that they are “not entitled to rely on the exemption set out 
in section 2.4(1)(b) of the Copyright Act.”13 Section 2.4(1)(b) is an exception to the rights 
                                                
7 [1999] C.B.D. No. 5, 1 C.P.R. (4th) 417, at para 1. Publication in the Canada Gazette is a requirement 
under the Copyright Act. Further, s. 70.16 requires the Board to “notify persons affected by a proposed 
tariff, by (a) distributing or publishing a notice, or (b) directing another person or body to distribute or 
publish a notice.” 
8 Ibid at para 2. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid at para 2. 
11 Ibid at para 11. 
12 Ibid at para 30. ISP is defined as “an entity that provides any Internet communication service, including 
connectivity to subscribers”; See Annexure 6 for detailed explanation. 
13 Ibid at para 13; Copyright Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-42, s 2.4(1)(b): For the purposes of communication to 
the public by telecommunication … a person whose only act in respect of the communication of a work or 
other subject-matter to the public consists of providing the means of telecommunication necessary for 
another person to so communicate the work or other subject-matter does not communicate that work or 
other subject-matter to the public … transmits by telecommunication a work or other subject-matter that is 
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of a copyright owner enumerated in section 3(1)(f).14 SOCAN contended that since Tariff 
22 applied to all telecommunications services, that any computer network could be 
brought under the ambit of Tariff 22, and that the exception under section 2.4(1)(b) 
would cease to apply to ISPs. SOCAN contended that “virtually everyone involved in the 
Internet transmission chain is liable [to pay royalties] for the communication, including 
those who provide transmission services, operate equipment or software sued for 
transmissions, provide connectivity, provide hosting services or post content.”15 As per 
SOCAN, a public communication occurs when the end user can access a musical work 
from a computer that is connected to that network, and that anyone involved in the 
Internet transmission chain should be liable for the communication. This would include 
the ISPs as well since they provide transmission services, handle equipment, host 
websites and cache content.16 In other words, SOCAN contended that no one is entitled 
to rely on the exemption set out in Section 2.4(1)(b) of the Copyright Act. Therefore, 
SOCAN stressed that they are entitled to the royalties payable by the ISPs for musical 
works transmitted by them or passing through their servers.  
The Canadian Association of Internet Providers (CAIP), along with other Canadian and 
foreign objectors in the case, opposed Tariff 22 and filed a complaint before the 
                                                                                                                                            
 
communicated to the public by another person who is not a retransmitter of a signal within the meaning of 
subsection 31(1), the transmission and communication of that work or other subject-matter by those 
persons constitute a single communication to the public for which those persons are jointly and severally 
liable. 
14 s. 3(1)(f): “For the purposes of this Act, “copyright”, in relation to a work, means the sole right to 
produce or reproduce the work or any substantial part thereof in any material form whatever, to perform the 
work or any substantial part thereof in public or, if the work is unpublished, to publish the work or any 
substantial part thereof, and includes the sole right …  in the case of any literary, dramatic, musical or 
artistic work, to communicate the work to the public by telecommunication.” 
15 Tariff 22, supra note 4 at para 13. 
16 Ibid. 
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Copyright Board.17 CAIP claimed that as ISPs were only intermediaries, they would not 
be held liable under the Canadian Copyright law and should be exempt from Tariff 22.18 
CAIP contended that an Internet transmission involves reproduction of data and not a 
communication.19 Further, since the transmissions occur on an “on-demand” basis and 
are not simultaneous, they cannot be classified as communications made to the public.20 
CAIP also argued that since transmission over the Internet occurs in “packets” of data 
and not entire files, the transmission does not represent a substantial part of the work in a 
manner that would result in communication. With these arguments, CAIP stressed that 
liability should not be imposed on ISPs and intermediaries by virtue of the exemption 
under Section 2.4(1)(b) of the Act.  
This matter was first decided by a quasi-judicial tribunal and then reviewed by two levels 
of Canadian courts – the first being the Federal Court of Appeal and the second being the 
Supreme Court 
5.2.1 Copyright Board21 
The Copyright Board took jurisdiction of this dispute as part of its statutory function as it 
is a quasi-judicial tribunal.22 As the parties appeared before this statutory tribunal, the 
Board has the final authority to render a decision on the factual circumstances in 
                                                
17 The objectors included the Canadian Motion Picture Distributors Association (CMPDA), the Canadian 
Recording Industry Association (CRIA), the Canadian Cable Television Association (CCTA), AT&T 
Canada, MCI Communications Corporation, ExpressVu, the Canadian Association of Broadcasters (CAB), 
Time Warner, Stentor Telecom Policy Inc. (STP) and the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC). 
CMPSA and CRIA supported the tariff while the rest opposed it. 
18 Copyright Act, supra note 13, s 2.4(1)(b). 
19 Tariff 22, supra note 4 at para 14. 
20 Ibid. 
21 [1999] C.B.D. No. 5, 1 C.P.R. (4th) 417. 
22 Copyright Act, supra note 13, s. 66 – 78 (Part VII: “Copyright Board and Collective Administration of 
Copyright”). 
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accordance with the Canadian Copyright Act.23 In it’s application of the law to these 
facts, the Board applied the Canadian Copyright Act to only those communications by 
telecommunication originating from Canada. The Board noted that it may be that a 
communication originating in Canada that is received elsewhere may constitute an 
infringement of the communication right in that other country. However, Canadian 
copyright law does not recognize this as infringement and therefore an infringing act 
originating outside Canada cannot be brought under the ambit of the Canadian Copyright 
Act. Therefore, the Board may be said to have relied on the principle of National 
Treatment to localize infringement, although it did not use this term or refer to the Berne 
Convention.24  
The relevant issues before the Copyright Board in this case included:25 
(a) Whether there is a communication by telecommunication to the public when a 
musical work is electronically transmitted, made available, uploaded, downloaded or 
browsed. 
(b) If there is a communication, who effects it, who is liable for it and whether anyone 
can claim the exemption in subsection 2.4(1)(b) of the Act.  
(c) The circumstances in which a communication occurs in Canada. 
(d) Whether the Board may approve a tariff applicable to persons located outside of 
Canada.26  
The Copyright Board declined to approve Tariff 22 on the ground that Section 2.4(1)(b) 
of the Copyright Act protects intermediaries in Canada from copyright liability, and 
imposing royalties on ISPs would be contrary to this protection offered by Canadian 
copyright law. To elaborate on this point, the Board discussed the process of transfer of 
                                                
23 Ibid. 
24 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 9 September 1886, S. Treaty Doc. 
No. 99-27 (entered into force 5 December 1887) (hereinafter the “Berne Convention”). 
25 Tariff 22, supra note 21 at para 4. 
26 Ibid at para 29. 
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information over the Internet. For a transmission to occur, the Board found that the 
following steps are required:  
i. The file is incorporated into an internet-accessible server;  
ii. A request is made by the recipient for the file to be broken down into packets.  
iii. The file is transmitted in packets from the host server to the recipient's server 
through one or more routers. 
iv. The recipient computer receives the packets, reconstitutes them into a file and 
stores for usage.27 
The Board found that a work is communicated not when it is made available, but when it 
is transmitted. The Board stated three reasons for this:  
1. Given that the performance occurs at the time of transmission, it is easy to 
conclude by analogy that the communication of a work over the Internet occurs at 
the same time. As a result, a communication to the public occurs each time that 
any member of the public uses a browser to access the work from the source 
computer.  
2. A work is communicated to the public even if it is transmitted only once, as long 
as it is made available on a site that is accessible to a segment of the public. As 
was stated earlier, a communication is to the public if its intended target is a 
public. The degree to which the person wishing to communicate the work 
succeeds in doing so is irrelevant.  
3. The communication occurs at the time the work is transmitted whether or not it is 
played or viewed upon receipt, is stored for use at a later date or is never used at 
all. A communication by facsimile is no less a communication if the message is 
                                                
27 Ibid at para 82; See Appendix 6. 
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stored in computer memory for later retrieval rather than immediately printed to 
paper.28  
The Board found that since any Internet communication travels in this form, it could only 
be said that a communication occurs in Canada if it originates from a server in Canada.29 
To quote the Board:  
When a work is transmitted, it is the person who posted it who 
communicates it. The person who posts a work (usually the content 
provider) does so for the sole purpose that it be accessed by others. 
Since Internet transmissions are communications, one should look at the 
source of the transmission to find out who is responsible for it. Any 
communication of a work occurs because a person has taken all the 
required steps to make the work available for communication. The fact 
that this is achieved at the request of the recipient or through an agent 
neither adds to, nor detracts from the fact that the content provider 
effects the communication.30  
The Board therefore held that any other factors such as “the place of origin of the request, 
the location of the person posting the content and the location of the original Website” 
are irrelevant in the consideration of the issue of communication.31  
Note that only ISPs and persons in charge of operating a server in Canada are not liable 
under Section 2.4(1)(b) of the Act (as they are intermediaries under the Act). The 
Copyright Board held that a musical work is not communicated when it is made available 
on a server in Canada but only when it is transmitted or originates in Canada.32 To quote 
                                                
28 Ibid at paras 119, 120, 121. 
29 Ibid at paras 122 156. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid at para 156. 
32 Ibid at paras 122 - 124. 
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the Board:  
Persons who can avail themselves of paragraph 2.4(1)(b) of the Act 
with respect to a given communication of a work do not communicate 
the work. Generally speaking, this includes all entities acting as 
Internet intermediaries such as the ISP of the person who makes the 
work available, persons whose servers acts as a cache or mirror, the 
recipient's ISP and those who operate routers used in the 
transmission.33 
In addition to this, the Board also held that the transmission of music from a cache or 
mirror site does not amount to a communication, and neither does hosting a website for 
an end-user.34 Regarding the question of “authorization”, the Board found that mere 
knowledge by the ISP that its facilities may be used for infringing purposes is not enough 
to incur liability.35 To authorize is to “sanction, approve and countenance.”36 To quote 
the Board: 
The person who makes a musical work available on an Internet-
accessible site authorizes its communication. The work is posted for 
the sole purpose of being communicated and with full knowledge and 
intention that such a communication would occur. The person who 
makes the work available does more than merely provide the means to 
communicate the work; he/she either controls or purports to control the 
right to communicate it.37 
                                                
33 Ibid at para 124. 
34 Ibid at para 157. 
35 Ibid at para 143. 
36 Ibid at para 144. 
37 Ibid. 
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However, the Board did note that ISPs could not claim this defense at all times.38 The 
Board stated that the liability of an entity participating in any Internet transmission “must 
be assessed as a function of the role the entity plays in that transmission, and not as a 
function of what it generally does over the Internet”. When an ISP posts content, offers 
content, embeds links, and performs other such actions beyond the scope of its role as an 
intermediary, it would be considered a “communication” and the ISP cannot claim the 
defense under Section 2.4(1)(b).39  
It can be seen, therefore, that the Copyright Board applied the National Treatment 
principle, although it did not directly refer to it. The principle of National Treatment 
presupposes an act of infringement to have occurred within the borders of a country for a 
foreigner to seek relief before a domestic court. The decision of the Copyright Board 
takes this stance as well – if an infringing act does not occur within the domestic 
boundaries of the country, then the plaintiff cannot invoke the provisions of the domestic 
copyright law. When the Copyright Board extended this reasoning to the Internet, it was 
faced with the challenge of localizing infringement to Canada in a medium that does not 
have boundaries similar to the physical world.40  
                                                
38 Ibid at para 134. 
39 Ibid at paras 156 - 160. 
40 Margaret Ann Wilkinson, “The Context of the Supreme Court’s Copyright Cases” in Michael Geist, ed., 
The Copyright Pentalogy: How the Supreme Court of Canada Shoot the Foundations of Canadian 
Copyright Law (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2013) at 71; Margaret Ann Wilkinson, “Filtering the 
Flow from the Fountains of Knowledge: Access and Copyright in Education and Libraries” in Michael 
Geist, ed., In the Public Interest: The Future of Canadian Copyright Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2005) at 
331; Daniel Gervais, “The Purpose of Copyright Law in Canada” (2005) 2:2 University of Ottawa L & 
Tech J 315 at 323; Gregory R. Hagen, “Technological Neutrality in Canadian Copyright Law” in Michael 
Geist, ed., The Copyright Pentalogy: How the Supreme Court of Canada Shoot the Foundations of 
Canadian Copyright Law (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2013) at 307; Robert C. Piasentin, 
“Unlawful? Innovative? Unstoppable? A Comparative Analysis of the Potential Legal Liability facing P2P 
End-Users in the United States, United Kingdom and Canada” (2006) 14(2) Int’l J of L and IT 195; 
Graham Reynolds, “Of Reasonableness, Fairness and the Public Interest: Judicial Review of Copyright 
Board Decisions in Canada’s Copyright Pentalogy” in Michael Geist, ed., The Copyright Pentalogy: How 
the Supreme Court of Canada Shoot the Foundations of Canadian Copyright Law (Ottawa: University of 
Ottawa Press, 2013) at 1. While literature on the Tariff 22 case discusses copyright infringement over the 
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5.2.2 Federal Court of Appeal41 
Upon application for judicial review,42 the decision of the Copyright Board was reversed 
on the ground that the Board had erred in law. This was a split decision. The majority 
decision (by Evans J.A., with Linden J.A. concurring) applied a private international law 
rule. The minority opinion (by Sharlow J.A, dissenting in part) agreed with the 
application of a private international law but disagreed with the opinion of Evans J.A. 
(thereby agreeing with the Copyright Board) characterizing caching as “an activity that is 
ancillary to Internet communication, and concluded that an Internet intermediary whose 
only activity is to provide caching is entitled to the protection of paragraph 2.4(1)(b )”.43 
Before the Federal Court of Appeal, SOCAN challenged the Board's conclusion that “the 
typical activities of operators of host servers and Internet access providers do not 
constitute communication by telecommunication as defined in the Copyright Act” and 
therefore do not give rise to liability to pay a royalty.44 SOCAN contended that the 
services provided by the ISPs that enable subscribers to access copyrighted musical 
works would not ensure the ISPs immunity under s. 2.4(1)(b). It contested the Board’s 
opinion that Internet intermediaries do not communicate by telecommunication as “their 
only act in respect of a communication consists of providing the means of 
telecommunication necessary to enable another person to so communicate it.”45 SOCAN 
                                                                                                                                            
 
Internet and the s.2 exceptions, there has been no focus on the private international law angle adopted by 
the Copyright Board. The use of the National Treatment principle in this decision is not referenced either, 
and neither is the same referenced in discussions of the Supreme Court of Canada decision. 
41 2002 F.C.A. 166; [2002] 4 F.C. 3. 
42 This was not an appeal as the Copyright Board is not a court but a quadi-judicial tribunal and its 
“decisions” are reviewable under s. 18.1(3)(b) of the Federal Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c F-7. Reversal of the 
Board’s “decisions” cannot be on the finding of facts. An error of law based on the standard review of 
“correctness” must be found for a reversal under s. 18.1(4)(c) of the Act; Ibid at 36. 
43 Tariff 22, supra note 41 at para 196. 
44 Ibid at para 28. 
45 Ibid. 
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also submitted that the Board’s decision to exclude ISPs from liability would make it 
difficult for SOCAN to effectively “protect its members' copyright from infringing 
Internet communications in Canada, because it limits to content providers and their 
collaborators the range of Internet actors who can be required to pay a royalty.”46  
The majority opinion held that the Copyright Board erred by ignoring the connecting 
factors that would result in the localization of the infringing activity in Canada, therefore 
attracting liability.47 The majority held that a communication by telecommunication 
would be said to have occurred if the communication had a “real and substantial 
connection” with Canada.48 To arrive at this conclusion, the Court agreed with the 
Board’s assessment of the Internet49 but disagreed on the finding that an Internet 
communication occurs in Canada if it originates from a server in Canada.50 As per the 
Board, the content provider is subject to a royalty approved by the Board “if, but only if, 
the content is posted on a server located in Canada.”51 Further, according to the Board, 
this would mean that the ISPs would require licenses for SOCAN for authorizing the 
communication of a musical work “when they post it on a host server in Canada, but not 
otherwise”. The Federal Court of Appeal found that this analysis by the Board was 
erroneous – in ruling that a communication by telecommunication occurs at the place 
from which the transmission originates, the Board had determined a question of law that 
did not apply to the facts of the case as it ignored the connecting factors.52 The Federal 
Court of Appeal noted that communication of any form requires “a communicator and an 
intended recipient”.53 However, the Court felt that due to the absence of any defining 
                                                
46 Ibid at para 30. 
47 Ibid at para 108. 
48 Ibid at para 186. 
49 Ibid. at para 166. 
50 Ibid at para 165. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid at para 170. 
53 Ibid at para 174. 
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authority, either in Canadian law or international instruments, that lays out how courts 
must view communication in such disputes, the Court in this case must apply a relevant 
private international law principle to resolve the dispute.54  To quote the majority: 
The principal infringing activity in this case is communication by the 
content provider, copyright material is not communicated until it is 
received on the end user's computer, and the location of the host server 
cannot alone determine where the communication occurs. The question 
remains: what test for locating the communications under consideration 
here would be most consistent with the policy of the Copyright Act and 
other legal principles?55  
The “real and substantial connection” test, the Court noted, should be used to determine if 
a transaction falls within Canada's territorial jurisdiction.56 The connecting factors to the 
case (other than the location of the host server to identify communications occurring in 
Canada) include the “location of the content provider, the end user and the 
intermediaries, in particular the host server”.57 The Court also added important factors 
that the court must consider for this test include the location of the end-user, the 
communication from caches and hyperlinks, and the location of a cache or a linked site 
from which material is transmitted.58 In the Court’s view, therefore, the Board’s decision 
to not recognize the connecting factors would result in a potential loss of music sales in 
the Canadian market. To counter this, the ISPs should be made liable to pay royalties to 
SOCAN.   
Lastly, to determine whether the s. 2.4(1)(b) exception applies to ISPs in this case, the 
following must have occurred: “the intermediary's activities must amount to the provision 
                                                
54 Ibid at para 184. 
55 Ibid at para 185. 
56 Ibid at para 190. 
57 Ibid at para 191 (also known as the “host server test”). 
58 Ibid at para 192. 
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of “the means of telecommunication”; second, these means must be “necessary” for 
enabling another person to communicate a work to the public; and third, the activities in 
question must constitute the intermediary's “only act” with respect to the 
communication.”59 The Court found that all three conditions were satisfied and that ISPs 
could therefore not use this exception to oppose payment of Tariff 22.  The majority 
decision also held that an ISP would not be liable for infringement only if the copyrighted 
information passed through their servers temporarily and no exception would be granted 
for caching of information.60 
5.2.3 Supreme Court of Canada61  
SOCAN appealed to the Supreme Court, which delivered a decision in which the 
majority judgment, delivered by Binnie J. (with McLachlin C.J.C., Iacobucci, Major, 
Bastarache, Arbour, Deschamps and Fish JJ. concurring), accepted the Federal Court of 
Appeal’s holding that the private international law rule of establishing a “real and 
substantial” connection to Canada would be sufficient to determine if a communication 
by telecommunication occurred in Canada under the Copyright Act.  
Further, the majority held that in the application of the real and substantial connection 
test, for determining if a communication originated in Canada, many factors are relevant, 
including the situs of the content provider, the host server, the intermediary, and the end 
user.  
The minority judgment was delivered by LeBel J., who concurred in the result, but 
dissented in part (and specifically in relevance to this thesis). He stressed that the “host 
server test” is a preferred to one looking at many factors. His test complies with the 
territoriality requirement of international copyright law and the National Treatment 
principle, and harmonizes Canadian copyright law with its international treaty 
                                                
59 Ibid at para 111. 
60 Ibid at para 196. 
61 2004 SCC 45; [2004] 2 S.C.R. 427. 
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obligations. As discussed further below, the majority reasoning, on the other hand, cannot 
comply with the principle of National Treatment.  
The majority held that ISPs are required to pay the royalty amount to SOCAN.  
Agreeing with the Federal Court of Appeal, the majority in the SCC appeal held that a 
communication (and therefore a royalty) may arise in respect of “any telecommunication 
that has a real and substantial connection with Canada.”62 The SCC agreed that the Board 
erred in holding that the only relevant connection between the communication and 
Canada would be the location of the host server. The SCC held that “as a matter of 
international law and practice, as well as the legislative reach of our Parliament, Canada's 
jurisdiction is not so limited”.63  
The SCC looked into the provisions of the Copyright Act to fully determine this issue. It 
held that the Copyright Act does not elaborate on the extraterritorial application of its 
provisions, and that it respects the territoriality principle “reflecting the implementation 
of a “web of interlinking international treaties” based on the principle of National 
Treatment”.64 However, it also viewed a telecommunication from a foreign state to 
Canada, or a telecommunication from Canada to a foreign state, as being “both here and 
there.”65 Since Canada has a “significant interest” in the flow of information in and out of 
the country, this fact is important to the issues at hand.66 The SCC therefore held that the 
“real and substantial connection” test is consistent with international copyright practice.67  
                                                
62 Ibid at para 36. 
63 Ibid at para 52. 
64 Ibid at para 56. 
65 Ibid at para 59. 
66 Ibid at para 62. 
67 Ibid at para 63. 
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In essence, the majority ruled that communication by telecommunication over the 
Internet is so multifaceted that it can occur simultaneously in any jurisdiction, and 
employing a private international law to resolve such issues is the way to proceed. The 
SCC therefore disagreed with the Copyright Board and agreed with the Federal Court of 
Appeal’s findings.  
It is important to note here that when the SCC discussed the extraterritorial application of 
the Copyright Act, it overlooked the Board’s opinion that the very essence of the 
territoriality principle enshrined in the Canadian Copyright Act is in fact drawn from 
international copyright treaties. The principle of National Treatment embodies 
territoriality and limits the application of national copyright laws to infringing acts 
occurring within the borders of the respective countries. Despite the majority stating that 
the Parliament “has the legislative competence to enact laws having extraterritorial 
effect,”68 it agreed that the Copyright Act is not to be applied extraterritorially, thereby 
respecting the principle of international comity.69 The SCC then goes on to say that the 
only way to “prevent the outreaching [of the Copyright Act] and to restrict the exercise of 
jurisdiction over extraterritorial and transnational transactions” is to apply the real and 
substantial connection test.70 Further, applying the test upholds the principles of “order 
and fairness ... that ensure security of cross-border transactions with justice.”71 To quote 
the majority: 
The test reflects the underlying reality of the territorial limits of law under 
the international legal order and respect for the legitimate actions of other 
states inherent in the principle of international comity. A real and substantial 
connection to Canada is sufficient to support the application of our 
Copyright Act to international Internet transmissions in a way that will 
                                                
68 Ibid at para 54. 
69 Ibid at para 55. 
70 Ibid at para 60. 
71 Ibid at para 59. 
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accord with international comity and be consistent with the objectives of 
order and fairness. […] In terms of the Internet, relevant connecting factors 
would include the situs of the content provider, the host server, the 
intermediaries and the end user. The weight to be given to any particular 
factor will vary with the circumstances and the nature of the dispute.72 
It can therefore be seen that the SCC applied a private international law principle to 
determine the outcome of the dispute while simultaneously asserting the National 
Treatment principle.  
In contrast, the minority disagreed with the application of the private international law 
rule and advocated the “host server test” instead.73 This accepts the Board’s argument of 
geographical limitation, asserting that “for copyright purposes there is no communication 
in Canada unless a communication originates from a host server located in Canada.”74 
Therefore, any participant in an Internet communication who is not a “conduit” for the 
transmission would be exempt from liability under Canadian copyright law, unless the 
host server is also located in Canada.75 Quoting the Board, the minority agreed that “each 
transmission must be looked at individually to determine whether in that case, an 
intermediary merely acts as a conduit for communications by other persons, or whether it 
is acting as something more. Generally speaking, however, it is safe to conclude that with 
respect to most transmissions, only the person who posts a musical work communicates 
it.”76 To further quote LeBel J.: 
The location of the content provider – the person who uploads content onto 
a host server -- is irrelevant. The location of the end user -- the person 
                                                
72 Ibid at paras 60, 61. 
73 Ibid at para 106. 
74 Ibid at para 107. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid at para 111 (quoting the Copyright Board decision at page 453). 
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making the request -- is also irrelevant. The Board held it is only when the 
copyrighted work is posted on a Canadian host server that the rights to 
authorize or communicate must be obtained from the person administering 
those rights in Canada.77 
And: 
However, where the host server is located outside of Canada but the 
content provider specifically targets Canadian recipients, the Board held 
that it remains an open question whether this constitutes a communication 
within Canada. In other words, specifically targeting a Canadian audience 
may well constitute a communication within Canada under the Act. Such a 
determination will depend on the facts of a given case, and is not 
foreclosed by the decision of the Board.78 
The minority’s approach covers the possibility that an ISP may specifically target 
Canadian audiences, stating that the Board did not answer this question as it did not 
pertain to the questions before it. Application of the “host server” test would comply with 
both the territoriality requirement of international copyright law and the National 
Treatment principle, and harmonizes Canadian copyright law with its international treaty 
obligations. If the majority’s opinion (agreeing with the Copyright Board) to be 
considered correct, then in disputes concerning cross-border copyright infringement 
occurring over the Internet, a Canadian court can take jurisdiction and apply the relevant 
provision under the Canadian Copyright Act. If the minority’s opinion is taken to be 
correct, then Canadian courts cannot take jurisdiction over such disputes at all, unless the 
host server is located in Canada or the transmission originated in Canada. It must be 
                                                
77 Ibid at para 137. 
78 Ibid at para 139. 
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noted then that the Copyright Board therefore applied National Treatment in a pure 
fashion, while the SCC did not.79  
5.3 Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. et al v iCraveTV 
et al80 (United States, 2000) 
As noted above in the 2002 judgment of the Federal Court of Appeal and the 2004 
judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada in Tariff 22, the Canadian courts accepted the 
rule of “real and substantial connection” (a private international law rule) as a helpful tool 
to determine jurisdiction and applicable law for transactions occurring over the Internet. 
Only a few years earlier, a District Court in the U.S. made a similar decision, elaborating 
on jurisdiction in particular.81  
The plaintiffs in the U.S. case were corporations engaged in the televised airing of public 
performances such as live professional sports and copyrighted television shows, framed 
with advertisements.82 All the plaintiffs in the case were based in the U.S. and conducted 
their activities within the U.S. with respect to the circumstances surrounding this dispute. 
The defendant iCraveTV was a private Canadian company with its principal place of 
business in Toronto. The defendant operated a website (icravetv.com) that converted 
broadcast signals of American television channels into a format capable of being 
streamed over the Internet such that content broadcasted in the U.S. could be watched 
live through the website in Canada.83  
                                                
79 Note that while the decisions of the Copyright Board and Supreme Court do not affect the outcome of the 
dispute, the judgments do declare the rights of the parties in the dispute, which differ when a private 
international law rule is applied and when National Treatment is applied.  
80 2000 WL 255989 (W.D.Pa.) (Western District Court of Pennsylvania) (hereinafter referred to as 
“iCrave”). 
81 Note that the Canadian courts did not cite this case. 
82 iCrave, supra note 80 at para 1. 
83 Ibid. 
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The plaintiffs appeared before the Western District Court of Pennsylvania alleging that 
“the defendants have captured United States programming from television stations in 
Buffalo, New York and elsewhere, converted these television signals into computerized 
data and streamed them over the Internet from a website.”84 As per the plaintiffs, any 
Internet user around the world can access icravetv.com by entering any Canadian area 
code and that the website did not verify the location of users before allowing access to the 
content.85 The plaintiffs were seeking a civil action for money damages and equitable 
relief in this regard.86  
Defendant iCraveTV contended that although original copyrighted works were streamed 
on the website, the website itself was not intended for an American or even worldwide 
audience.87 Further, since the website required a Canadian area code to be supplied to 
allow access, if any American residents did view the content, it was due to acts of 
circumvention on their part. iCrave also stated that the transmission itself began in 
Canada and the end-user happened to be U.S. residents – a fact that iCrave had no control 
over.88 Due to this fact, the defendant contended that it did not commit any act of 
infringement as under American copyright law and that the “alleged improper acts are 
limited to Canada”. The defendant therefore claimed that the Court did not have 
jurisdiction over the dispute. However, if the Court did take jurisdiction, the defendant 
argued, it should apply Canadian law (where the transmission originated). The relevant 
Canadian law provides an exception for rebroadcasts of local or distant television and 
radio signals, resulting in no liability for the defendants.89 
                                                
84 Ibid at para 3. 
85 Ibid. 
86 This case involved a question of infringement, unlike in Tariff 22 which involved a judicial review of the 
decision of the Copyright Board. 
87 Ibid at para 6. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Copyright Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-42, s. 31(2)(a): It is not an infringement of copyright for a retransmitter 
to communicate to the public by telecommunication any literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work […] if 
the communication is a retransmission of a local or distant signal.  
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The Court laid out the issues to be discussed in this dispute in the following order: 
(1) Whether the Court has jurisdiction in a dispute involving non-resident 
defendants? 
a. Regarding subject matter jurisdiction. 
b. Regarding personal jurisdiction. 
(2) Whether American copyright law can be applied to this case to determine 
infringement and the necessary remedies? 
For the first question, it was decided that under American law the District Court had 
original (and subject matter) jurisdiction over any civil action relating to copyright and 
trademark disputes.90 The Court went on to specify that although trademark disputes 
often have an international character and therefore extraterritorial application in some 
cases,91 there can be no extraterritorial application for copyright law.92 The Court further 
noted, “when an allegedly infringing act occurring without the United States is publicly 
performed within the United States, the Copyright Act is implicated and a district court 
possesses jurisdiction.”93 Further, even though the streaming of the plaintiffs’ 
programming originated in Canada, the transmissions were received in the U.S., 
constituting a public performance under the Act.94 The Court therefore took jurisdiction 
in this particular case on the basis of the territorial nature of copyright laws, a key feature 
of any national law based on the major copyright treaties. Note that the Court did not 
discuss the principle of National Treatment in its decision but nonetheless applied the 
rule of territoriality to determine jurisdiction.  
                                                
90 iCrave, supra note 80 at para 5 (pursuant to 28 U.S.C. s.1338, 15 U.S.C. s.1121). 
91 Lanham Act 15 U.S.C. s.1051, s. 45. The Lanham Act applies to trademark disputes in the U.S. This 
section has been interpreted as having extraterritorial application in several American cases, the first being 
Steele v Bulova Watch Co, (1952) 344 U.S. 280. 
92 iCrave, supra note 80 at para 5.  
93 Ibid at para 8. 
94 The U.S. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C., s.101.  
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It was with respect to establishing personal jurisdiction over the defendants that the Court 
applied a private international law principle. The Court held that it could exercise 
jurisdiction over the dispute “regardless of whether the subject matter of the cause of 
action has any connection to the forum.”95 As long as the non-resident’s contact with the 
place is “continuous and substantial”, general personal jurisdiction can be established. To 
quote the decision: “the amount and kind of activities which must be carried on by the 
foreign corporation in the forum state so as to make it reasonable and just to subject the 
company to the jurisdiction of that forum.”96 The factual findings before the Court were 
the defendants, through their agents, have transacted in Pennsylvania on an ongoing 
basis.97 The Court therefore found that the transactions over the Internet did require 
localization within the U.S., and that by connecting the non-resident defendants to U.S., 
the Court can exercise jurisdiction over the case. This private international law rule, as 
per the Court’s assessment above, can be applied simultaneously with the determinations 
of subject matter jurisdiction of the forum. Therefore, the Court has gone beyond the 
scope of the Copyright Act and the principle of territoriality to establish a separate private 
international law rule that prescribes personal jurisdiction of the forum.  
Regarding the second question on applicable, the Court held that American copyright law 
would apply to the dispute and not Canadian law.98 Since the plaintiffs were seeking 
relief under the American copyright law and not Canadian law, the Court decided there 
was no need for the Court to consider Canadian law at all, despite the defendants’ claim 
that Canadian law should be applied.99 The Court thereby found that the defendant’s 
actions were material in the causing of infringement, finding sufficient points of 
                                                
95 iCrave, supra note 80 at para 11. 
96 Ibid at 12. 
97 Ibid.  
98 Ibid at 24. 
99 Ibid. The Court referred to cases noted in Chapter 4: Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co. 
(1994) 24 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir.) and Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v Russian Kurier, Inc. (1998) 153 F.3d 
82 (2d Cir.). 
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attachment with the U.S. to justify the application of American copyright law.100 The 
place of reception of the transmission and subsequent viewing by U.S. residents was 
found to be the point of localization of infringement, without consideration to the place of 
transmission. This was because under American law, the receipt of transmission was 
considered a “public performance” and the defendant further gained commercial benefit 
from the “public performance” of the work. The defendant was thereby ordered to stop 
retransmitting the works in the U.S.101  
The study of this case finds that by accepting the territorial limits of the U.S. Copyright 
Act, the Court recognized the international copyright principles by which the U.S. is 
bound. The principle of National Treatment embodies the very essence of territoriality 
and the Court’s acknowledgement of this principle (without direct reference to it) 
signified its importance. However, the Court also went on to establish personal 
jurisdiction by using a private international law rule, despite having already established 
subject matter jurisdiction.102 A national copyright statute has the effect of applying to 
the entire country and the National Treatment principle ensures that if the act of 
infringement occurred within the country, then the local forums would have jurisdiction 
over the dispute. Establishing personal jurisdiction, therefore, is a matter of interpreting a 
civil code provision that determines whether that specific local forum has jurisdiction 
among all the others in the state. It is important to make this distinction because the 
application of this private international law rule does not negate the effect of National 
Treatment. In the United States (or any federation state), private international law rules 
                                                
100 Ibid at 19, 25.  
101 Ibid at 8, 22. 
102 Jane Ginsburg, “Private International Law Aspects of the Protection of Works and Objects of Related 
Rights Transmitted through Digital Networks (2000 Update)”, (2001) WIPO Forum on Private 
International Law and Intellectual Property, WIPO/PIL/01/2 at 10 (Ginsburg agrees with the finding of the 
court but suggests that such a strictly territorial approach towards the application of national copyright laws 
could encumber Internet commerce); Jonathan Zittrain, “Be Careful What You Ask For: Reconciling a 
Global Internet and Local Law” (2003) The Berkman Center for Internet & Society Research Publication 
Series, Research Publication No. 2003-03 at 6 (looks at the issue differently: that establishing personal 
jurisdiction is apt but the court cannot ask a foreign firm to cease its activities if they are not infringing 
activities in the foreign country in which they operate). 
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may be relevant when deciding which state’s forum has jurisdiction over a dispute as 
well. Therefore, even though the Court in this case applied a private international law rule 
to determine personal jurisdiction, the fact that it acknowledged the territorial limitations 
of the American copyright statute is of utmost importance. The determination of subject 
matter jurisdiction using the principle of territoriality and the localization of infringement 
to within the U.S. ensures that the National Treatment principle can be applied to 
determine both jurisdiction and the applicable law (American law in this case).  
5.4  La Société des Auteurs des arts visuels et de 
L’image Fixe SAIF) v Google France, S.A.R.L., and 
Google Inc.103 (France, 2011) 
A few years after Tariff 22 and iCraveTV, the conversation regarding cross-border 
copyright infringement over the Internet and the influence of the Berne Convention was 
initiated in the French courts. Generally, copyright-related disputes in France that 
involved the EU Member States found that the relevant EU Directive decided matters of 
jurisdiction and applicable law.104 The case of SAIF v Google, however, involved French 
copyright owners as plaintiffs and the defendants were corporations based in the U.S, 
which required French courts to assess the role of the Berne Convention in resolving 
copyright disputes with a foreign element.  
The plaintiff in this case was La Société des Auteurs des arts visuels et de L’image Fixe 
(SAIF), a copyright collective representing the interests of over 9,000 visual artists of 
both French and other nationalities.105 The defendants, Google France and Google, Inc., 
ran search engine websites (google.fr and google.com respectively), which included an 
                                                
103 Cour d’appel Paris, L.E.Ch. (26 Jan 2011) (hereinafter referred to as “SAIF v Google”). 
104 See Chapter 6 for full analysis of the EU exception to private international law rules applicable in cross-
border copyright infringement. 
105 SAIF v Google, supra note 103 at 2 
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image search feature that depicted certain copyrighted works of French artists as 
“thumbnails” for ease of search by users.106 
5.4.1 Paris Civil Court of First Instance107 
The plaintiff alleged that the reproduction of copyrighted artworks through thumbnails 
amounts to copyright infringement.108 Further, the plaintiff sought an injunction from the 
Court of First Instance to stop the websites from displaying the art works, as well as 
penalties for each instance of infringement and damages.109 The defendant submitted 
itself to the jurisdiction of the Court, but plead that American copyright law would apply 
to the dispute.110 The defendant argued that the Court should follow the private 
international law rule indicated in Article 5 of the Berne Convention, contending that “the 
law applicable to the lawsuit is that of the country in which protection is claimed” would 
be applicable.111 If the Court applied French law to this case, it would be applying the 
law of  “the country where the proximate cause” and not the law of the country where “ 
the damage was produced”.112 The application of American law, however, would invoke 
“fair use” provisions under the U.S. Copyright Act, and the activities of the defendants 
would not amount to infringement. The plaintiff in turn claimed that the law of the place 
where the damage is caused is more relevant in terms of proximity to the dispute and in 
                                                
106 Ibid. 
107 La Société des Auteurs des arts visuels et de L’image Fixe (SAIF) v Google France, S.A.R.L., and 
Google Inc, Tribunaux de grande instance Paris 3e ch. (20 May 2008) (Justices Marie Courboulay, Cécile 
Viton and Sylvie Lafaix unanimously deciding). 
108 Ibid at 2. 
109 Ibid at 3. 
110 The U.S. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C, s. 106. 
111 SAIF v Google, supra note 107 at 7. 
112 Ibid. (defendant relied on the decision in Jean Lamore v Universal City Studios (2007) 212 R.I.D.A. 
261, discussed in Chapter 4). 
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consideration of the rights of the authors.113 The plaintiff therefore contended that French 
law would apply.  
The Court therefore found two questions to answer in this case:  
(1) Whether the Court had jurisdiction over the dispute. 
(2) Whether French or American law should apply, if the Court does have 
jurisdiction. 
The defendants did not contest the jurisdiction of the French Court.114 Instead they 
solicited the application of American law to decide infringement. Therefore, the Court 
decided to take jurisdiction, as neither party contested it.  
The second question on applicable law required the Court to decide between the 
application of French and American law. The Court accepted the arguments of the 
defendant, agreeing that the Berne Convention did incorporate a choice of law rule, 
nothing that the Jean Lamore case saw the “application of the law of the place where the 
harm was produced”.115 The Court reasoned that since the alleged harm was effected by 
the search facility run by the defendant, headquartered in California in the U.S., the 
location of production of the harm was the U.S. and therefore American law would 
apply.116 The court reasoned that since the servers that enabled access to the website in 
question (www.google.fr) were located in California, American copyright law should be 
applied to address infringement. Since the act causing damage did not originate in 
France, French law could not be applied to the dispute. By the application of the 
                                                
113 Ibid at 2. 
114 Ibid at 7. 
115 Ibid. 
116 Ibid at 8. 
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provisions of the U.S. Copyright Act, the Court reviewed the four “fair use” criteria to 
find that the defendant would not be liable under the Act.117 
5.4.2 Paris Court of Appeal118 
Upon appeal, the Paris Court of Appeal reversed this decision. Firstly, the Court asserted 
that it had jurisdiction over the matter as under the provisions of the Berne 
Convention.119 The Court of Appeal accepted the lower court’s reasoning that the 
provisions of the Berne Convention would the forum.120 By doing so, the Court affirmed 
the private international law rule that is prevalent in Article 5. The Court, however, did 
not agree on the application of the U.S. Copyright Act on the simple reasoning that the 
harm did not occur in the U.S. at all but instead occurred in France.121 Under the Berne 
Convention, the applicable law may either be the place of the wrongful act or the place 
where the damage is felt, and to rectify this ambiguity, the one with the closest link to the 
case should be applied. The Paris Court of Appeal reversed the lower court’s decision, 
holding that the Berne Convention points towards the application of the law of the place 
where the harm was sustained and not from where the act causing harm originated.122 
The Court reasoned that the factual circumstances of the case point to the sustenance of 
harm in France as French users were able to access the Google search engines through 
the websites google.fr and images.google.fr.123 Therefore the applicable law to the 
dispute would be French law. Under French law, however, the Paris Court of Appeal still 
                                                
117 Ibid at 8 - 12. 
118 SAIF v Google, supra note 103 (Judges Didier Pimoulle, Brigitte Chokron and Anne-Marie Gaber in a 
unanimous decision) 
119 Ibid at 4. 
120 Ibid at 6. 
121 Ibid at 6. 
122 Ibid at 7. 
123 Ibid. 
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rejected the plaintiff’s claims, finding the search engines to be intermediaries causing 
“transient reproduction”, thereby not resulting in infringement.124  
The decisions of the two levels of courts in this case see a reversal of positions from the 
Canadian Federal Court of Appeal and Supreme Court majority decisions in the Tariff 22 
case. While the outcome of both the Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeal in 
SAIF v Google was the same, the manner in which the Courts affirmed the application of 
the National Treatment principle as a private international law rule is relevant. Neither 
court was ambiguous as to the application of National Treatment; they only differed in 
their interpretation of it.125 This case therefore saw a pure application of the National 
Treatment principle to determine jurisdiction and the applicable law in a cross-border 
copyright dispute occurring over the Internet. If the Court of Appeal had not connected 
the damage caused (by infringement) with the National Treatment principle, the outcome 
would have been similar to that in the pre-Internet French decision in the Jean Lamore 
case, seeing the application of the foreign law.126  
5.5 Analyzing the Post-Internet Cases 
Upon closer analysis of each of these cases, it can be noted that there is no uniform 
approach to the conflict rules that courts in Canada, France and the U.S. are using to 
                                                
124 Ibid at 8, 9 (Under the French statute Loi 2004-575 du 21 juin 2004 pour la confiance dans l’économie 
numérique [Law 2004-575 of June 21, 2004 on the confidence in the digital economy], Journal Officiel de 
la République Francaise  (22 June 2004). 
125 Aurelio Lopez-Tarruella, “International Dimension of Google Activities: Private International Law and 
the Need of Legal Certainty” in Aurelio Lopez-Tarreulla (ed.), Google and the Law: Empirical Approaches 
to Legal Aspects of Knowledge-Economy Business Models (The Hague, Netherlands: Springer, 2012) at 
331 (author disagrees with the application of international copyright conventions to disputes within the EU, 
irrespective of whether any of the parties are from states outside the EU. He considers the decision of the 
Paris Court of Appeal as preventing the uniform application of EU directives on jurisdiction and private 
international law among EU Member States). 
126 Kate Spelman, Brent Caslin, “La Société des Auteurs des arts visuels et de l’Image Fixe (SAIF) v. 
Google: A Parisian Story of the Berne Convention and Online Infringement Claims” (2011) 19(1) Cal. Int’l 
L.J. at 5 (considers the Paris Court of Appeal’s decision a “mixed blessing”, recognizing that copyright law 
is bound by the territoriality principle and contemplating the decision’s implications on national laws 
regulating online conduct). 
  
150 
determine the law applicable to copyright infringement cases over the Internet. However, 
all three cases, at some level, do discuss the principle of National Treatment, albeit 
without direct reference to it. This pattern is similar to the cases analyzed in Chapter 4 in 
the same jurisdictions, and the courts of each jurisdiction have referred to these earlier 
cases (excluding the Tariff 22 case)127 in their opinions as well. Each court (in all 
jurisdictions discussed here, including Canada) has gone to great lengths to stress on the 
need for a nuanced understanding on how transmission of information takes place over 
the Internet.  
The Canadian decisions in Tariff 22 begin with a discussion of what appears to be the 
principle of National Treatment at the Copyright Board level and moves into a private 
international law discussion at the Supreme Court level. The SCC refers to the principle 
in its judgment briefly but moves on to assessing the applicability of the Copyright Act to 
“communications that have international participants”. The SCC states that the Act’s 
application will depend on “whether there is a sufficient connection between this country 
and the communication in question for Canada to apply its law consistent with the 
principles of order and fairness that ensure security of cross-border transactions with 
justice.”128 The SCC compares the “sufficient connection” concept to previous Canadian 
cases largely involving investment and corporate law to verify this point.129 This 
analysis, however, is flawed due to the overreaching act of establishing a “sufficient 
connection” in international transactions involving copyright infringement as the concept 
of infringement can only apply to an act committed within the territorial boundaries that a 
national copyright statute covers. However, the SCC also acknowledges that the very 
basis of copyright law is grounded in territoriality and, as the SCC observed as well, this 
concept emerges from the principle of National Treatment. Therefore, the SCC 
referenced the National Treatment principle but did not apply it in a pure form. Instead it 
opted to connect infringement with a prevalent private international law rule already in 
                                                
127 The exclusion of the Tariff 22 case is not surprising because it is a Canadian case and no case law in 
Chapter 4 arises from Canada. 
128 Tariff 22, supra note 61 at paras 56, 57. 
129 Ibid at para 60. 
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use in Canada.  
It is also intriguing to note that all three levels of the judiciary – the Copyright Board, the 
Federal Court of Appeal, and the Supreme Court of Canada – agreed to the technical 
process of information transmission over the Internet. To reiterate, each court agreed that 
for a transmission to occur, (i) the file must be incorporated into an internet-accessible 
server; (ii) a request must be by the recipient for the file to be broken down into packets; 
(iii) the file must be transmitted in packets from the host server to the recipient's server 
through one or more routers; and (iv) the recipient computer must receive the packets, 
reconstitutes them into a file and stores for usage.130 Therefore, the difference in opinion 
between the Copyright Board and the SCC is on the basis of the extent to which Canada’s 
national copyright statute can be applied to a transmission that is known to have not 
originated from a server in Canada, leading to the extra-territorial application of 
provisions regarding infringement. The discussion of whether the Internet influences how 
National Treatment is applied may not be necessary at all; the Internet adds an additional 
question of jurisdiction but does not cause courts to waver from the application of 
National Treatment.  
To quote LeBel J. in the dissenting opinion of the SCC decision, the host server test 
“clearly complies with the territoriality requirements of international copyright law, and 
harmonizes Canadian copyright law with international treaty principles” while also 
functioning in tandem with the meaning and purpose of the Copyright Act.131 This 
approach acknowledges that while an infringing act may have occurred across a number 
of jurisdictions, the only infringing act of concern to Canadian courts should be whether 
the host server is located in Canada, thereby localizing the infringing act within Canada 
(as laid out in the relevant provisions of the Copyright Act). According to the Copyright 
Board, SOCAN’s request to impose Tariff 22 on any ISP in whose servers the musical 
works are contained will result in the extra-territorial application of the Copyright Act. 
                                                
130 Tariff 22, supra note 21 at para 82; Tariff 22, supra note 41 at para 16; Tariff 22, supra note 61 at para 
10. 
131 Tariff 22, supra note 61 at paras 145 – 148. 
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The decisions of the Federal Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court therefore conflict 
with the territoriality concepts inherent in the various copyright treaties in forces since 
the Berne Convention. 
The decisions of the Federal Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court additionally subject 
ISPs to conflicting copyright regimes. While most national copyright statutes adhere to 
certain minimum standards of protection, the same is not true for acts of infringement 
over new media such as the Internet.132 Acts that are non-infringing in one country may 
be infringing in another. If domestic courts across the world began applying conflict rules 
similar to the “real and substantial connection” test, ISPs would be exposed to plaintiffs 
seeking relief in jurisdictions that have narrowly interpreted “infringement” over the 
Internet. An ISP may thus have to pay royalties in each of these jurisdictions, therefore 
being charged multiple tariffs for a single transmission, with each tariff imposed by the 
jurisdiction in which the servers used for the purpose of that transmission are present.  
In the American iCrave decision, the test of “continuous and systematic contact” was 
established, with the Western District Court of Pennsylvania holding that the U.S. 
Copyright Act would apply to any infringing act that had sufficient points of contact with 
the U.S. Since the American law stated that the receipt of transmissions was a violation 
of the Copyright Act, the court’s attempt to localize harm only within the U.S. was an 
obvious route for the court to take. If the decision in Itar-Tass and subsequent cases had 
been followed in this case as well, the decision would have been starkly different. Firstly, 
the extra-territorial approach in Itar-Tass would have required the court to consider the 
application of Canadian law to the case. This approach would have been tedious, 
expensive and would require experts in Canadian copyright and cyber law to testify in 
court for an act of infringement that did not even occur in Canada. Further, such a 
decision would imply that if the transmission had taken place in more than one country, 
                                                
132 Richard P. Rozek, “Protection of Intellectual Property Rights: Research and Development Decisions and 
Economic Growth” in 5:3 Contemporary Economic Policy (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1987) at 54 (In 
certain countries like the U.S., the national copyright statute provides wide and extensive protection in the 
interest of authors, while in countries like India and China, strict standards of copyright protection and 
access over the Internet are considered to be detrimental to the purpose of dissemination of information). 
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then the court would be required to apply the copyright law of each of those countries, 
causing localization to vary based on each individual act of transmission in each place of 
transmission. Such a nuanced understanding of “transmission” by the court in this case 
was similar to the one purported by the Copyright Board in the Tariff 22 case.  
Lastly, in the SAIF decision, the Paris Court of Appeal expressly addressed the Berne 
Convention, stating that Article 5 refers to the law of the country where the protection is 
claimed. However, it went beyond the scope of Berne, seeking to rectify any ambiguity 
that courts before it may have faced in this regard. The decision ensures that even if 
damage occurs in more than one place (with either forum having jurisdiction over the 
dispute), the court that is approached by the parties can only consider acts of 
infringement that can be directly linked within the jurisdiction of that court. In this case, 
the French court refused to apply the law of the place from which the infringing work 
was transmitted (the U.S.) and only concerned itself with the point of reception of the 
infringing work (France). In making this distinction, the French court ensured that future 
disputes concerning infringement would only apply French law if the harm could be 
directly connected to France. This case therefore saw a pure application of the National 
Treatment principle to determine jurisdiction and the applicable law in a cross-border 
copyright disputes occurring over the Internet.  
In each of these cases, a different interpretation of copyright infringement taking place 
over multiple jurisdictions. Some courts can be seen referring to the principle of National 
Treatment expressly in their decisions while others establishing conflict rules similar to 
those seen in the pre-Internet cases. However, when the principle of National Treatment 
is referred to, it seems that courts are able assess the Internet in a manner that establishes 
“borders” for the purpose of determining jurisdiction and the applicable law. With the 
current technical understanding of the Internet, this approach not only makes it easier for 
courts to abide by their obligations towards international copyright conventions, but also 
secures the conflict rule embodied in these conventions.  
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5.6 Conclusion 
The chapter covered three cases (in Canada, the United States and France respectively) 
that have examined how transactions over the Internet have influenced how private 
international law rules addressing copyright infringement have been applied. In each 
case, an analysis was done on the basis of three core issues:  
(1) Whether the court took jurisdiction and which private international law rule 
dictated the same; 
(2) Whether the court applied national or foreign law; and 
(3) Whether the court determined the applicable law by using a private international 
law rule or the principle of National Treatment.  
By assessing the decisions at every level of court, it can be seen that these issues have not 
been addressed in a uniform manner. While courts have developed or extended private 
international law rules dictating that the law of country of origin (lex originis) or the 
protecting country should apply (lex loci protectionis), others affirmed the territoriality 
principle inherent in National Treatment and applied the law of the forum (lex fori). This 
pattern is similar to the approach of courts in the pre-Internet cases examined in Chapter 
4. This affirms that, despite the introduction of the Internet, the same issues of 
jurisdiction and applicable law plague courts in the post-Internet era as they in the late 
20th century. Furthermore, each of the courts developed a similar understanding of how 
copyrighted works are transmitted over the Internet and the technical aspect of this 
transmission was not at stake in any of the cases.  
The conclusion that can be drawn from this analysis (and the findings of Chapter 4) is 
that the Internet as a medium of dissemination of information does not have the effect of 
colouring how private international law issues are being framed in courts. In fact, while 
the issues highlighted in each case may require the analysis of transmission over the 
Internet, the courts used these analyses only to clarify technical questions as to how 
courts should look at jurisdiction on the Internet generally and these technical questions 
did not appear to specifically affect treatment of copyright issues in these courts. 
The evidence therefore does not prove that applying the principle of National Treatment 
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would answer the problems that courts are facing regarding cross-border copyright 
disputes because they are occurring over the Internet. It does, however, support the 
evidence noted in Chapter 4: that the principle of National Treatment already provides 
the answers to issues of jurisdiction and applicable law and that developing a range of 
additional private international law rules is unnecessary.  
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Table 2: Consolidating the Decisions in the Post-Internet Case Studies 
Private international law rules of domestic courts applicable to copyright infringement 
Case Studied Did the court 
take 
jurisdiction? 
Application 
of PIL rule? 
Application 
of National 
Treatment? 
Law applicable to 
infringement 
Tariff 22 
(Canada, 2004) 
- Copyright Board 
of Canada 
 
- Federal Court of 
Appeal 
 
 
- Supreme Court 
 
 
- 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
No 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
No 
 
 
 
No 
 
 
Canadian law 
(lex fori) 
 
Canadian law 
(“real and substantial 
connection”) 
 
Canadian law 
(“real and substantial 
connection”) 
iCrave TV (US, 2000) 
- West. Dist. Court 
of Pennsylvania 
 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
 
American law 
(“continuous and 
systematic contacts”) 
SAIF v. Google 
(France, 2011) 
- Court of First 
Instance 
 
- Court of Appeal 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
No 
 
 
No 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
American law 
(lex originis) 
 
French law 
(lex fori) 
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Chapter 6  
 
6 Private International Law in Copyright Disputes in the 
European Context 
 
6.1 Introduction 
6.2 Peter Pinckney v KDG Mediatech AG (Europe, 2013) 
6.2.1 Tribunal de grande instance de Toulouse  
6.2.2 Cour d’appel de Toulouse  
6.2.3 Cour de cassation  
6.2.4 Court of Justice of the European Union 
6.3 The European Union as an Outlier to this Study 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The European Union (EU) functions on two principles: “federalism” and “subsidiarity”.1 
Federalism, although not defined in any EU treaties or legislation, is essentially the 
concept of “dispersal of power between different levels of government.”2 Since it is not 
defined, some specialists in EU law prefer to use the term “inter-governmentalism”, 
denoting a power sharing agreement between the EU institutions and the Member States 
that promotes collaboration and cooperation.3 The subsidiarity principle, which was 
                                                
1 Karen Davies, Understanding EU Law (London, Cavendish, 2001) at 21; August Reinisch, Essential 
Questions in EU Law (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 13; Josephine Steiner and Lorna 
Woods, EU Law, 10th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) at 51; Nigel Foster, EU Law, 4th ed. 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014) at 44; Erika Szyszczak, Adam Cygan, Understanding EU Law, 
2nd ed. (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2008); Thomas Christiansen, "The European Union after the Lisbon 
Treaty: An Elusive Institutional Balance?" in Andrea Biondi et al (ed), EU Law After Lisbon (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2012) at 228. 
2 Davies, supra note 1 at 21. 
3 Ibid at 22. 
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formally recognized by the EU Member States in Article 5 of the Treaty Establishing the 
European Community, requires that decisions should be taken “at the most appropriate 
level, as close to the citizen as possible, demonstrating that power is intended to be shared 
between the supranational institutions, national (Member State) and sub-national 
(regional) levels.”4 Due to these core principles, the EU functions as a supranational 
organization, the basis for which is found in a series of international agreements, treaties 
and regulations that are negotiated and adopted by its Member States.5 Membership in 
the EU therefore requires relinquishment of sovereignty in a limited fashion, with the 
likelihood of sanctions being imposed on Member States that refuse to do so.6  
To that end, within the EU issues of jurisdiction in disputes of a civil or commercial 
nature, including matters relating to national intellectual property rights, are subject to the 
Brussels I Regulations.7 In these Regulations, the ones relevant to intellectual property 
disputes (as of the amendments that came into force in 2012) are: 
(i) Article 4 (formerly Article 2), stating that a defendant domiciled in a Member 
State, irrespective of his nationality, is to be sued in the country of his 
domicile. 
(ii) Article 7(2) (formerly Article 5(3)), stating that for matters relating to tort, 
delict or quasi-delict, the place where the harmful event occurred would be the 
basis for establishing jurisdiction, including the place where a casual act 
causing the harm has occurred. 
                                                
4 Ibid at 21; Treaty Establishing the European Community (Consolidated Version) [2008] OJ C115/13 
(entered into 25 March 1957), art 5 [hereinafter referred to as the “EC Treaty”]. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid at 22. 
7 Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, OJ L 351, 
20 December 2012 (formerly Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction 
and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, OJ L 012, 16 January 
2001) (henceforth known as “Regulation”). 
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(iii) Article 8 (formerly Article 6), stating that co-defendants in other Member 
States may be joined to the action under certain circumstances. 
(iv) Article 24(4) (formerly Article 22(4)), referring to the place of registration of 
an IP as the basis for establishing jurisdiction. 
To specify, the Regulation determines jurisdiction for disputes between states in the EU. 
Further, a judgment given by a court in a EU Member State is to be recognized in all 
other Member States. Within the EU, the general rule regarding applicable law for non-
contractual disputes is the “law of the country for which the protection is claimed.”8 If 
any court approached by the parties in the Member States takes jurisdiction of a copyright 
dispute in pursuance to the provisions of the Regulations, the applicable law would be the 
law of that forum since the each Member State has national IP statutes containing 
substantive provisions.9 The Regulation’s provisions on jurisdiction are based on the 
principle that jurisdiction is to be exercised by the EU Member State in which the 
defendant is domiciled, irrespective of the nationality of the defendant.10 Domicile is 
determined by application of the domestic law of EU Member State if the suit is brought 
before a forum in that State. The Regulations therefore do not apply if one of the parties 
is domiciled outside the EU.  
With this understanding of the Regulation in mind, analysis of relevant case law 
discussed during this research11 – and, indeed, there is only one case referring to Internet 
facts. This case involved three levels of the French court system before reaching the 
European Court of Justice. 
                                                
8 Regulation (EC) No 846/2007 of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome 
II) O.J. L 199 (entered into force on 31 July 2007), art 8(1): The law applicable to a non-contractual 
obligation arising from an infringement of an intellectual property right shall be the law of the country for 
which protection is claimed. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Regulation, supra note 7, art 4. 
11 Note that the cases discussed in Chapter 4 involving European parties are excluded from this discussion. 
The Def Lepp case (1986) predated the European Union Regulation. The Lucasfilms and Jean Lamore 
cases involve non-European parties, to which the Regulation will not apply. 
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6.2 Peter Pinckney v KDG Mediatech AG12 (Europe, 
2013) 
This case, as mentioned, brought before the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) involved a question of interpretation of Article 5(3) of the Regulation.13 The 
plaintiff in this case was a French national living in Toulouse who claimed authorship 
over musical works produced by him in 1970.14 The plaintiff discovered that his musical 
works had been reproduced without his authorization on compact discs that were burned 
in Austria by the defendant Mediatech, and subsequently marketed by two U.K. 
companies, Elegy and Crusoe.15 All these states – France, Austria and the U.K. – are 
Member States of the EU. 
6.2.1 Tribunal de grande instance de Toulouse  
The plaintiff brought the suit before of the French Court of First Instance at Toulouse 
seeking compensation for damage sustained on account of the infringement of his 
copyrighted works.16 Before the Court, the plaintiff claimed that: (i) the defendant copied 
his musical works on a compact disc in Austria, and (ii) the two U.K. companies were 
involved in the marketing and selling of the discs through websites accessible by the 
plaintiff in France. The defendant challenged the suit on the ground that the court did not 
have jurisdiction over the dispute. Rejecting the defendant’s claims, the French Court 
took jurisdiction of the case, holding that the plaintiff was able to access the website at 
his residence in France and this fact was “sufficient to establish a substantial connection 
                                                
12 [2013] EUECJ C-170/12. 
13 Note that the 2001 Regulation was in question in this case as the events occurred prior to the adoption of 
the 2012 amendments. 
14 Pinckney, supra note 11 at para 9. 
15 Ibid at para 9. 
16 Ibid at para 10. Please note that a translated copy of the decision (in English) of the Tribunal de grande 
instance de Toulouse is unavailable. However, the decisions of the Cour d’appel de Toulouse and the CJEU 
(which are available in English) refer to the decision of the Tribunal.  
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between the facts and the alleged damage.”17 The Court then applied French law to the 
case, finding that the defendant was liable for infringement.  
6.2.2 Cour d’appel de Toulouse  
The defendants appealed against the decision of the lower court, arguing that the CDs had 
been prepared in Austria and the same were marketed in the U.K. Therefore, only the 
courts in Austria (place of domicile of the defendant) or the U.K. (where the alleged acts 
of infringement occurred) would have jurisdiction over the case. The French Court of 
Appeal accepted the defendant’s claim and overturned the decision of the Regional 
Court, stating that the “damage likely occurred outside the borders of France”.18 The 
Court also held that, due to the circumstances being such that the damage occurred 
outside France, the Court could not investigate the possibility of any collusion between 
the defendant and the U.K. companies that were involved in the marketing and selling of 
the discs through their websites.19 The French Court of Appeal therefore refused to take 
jurisdiction of the dispute.  
This view was inconsistent with the Regulation provision that “a person domiciled in a 
Member State may, in another Member State, be sued … in matters relating to tort, delict 
or quasi-delict, in the courts of the place where the harmful event occurred or may 
occur.”20 
                                                
17 Ibid at para 10. 
18 Ibid at para 12. 
19 Ibid at 6. 
20 Regulation, supra note 7, art 5(3). 
  
162 
6.2.3 Cour de cassation 
The Court of Cassation stayed the proceedings of the appeal from the French Court of 
Appeal.21 The Court then referred the matter to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling on the 
following questions: 
1. Is Article 5(3) of the Regulation to be interpreted as meaning that, in the event of 
an alleged infringement of copyright committed by means of content placed 
online on a website, 
a. The person who considers that his rights have been infringed has the 
option of bringing an action to establish liability before the courts of each 
Member State in the territory of which content placed online is or has been 
accessible, in order to obtain compensation solely in respect of the damage 
suffered on the territory of the Member State of the court before which the 
action is brought, or 
b. Does that content also have to be, or to have been, directed at the public 
located in the territory of that Member State, or must some other clear 
connecting factor be present? 
2. Is the answer to Question 1 the same if the alleged infringement of copyright 
results, not from the placing of de-materialized content online, but, as in the 
present case, from the online sale of a material carrier medium, which reproduces 
that content?22 
6.2.4 Court of Justice of the European Union 
Before issuing a “clarification” on the questions posed by the French Court of Cassation, 
the CJEU reformulated the questions.23 The new question before the CJEU was hence: 
                                                
21 No judgment was rendered; therefore no citation is provided. 
22 Ibid at para 15. 
23 Bench comprising of L. Bay Larsen, J. Malenovský, U. Lõhmus, M. Safjan (Rapporteur) and A. Prechal 
(unanimously deciding). 
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Whether Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation must be interpreted as 
meaning that where is an alleged infringement of a copyright which is 
protected by the Member State of the court seized, that court has 
jurisdiction to hear an action to establish liability brought by the author 
of a work against a company established in another Member State, which 
has in the latter State reproduced that work on a material support which is 
subsequently marketed by companies established in a third Member State 
through an internet site which is also accessible in the Member State of 
the court seized?24 
Based on this question, the CJEU then clarified the meaning of the “place where the 
harmful event occurred or may occur” under Article 5(3) of the Regulation.25 The CJEU 
held that this provision covers both the place where the damage occurred and the place 
where the event causing the damage took place – meaning that the defendant can be 
brought before a court at either places.26 This also signifies that the EU has given a 
choice to European plaintiffs about which place he/she/it wishes to file the suit. To quote 
the CJEU:  
In the light of all of the foregoing, the answer to the questions referred is 
that Article 5(3) of the Regulation must be interpreted as meaning that, in 
the event of alleged infringement of copyrights protected by the Member 
State of the court seized, the latter has jurisdiction to hear an action to 
establish liability brought by the author of a work against a company 
established in another Member State and which has, in the latter State, 
reproduced that work on a material support which is subsequently sold by 
companies established in a third Member State through an internet site 
also accessible with the jurisdiction of the court seized. That court has 
                                                
24 Pinckney, supra note 11 at para 22. 
25 Ibid at para 25. 
26 Ibid at para 26. 
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jurisdiction only to determine the damage caused in the Member State 
within which it is situated.27  
The CJEU therefore held that courts of Member States where the harm occurred and 
where the works are protected would be competent to determine infringement and order 
compensation. In essence, the place of harm or the likelihood of occurrence of harm 
would determine which law is to be applied in a cross-border copyright infringement 
case. The CJEU rationalized this view by stating that if a work is accessible online, 
irrespective of the medium of sale, there is likelihood of harm occurring.28 Further, the 
CJEU approached the provision under the Regulation as a “rule of special jurisdiction” 
that directed courts in deciding which country’s law would apply.29 This marks the 
difference between the common law approach to private international law rules in 
copyright cases and the more comprehensive regulated European approach. Under the 
Regulation, the general rule regarding jurisdiction is that the suit can be entertained in the 
place of domicile or residence of the defendant.30 The Article 5(3) rule, however, grants 
“special jurisdiction” that should be wielded by courts in a selective manner. This is 
because the provision expressly refers to the place where the harmful event “occurred or 
may occur,” hence including the place of harm, the place of likelihood of harm and the 
place where the act causing harm occurred. The provision therefore embodies the 
application of lex loci delicti in pursuance of prevalent tort principles in Europe.31 This is 
notably different from the lex fori rule contained in the principle of National Treatment in 
Berne. Note that the CJEU decision does not refer to the Berne Convention or any other 
international copyright treaty in any capacity. It does, however refer to the principle of 
territoriality, dismissing it in favour of the Regulation. To quote:  
                                                
27 Ibid at para 47. 
28 Ibid at para 36, 44, 47. 
29 Ibid at para 27. 
30 Regulation, supra note 7, art 2(1). 
31 eDate Advertising v X (Area of Freedom, Security and Justice) [2011] EUECJ C-509/09 (25 October 
2011); Wintersteiger AG v Products 4U Sondermaschinenbau GmbH [2012] WLR (D) 117, Case C-
523/10). 
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First of all, it is true that copyright, like the rights attaching to a national 
trademark, is subject to the principle of territoriality. However, 
copyrights must be automatically protected, in particular by virtue of 
Directive 2001/29, in all Member States, so that they may be infringed in 
each one in accordance with the applicable substantive law.  
In that connection, it must be stated from the outset that the issue as to 
whether the conditions under which a right protected in the Member State 
in which the court seized is situated may be regarded as having been 
infringed and whether that infringement may be attributed to the 
defendant falls within the scope of the examination of the substance of 
the action by the court having jurisdiction.32 
As the CJEU explains, the Regulation should be mandatorily followed by the Member 
States to establish jurisdiction, so that they can give effect to copyright protections under 
the respective substantive law efficiently. The effect of the international copyright treaties 
and the principle of National Treatment are therefore quashed by the effect of the 
Regulation. 
Further note that the ratio of the CJEU in Pinckney did not consider the added factual 
element of the Internet (as a medium of distribution of copied works) as essential to its 
discussion. The presumption that harm has occurred or will occur, without the 
requirement of targeting consumers in a particular jurisdiction, ensures that infringement 
can be localized and the relevant national laws can be applied to resolve the dispute 
regardless of where the actual infringement takes place.  
                                                
32 Pinckney, supra note 11 at para 39, 40. 
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6.3 The European Union as an Outlier to this Study  
Note that while the factual circumstances of the case involve the Internet, the process of 
transmission over the Internet does not form the core analysis of this case, differentiating 
it from the post-Internet cases dealt with in Chapter 5. This case is in terms of this thesis 
an exception to the application of the principle of National Treatment and, indeed, also to 
the application of private international law rules because the CJEU interpreted only the 
EU’s internal supranational Regulation for the purpose of determining jurisdiction and 
applicable law. This case analysis provided by the CJEU therefore appears to assume 
copyright disputes within the European Union are to be handled in a manner differently 
from those in other jurisdictions. It should be noted that the author’s analysis of this case 
questions whether the Regulation as applied in Pinckey to copyright is in line with the 
obligations of the Member States of the EU as signatories of the Berne Convention.  
The case of Pinckney highlights why EU disputes brought before the CJEU or other 
European courts, and decided exclusively on the basis of the Regulation, cannot form a 
part of this study.33 The EU system of implementing Directives that guide the courts of 
Member States (through the guidance of the supranational CJEU) on the application of 
private international law rules is starkly different from the manner in which other nations 
are subject to such supranational Directives conduct themselves and apparently even lead 
the EU to ignore the Berne Convention and, presumably, its successor copyright treaties. 
In the Berne context, the requirement of territoriality was developed based on copyright-
specific national laws from the 19th century with the intent of legitimizing the concept of 
global authorship.34 Therefore, the National Treatment principle was based on the 
understanding that copyright is best protected through national laws, but an additional 
requirement of non-discrimination, informality, and minimum rights will only make this 
                                                
33 Trevor Cook, "Exceptions and Limitations in European Union Copyright Law" (2012) 17(3) J. of Int'll. 
Prop. Rights 17(3) 243 at 243, 244 (examining a gap in the application of copyright limitations and 
exceptions between the United States and the EU, questioning whether the EU is a problem in this regard). 
34 See Chapter 3 discussing the evolution of copyright law in national legislation, moving into the 
international sphere. 
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system stronger on a global scale. In the EU context, the existence of a mandatory 
Directive prescribing private international law rules negates the effect of the Berne 
Convention and the principle of National Treatment.35 Additionally, even if a court in a 
Member State decided to apply the National Treatment principle to a cross-border 
copyright dispute before it, it appears it can only do so as long as its interpretation fits 
within the boundaries of the Regulation. However, as seen in Pinckney, this cannot be 
achieved. Article 5 of the Regulation specifies a rule for determining jurisdiction that 
goes beyond the lex fori rule that National Treatment encapsulates. Therefore, there is no 
option for reconciliation between the private international law rules prescribed in the 
Regulation and the Berne Convention.  
In conclusion, while the conversation in the EU context is an exception to the questions 
put forth in this thesis, the area does present scope for further research in understanding 
how the Berne requirements (and provisions of subsequent copyright treaties) can be 
interpreted in the context of EU Directives that prescribe private international law rules.  
                                                
35 Considering the private international law rule of lex fori contained in the National Treatment principle, 
the Regulation therefore is in contravention of the Berne Convention. However, this discussion does not 
pertain to the overall objective of the thesis, and may be investigated through further research in the area. 
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Chapter 7  
7 Conclusions 
 
This final chapter restates the research problem set out in Chapter 1, summarizes the 
findings of the research, addresses the hypotheses laid out in Chapter 1, and demonstrates 
the answer to the research question that this thesis establishes. The chapter also includes 
some proposals for further areas of research.  
In the first chapter the following research question was set out: 
What is the extent to which the principle of “National Treatment” can 
be applied as a private international law or conflict of laws rule to 
resolve cross-border copyright infringement issues over the Internet? 
The key concepts involved in the Research Question are the following: 
(1) The Principle of National Treatment (as it pertains to copyright); 
(2) Copyright infringement; 
(3) Cross-border flows (of works and other subject matter governed by copyright 
law); and 
(4) The advent of the Internet. 
The “principle of National Treatment”, discussed extensively in Chapter 3, is a principle 
of non-discrimination that promises foreign authors (from countries that are members of 
the Union) that they will enjoy the same protection of their works in the protecting 
country that the nationals of the country of the domestic forum would enjoy. It is 
contained in the core international copyright law treaties - the Berne Convention 1886,1 
                                                
1 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 9 September 1886, S. Treaty Doc. 
No. 99-27 art 5 (entered into force 5 December 1887) (hereinafter referred as “Berne Convention”). 
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the Rome Convention 1961,2 the TRIPS Agreement 1994,3 and the WIPO Copyright 
Treaties 1996.4 National Treatment, embodied in text for the first time in Article 5 of the 
Berne Convention, was found to be a core concept of copyright treaties that facilitated the 
dissemination of information in protected works while also ensuring economic and moral 
rights to authors irrespective of their nationality.  
In Chapter 3, the evolution of copyright law in the national and international spheres 
were studied, historically mapping its development in England, the United States and 
France, and then moving into the global landscape. The Chapter demonstrated that 
throughout the eighteenth century, copyright law was restricted to national legislation – 
the national laws were territorial and remedies were largely only available to the local 
authors. Authors therefore faced several challenges with respect to how their works were 
treated in foreign jurisdictions. The chapter also studied the emergence of bilateral 
treaties in Europe, followed by the evolution of the major copyright treaties – the Berne 
Convention 1886,5 the Rome Convention 1961,6 the TRIPS Agreement 1994,7 and the 
WIPO Copyright Treaties 1996.8 Through these treaties, the principle of “National 
Treatment” was studied. National Treatment, embodied in Article 5 of the Berne 
Convention, was found to be a core concept of copyright treaties that facilitated the 
dissemination of information in protected works while also ensuring economic and moral 
rights to authors irrespective of their nationality.  
                                                
2 International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting 
Organisations (Rome, 26 Oct. 1961) 496 U.N.T.S. 43 (entered into force 18 May 1964) (hereinafter 
referred as “Rome Convention”). 
3 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 15 April 1994, 1869 UNTS 299; 33 
ILM 1197 art 3 (entered into force 1 January 1996) (hereinafter referred as “TRIPS Agreement”). 
4 WIPO Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 2186 U.N.T.S. 121, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17; 36 I.L.M. 65 
(hereinafter referred as “WCT”); WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 2186 
U.N.T.S. 203, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17; 36 I.L.M. 76 (hereinafter referred as “WPPT”). 
5 Berne Convention, supra note 1. 
6 Rome Convention, supra note 2. 
7 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 3. 
8 WCT, supra note 4; WPPT, supra note 4. 
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“Copyright infringement” is an essential matter of substantive copyright law: it the 
statutory action for enforcement of private rights in copyright, as described above in 
Chapter 1. 
Decisions by courts about whether to entertain “Cross-border” disputes involving law in 
general, as observed in Chapter 2, involves the application of traditional private 
international law principles. In this thesis, those private international law rules were 
considered in terms of their possible application to copyright law. 
The “Internet” as a concept in this thesis was studied in two parts: it was conceptualized 
in two phases as the law involving fact patterns consistent with pre-Internet conditions 
and the law involving facts patterns that can only exist post-Internet. The question that 
the thesis posed in terms of copyright infringement over the Internet was to assess 
whether courts had changed their approaches to post-Internet cases in ways that were 
unique to the post-Internet environment and did not occur for any pre-Internet cases.  
The hypotheses put forth before embarking on this research were:  
1. The application of the principle of National Treatment reflects a 
private international law rule applicable to cross-border 
copyright disputes. 
2. Domestic courts need not adopt any private international law 
rule in addition to the principle of National Treatment in order to 
resolve cross-border copyright disputes. 
3. The Internet has changed the circumstances of cross-border 
copyright infringement such that it can only be combated by the 
application of principles in addition to National Treatment and 
involving other private international law rules.  
With respect to Hypothesis 1, the hypothesis was supported by this research.  In 
particular, in Chapter 3, it was demonstrated by this author, based on analysis of the 
opinions of legal scholars on the question of the nature of the principle of National 
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Treatment, that the principle of National Treatment is best considered as included within 
the private international law rule of lex fori.  
By conducting an extensive literature review, it was found that various scholars opted to 
describe the National Treatment principle in different ways. Some scholars looked at the 
National Treatment principle as the private international law rule of lex fori or the 
application of the law of the forum.9 Others entirely rejected the possibility of any private 
international law rule embracing the principle National Treatment.10 A few others not 
only embraced National Treatment as part of international recognized international 
private law rule, but also argued that it was embraced in lex fori. They also sought to 
include it within other private international law principles, such as lex originis,11 lex loci 
protectionis12 and lex loci delicti.13  
Among these arguments, authors who proposed exclusively the rule of lex fori not only 
considered the bare text of Article 5, but also assessed the historical climate of the 
nineteenth century in the copyright context. More importantly, it was noted that National 
Treatment was a principle contained within lex fori, as lex fori itself was applicable to a 
range of private international law issues, (including procedural matters, tax law and 
criminal law). As the aim of the Berne Convention was to push the world towards global 
authorship rights and equal treatment of all authors, the principle of National Treatment 
would ensure that courts in signatory countries would look to applying the national 
copyright law to foreign authors. Essentially, the National Treatment principle dictated 
that the domestic courts would have jurisdiction over cases if infringement occurred in 
                                                
9 The works of Melville Nimmer, Stephen M. Stewart and Paul Edward Gellar, discussed in Chapter 3.  
10 The works of Sam Ricketson, Jane Ginsburg and Mireille van Eechoud, discussed in Chapter 3. 
11 Stephen M. Stewart agrees that lex originis could be a possibility, but rejects it on the point that it would 
force courts to apply the law of the origin of the work to every copyright dispute before it, and such a 
position would lead to discrimination of foreign authors – which National Treatment specifically forbids. 
12 The works of James Fawcett and Paul Torremans, and Sierd J. Schaafsma, discussed in Chapter 3. 
13 Richard Fentiman rejects the rules of lex fori, lex originis and lex loci protectionis, but considers whether 
lex loci delicti would apply, although the language of Article 5 of the Berne Convention suggest that it does 
not, discussed in Chapter 3. 
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that country, and that the law applicable to the dispute would be the national copyright 
law. With this understanding of National Treatment, especially looking at the principle in 
its historical setting, the evidence points to the inclusion of the principle of National 
Treatment in the private international law rule of lex fori. 
The first hypothesis therefore, being whether the application of the principle of National 
Treatment reflects a private international law rule applicable to cross-border copyright 
disputes, is proven. National treatment has been expressed by various scholars as being 
part of lex fori (noted in Chapter 3.6). In a cross-border copyright situation, copyright 
infringement is governed by National Treatment, which is a unique principle of copyright 
law that is a recognizable application of the general private international law rule of lex 
fori. National Treatment is therefore uniquely located within substantive national 
copyright statutes but is applicable in the private international law scenarios brought in 
front of courts through cross-border disputes. 
This research focused on seeking out cross-border copyright cases involving explicit 
judicial discussion of the principles of private international law arising in the three 
jurisdictions historically linked with the origins of copyright law: Britain (whose 
eighteenth century copyright law was carried into the law of the United States when it 
achieved independence by the end of that same century); the United States, whose 
adherence to its original conception of copyright law persisted long after the progenitor of 
that law, Britain, had moved to a changed conception because of its international 
multilateral commitments beginning with the late nineteenth century Berne Convention; 
and France, whose copyright law emerged as least as early as the British and who, with 
Britain, instigated the original Berne Convention.  The law of a fourth jurisdiction, 
Canada, is also examined – as a jurisdiction brought into Berne on its inception whose 
Supreme Court has grappled explicitly with the implications of the Internet on the 
concepts underpinning this thesis.  
It was found that although, for about a century after the Berne Convention, cross-border 
copyright infringement cases observed involving pre-Internet fact patterns did not involve 
judicial discussion of private international law rules, some courts began to contemplate 
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the application of private international law rules to such pre-Internet scenarios after 1990. 
In Lucasfilm Limited and others v Ainsworth and another14 (U.K., 2011), the different 
levels of the English courts struggled with understanding whether English courts had 
jurisdiction over the case and how the extra-territorial application of the U.K. copyright 
law could be interpreted, arriving at the conclusion that U.K. would apply based on the 
principle that the law where the protection is claimed should apply. In Jean Lamore v 
Universal City Studios and others15 (French, 2007), it was held that by the final French 
appeal court that the law of the origin of the work is relevant to a copyright dispute, and 
law of the place where the protection is claimed could not be applied in consideration of 
the foreign parties’ interests. In the American case of Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v 
Russian Kurier, Inc.16 (U.S., 1998), both levels of courts applied the law of the origin of 
the work as well, with the appeal court additionally splitting “ownership” and 
“infringement” (applying the law of the place of harm to infringement). In L.A. News 
Serv. v Reuters Television Int’l, Ltd.17 (1998), foreign acts of infringement were found to 
be justiciable in the U.S., with American law applying to the dispute.  
The data therefore showed that, from 1990 onwards, courts in each of the UK, US and 
France moved away from the strict territorial application of their national copyright laws 
and resorted to the exploration and application of private international law principles 
instead. Analysis of these cases, however, illustrates that at every level of court, there 
were discrepancies about which private international law rule to choose to apply– lex fori, 
lex originis, lex loci protectionis, lex loci delicti or the law of the place where the 
defendant is domiciled (see again Table 1).  
Further analysis in this thesis of each of these cases in Chapter 4 showed that upon the 
application of National Treatment as the sole private international law rule the disputes in 
issue could have been resolved in a much easier manner. In each case, the National 
                                                
14 [2011] UKSC 39; [2012] 1 AC 208. 
15 (2007) 212 R.I.D.A. 261. 
16 153 F.3d 82 (2nd Cir. 1998). 
17 149 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 1998). 
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Treatment rule would find that as long as the infringement occurred within the borders of 
the country, the domestic law would apply indiscriminately for claims by both national 
and foreign rights holders. For any acts of infringement occurring outside the borders of 
the country, the domestic courts could not take jurisdiction of such disputes and the 
domestic law would not apply to these instances of infringement. Indeed, in all cases 
found before 1990, lex fori was the only principle used to settle the cases, which 
inadvertently applied the National Treatment principle, regardless of whether the courts 
in those cases directly referred to the Berne Convention or not. This finding supports 
Hypothesis 2, demonstrating that domestic courts do not need to adopt any private 
international law rule in addition the principle of National Treatment (whether or not it is 
embedded within an existing rule of private international law, though the finding of this 
research in respect of Hypothesis 1 demonstrates that it is best conceived as part of the 
law of lex fori). 
In the post-Internet analysis, it was found that the issues of jurisdiction and applicable 
law involved assessment of the transmission of information over the Internet in each of 
these cases, and the courts had discussed the influence of the Internet at every level. 
Some levels of courts attempted to answer cross-border copyright infringement over the 
Internet by using connecting factors to localize infringement to within the state’s borders. 
Others acknowledged that if an act of infringement by transmission does not originate in 
the country, the national copyright law would not apply to that dispute. In the Canadian 
case of Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v Canadian 
Association of Internet Providers (Tariff 22),18 two diverging opinions of the Copyright 
Board and the Supreme Court of Canada are noted. While the Copyright Board 
established that the national copyright law would only apply on a territorial basis, the 
Supreme Court adjudged that infringement actions that occurred abroad may be localized 
to Canada by the use of the private international law rule that mandates a “real and 
substantial connection” to Canada. In the American case of Twentieth Century Fox Film 
                                                
18 2 S.C.R. 427, 2004 SCC 45. 
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Corp. et al v iCraveTV et al,19 it was found that Western District Court of Pennsylvania 
applied a private international law rule to localize infringement (“continuous and 
systematic contacts”) but that rule in no way negates the effect of the principle of 
National Treatment. In fact, although Court adopted a private international law rule to 
establish personal jurisdiction over the dispute, the application of National Treatment 
would have resulted in the same effect. This was therefore a curious case where the Court 
applied a private international law rule, but within the confines of the principle of 
National Treatment. Lastly, the case of La Société des Auteurs des arts visuels et de 
L’image Fixe (SAIF) v Google France, S.A.R.L., and Google Inc.20 saw a role reversal 
from the Tariff 22 case. In this case, the Court of Appeal expressly referred to the Berne 
Convention, holding that Article 5 refers to the law of the country where the protection is 
claimed. Further, it upheld the territoriality rule contained in National Treament, ruling 
that even if damage occurs in more than one place (with either forum having jurisdiction 
over the dispute), the court that is approached by the parties can only consider acts of 
infringement that can be directly linked within the jurisdiction of that court. By applying 
the law of the forum to the dispute, the Court asserted a pure application of the National 
Treatment principle to determine jurisdiction and the applicable law in a cross-border 
copyright dispute occurring over the Internet. As noted in the cases studied in Chapter 4, 
the application of the principle of National Treatment as a private international law, 
similar to the SAIF v Google decision in France, as long as an act of infringement 
occurred within the domestic borders of the country - a fact that could be established 
through a technical understanding of transmission of information over the Internet, as 
described in the Tariff 22 case – the domestic court can take jurisdiction of the dispute 
and apply the relevant domestic law. This would result in a more efficient process of 
combating cross-border copyright infringement.  
With this analysis, the second hypothesis is proven. With the use of the National 
Treatment principle, courts need not look into the application of any additional private 
                                                
19 2000 WL 255989 (W.D.Pa.) (Western District Court of Pennsylvania). 
20 Cour d’appel Paris, L.E.Ch. (26 Jan 2011) [hereinafter referred to as “SAIF v Google”]. 
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international law rule. As noted in each of the cases studied, the application of National 
Treatment would assist the courts in only taking jurisdiction of copyright disputes that 
arose due to an actual instance of infringement in within that jurisdiction. Further, once 
the court does take jurisdiction of the dispute, the National Treatment principle would 
point towards the application of the domestic copyright law (lex fori).  
The third hypothesis, of this research, however, was not proven on the data uncovered. 
The evidence does not support the proposition that the Internet as a medium of 
information dissemination caused changes in the circumstances of cross-border copyright 
disputes such that principles of private international law were required in addition to the 
principle of National Treatment.  
The third hypothesis failed to support in the data in two ways.  First, as mentioned above, 
Chapter 4 demonstrates that courts began to explore use of principle of private 
international law after 1990 on facts that did not involve the Internet (these courts were 
still grappling with issues involving physical copies of works travelling across borders) – 
so the advent of the Internet could not be the precipitating factor in this change. Second, 
as discussed in Chapter 5, even where the facts do include the Internet, the principle of 
National Treatment still effectively answers these issues irrespective of the role of the 
Internet in the infringing acts.  This research has demonstrated, in fact, that analysis of 
post-Internet factual realities by domestic courts has shown them to readily demonstrate a 
technical understanding of the Internet in order to address the questions before them but 
then, taken together, analysis of these courts indicates that the Internet is not a core factor 
in why some courts have changed their tune with respect to applying National Treatment 
as a private international law rule. It is analyzed, in this thesis, of the jurisprudence in 
Chapters 4 and 5, taken together with exploration of authors writing on these questions 
(in Chapter 3), that demonstrates conclusively that the application of the National 
Treatment principle to cross-border copyright disputes (whether involving the Internet or 
not) is more effective than the application of any other private international law rule. 
Nevertheless, this researcher anticipated finding a change in the way private international 
law rules were applied in copyright disputes that would be observable only in cases 
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involving post-Internet facts. However, the findings in Chapters 4 and 5 show that the 
trend of applying private international law rules to cross-border copyright disputes by 
courts was not in any way exacerbated by the introduction of the Internet.  The advent of 
the Internet has been shown to have merely continued a trend that was already in 
existence in non-Internet cases decided post-1990.  
Further consideration of the fact that the positions of some courts with respect to cross-
border copyright infringement disputes changed after 1990 to include principles of 
private international law beyond that of National Treatment begs further research.   
Since the United States remained outside the Berne Union until 1989, and therefore 
would not have used the principle of National Treatment from the Berne Convention in 
its court decisions made before that time, it provides reason to speculate whether the 
entry of the United States into the Berne regime and the subsequent decisions of 
American courts, canvassing both the Berne Convention and the wider principles of 
private international law (see both Chapters 4 and 5), have affected the views of the 
courts in the United Kingdom and France, as well as the American courts.  This change in 
the international copyright position of the United States (and not the advent of the 
Internet) may provide the explanation for the change away from exclusive reference to 
the principle of National Treatment by Berne Union members up until the 1990s.  This 
thesis cannot establish such a causal connection but it could be an area for future 
research.  
This thesis establishes that, contrary to the expectations of Hypothesis 3, there is no 
factual situation in which it can be demonstrated that the application of the principle of 
National Treatment is not equal to the task before court of fairly deciding cases involving 
cross-border disputes, given the fact that virtually all the countries of the world are now 
part of the Berne Union as a result of widespread membership in the World Trade 
Organization.  
Given this finding, it is important to reflect upon the study provided in this thesis of the 
state of public international treaties and other texts that attempt to codify private 
international law rules and provide agreements for their global application. Chapter 2 
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provided an understanding of the status of these treaties, and also examined public 
international law efforts – and “model” efforts to standardize and codify private 
international law precepts across nations. It was noted that a common provision that each 
of these treaty attempts was the “public policy” exception. The “public policy” exception 
in each such document was shown to be available for member nations to use in a situation 
where a foreign law that would generally be applicable to a domestic forum cannot be 
enforced in domestic law pursuant to the treaty because its enactment by the state would 
violate a public policy of that land. Despite the inclusion of the “public policy” exception, 
this research describes the fact that these treaties have not been particularly successful: 
very few countries have signed and ratified them.21  
As a consequence of the analysis of the third hypothesis in this research (which was not 
supported), this thesis has demonstrated that “National Treatment” embedded in the 
substantive text of the Berne Convention and all subsequent international copyright 
treaties is a more effective way of resolving private international law issues in copyright 
infringement disputes than the development and enforcement of treaties containing 
similar provisions in a comprehensive international “procedural treaty” governing private 
international law matters, even if the “public policy” exception is included in the drafting 
of such public international law instruments. The Berne principles have excelled in 
application to cross-border copyright disputes, as evidenced by the complete lack of 
reference to principles of private international law principles in cross-border disputes in 
copyright right up until the 1990s. The longevity of Berne and the National Treatment 
principle embedded within it demonstrates that National Principle is the necessary private 
international law rule that courts need to apply to cross-border copyright disputes and that 
is acceptable to states around the globe. Additionally, this research has shown that if such 
                                                
21 Note that very few of these treaties are in force. Only those relating to family matters have shown any 
sign of success. Among the family law treaties, the Hague Convention on parental responsibility and 
protection of children (entered into force 1 January 2002) has 41 ratifications and is currently in force. No 
such treaty involving any other area of law has come into force. For instance, as of this thesis, only five 
states have signed on to the Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments 
in Civil and Commercial Matters, and only three have ratified it. It is currently in force (as it requires two 
ratifications to do so) but the signatures and ratifications it has received are no a significant number to 
deem it successful, or at least, as successful as the treaties in the family law areas. 
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public international law treaties do continue to become effective to regulate states’ laws 
regarding appropriate application of principles of private international law to disputes, in 
the case of copyright law, their existence and their application by states, except in cases 
where the principle of National Treatment would effectively be the exclusive private 
international law principles allowed, would put member states in violation of the Berne 
principles. In this thesis, this very scenario is raised in Chapter 6 in terms of the 
supranational law of the Brussels I Regulation, which appears to bring the states of the 
European Union into possible violation of their international copyright commitments. 
Therefore, the evidence of this thesis study demonstrates that such treaties should 
expressly exclude copyright law from their ambit.  
This thesis has proven that the principle of National Treatment is just as relevant today in 
the context of the Internet as it has been since its inception into international law in the 
nineteenth century. Its relevance as a private international law principle for cross-border 
copyright infringement occurring over the Internet has been studied in this thesis through 
a historical assessment of both National Treatment and the private international law 
principles that courts across key copyright jurisdictions have developed. Despite how 
different private international law rules would treat multi-national copyright infringement 
issues, this thesis has demonstrated that the text of the major copyright treaties can ensure 
that the pure use of National Treatment is sufficient to protect foreign authors, with the 
caveat that all the nations involved must also have the same responsibilities and follow 
the same principles as apply to nationals of the forum country.  
The very nature of information on the Internet, as elaborated in the Tariff 22 case, is such 
that its transmission can be traced. There is a point of transmission, a point of reception 
and several points of hosting and storage along the way, each server generally in a 
different country. Often, temporary copies or caches are made on various servers for the 
purpose of efficiency in retrieving information. The way the Internet operates will not 
change in the near future and although courts have begun to understand the legal 
implications of such technology, they have attempted to address its legal issues by 
applying private international law principles that were developed for the movement of 
physical copies of information across real borders. Therefore, while such an approach is 
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in line with traditional approaches to private international law rules for other cross-border 
matters, it creates ambiguities to apply the same rules to copyright in the Internet context.  
Copyright is concerned with the protection of information, making it a valuable 
commodity in international transactions. The private international law rules that govern 
jurisdiction and the procedural and substantive law applicable to copyright cross-border 
infringement issues cannot be left in the uncertain state that it currently occupies, as 
demonstrated in analysis of the post-Internet fact patterns dealt with by courts described 
in Chapter 5, with different jurisdictions, and different courts even within a given 
jurisdiction, seeking to apply various principles to the disputes. Although this thesis has 
demonstrated at a theoretical level that the scope of the principle of National Treatment 
falls within the private international law rule of lex fori, the implication of the rule of 
National Treatment is that it makes the functioning of courts much easier. National laws 
need not be amended to address issues arising in either new or old fact situations as the 
principle of National Treatment is a core concept of global copyright law, prescribed by 
international treaties and encompassed in national statutes. The private international law 
embodied in the principle of National Treatment ensures that courts can take jurisdiction 
of disputes where the infringement occurs within that territory and the law applicable to 
the dispute would be the local copyright law. In the context of the Internet, strict 
adherence to the principle of National Treatment will help reduce the burdens of the 
courts by determining jurisdiction and applicable law. It is therefore important to 
acknowledge that, for copyright disputes, the law had already adapted itself appropriately 
for the Internet back when the principle of National Treatment was embedded in the 
nineteenth century Berne Convention.   
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Appendices 
 
Appendix  1: Relevant Provisions of the Berne Convention for the 
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Berne Convention, 1886) 
 
Article 5.  
Rights Guaranteed: 1. and 2. Outside the country of origin; 3. In the country of 
origin; 4. “Country of origin” 
(1) Authors shall enjoy, in respect of works for which they are protected under this 
Convention, in countries of the Union other than the country of origin, the rights which 
their respective laws do now or may hereafter grant to their nationals, as well as the rights 
specially granted by this Convention. 
(2) The enjoyment and the exercise of these rights shall not be subject to any formality; 
such enjoyment and such exercise shall be independent of the existence of protection in 
the country of origin of the work. Consequently, apart from the provisions of this 
Convention, the extent of protection, as well as the means of redress afforded to the 
author to protect his rights, shall be governed exclusively by the laws of the country 
where protection is claimed. 
(3) Protection in the country of origin is governed by domestic law. However, when the 
author is not a national of the country of origin of the work for which he is protected 
under this Convention, he shall enjoy in that country the same rights as national authors. 
(4) The country of origin shall be considered to be: 
(a) in the case of works first published in a country of the Union, that country; in the 
case of works published simultaneously in several countries of the Union which 
grant different terms of protection, the country whose legislation grants the 
shortest term of protection; 
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(b) in the case of works published simultaneously in a country outside the Union and 
in a country of the Union, the latter country; 
(c) in the case of unpublished works or of works first published in a country outside 
the Union, without simultaneous publication in a country of the Union, the 
country of the Union of which the author is a national, provided that: 
(i) when these are cinematographic works the maker of which has his 
headquarters or his habitual residence in a country of the Union, 
the country of origin shall be that country, and 
(ii) when these are works of architecture erected in a country of the 
Union or other artistic works incorporated in a building or other 
structure located in a country of the Union, the country of origin 
shall be that country. 
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Appendix  2: Relevant Provisions of the International Convention for the 
Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting 
Organisations (Rome Convention, 1961) 
 
Article 2. 
Protection given by the Convention 
Definition of National Treatment 
1. For the purposes of this Convention, national treatment shall mean the treatment 
accorded by the domestic law of the Contracting State in which protection is claimed: 
(a) to performers who are its nationals, as regards performances taking place, 
broadcast, or first fixed, on its territory; 
(b) to producers of phonograms who are its nationals, as regards phonograms first 
fixed or first published on its territory; 
(c) to broadcasting organisations which have their headquarters on its territory, as 
regards broadcasts transmitted from transmitters situated on its territory. 
2. National treatment shall be subject to the protection specifically guaranteed, and the 
limitations specifically provided for, in this Convention. 
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Appendix  3: Relevant Provisions of the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement, 1994) 
 
Article 3.  
National Treatment 
1. Each Member shall accord to the nationals of other Members treatment no less 
favourable than that it accords to its own nationals with regard to the protection of 
intellectual property, subject to the exceptions already provided in, respectively, the Paris 
Convention (1967), the Berne Convention (1971), the Rome Convention or the Treaty on 
Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits.  In respect of performers, 
producers of phonograms and broadcasting organizations, this obligation only applies in 
respect of the rights provided under this Agreement.  Any Member availing itself of the 
possibilities provided in Article 6 of the Berne Convention (1971) or paragraph 1(b) of 
Article 16 of the Rome Convention shall make a notification as foreseen in those 
provisions to the Council for TRIPS. 
2. Members may avail themselves of the exceptions permitted under paragraph 1 in 
relation to judicial and administrative procedures, including the designation of an address 
for service or the appointment of an agent within the jurisdiction of a Member, only 
where such exceptions are necessary to secure compliance with laws and regulations 
which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement and where such 
practices are not applied in a manner which would constitute a disguised restriction on 
trade. 
  
Article 4. 
Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment 
With regard to the protection of intellectual property, any advantage, favour, privilege or 
immunity granted by a Member to the nationals of any other country shall be accorded 
immediately and unconditionally to the nationals of all other Members.  Exempted from 
this obligation are any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity accorded by a Member: 
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(a) deriving from international agreements on judicial assistance or law enforcement 
of a general nature and not particularly confined to the protection of intellectual 
property; 
(b) granted in accordance with the provisions of the Berne Convention (1971) or the 
Rome Convention authorizing that the treatment accorded be a function not of 
national treatment but of the treatment accorded in another country;  
(c) in respect of the rights of performers, producers of phonograms and broadcasting 
organizations not provided under this Agreement; 
(d) deriving from international agreements related to the protection of intellectual 
property which entered into force prior to the entry into force of the WTO 
Agreement, provided that such agreements are notified to the Council for TRIPS 
and do not constitute an arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination against nationals 
of other Members. 
  
Article 5.  
Multilateral Agreements on Acquisition or Maintenance of Protection 
The obligations under Articles 3 and 4 do not apply to procedures provided in multilateral 
agreements concluded under the auspices of WIPO relating to the acquisition or 
maintenance of intellectual property rights. 
  
Article 6. 
Exhaustion 
For the purposes of dispute settlement under this Agreement, subject to the provisions of 
Articles 3 and 4 nothing in this Agreement shall be used to address the issue of the 
exhaustion of intellectual property rights. 
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Appendix  4: Relevant Provisions of the WIPO Copyright Treaty, 1996 
 
Article 1.  
Relation to the Berne Convention 
(1) This Treaty is a special agreement within the meaning of Article 20 of the Berne 
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, as regards Contracting 
Parties that are countries of the Union established by that Convention. This Treaty shall 
not have any connection with treaties other than the Berne Convention, nor shall it 
prejudice any rights and obligations under any other treaties. 
(2) Nothing in this Treaty shall derogate from existing obligations that Contracting 
Parties have to each other under the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and 
Artistic Works. 
(3) Hereinafter, “Berne Convention” shall refer to the Paris Act of July 24, 1971 of the 
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works. 
(4) Contracting Parties shall comply with Articles 1 to 21 and the Appendix of the Berne 
Convention. 
 
Article 3. 
Application of Articles 2 to 6 of the Berne Convention 
Contracting Parties shall apply mutatis mutandis the provisions of Articles 2 to 6 of the 
Berne Convention in respect of the protection provided for in this Treaty. 
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Appendix  5: Relevant Provisions of the WIPO Performances and 
Phonograms Treaty, 1996 
 
Article 1. 
Relation to Other Conventions 
(1) Nothing in this Treaty shall derogate from existing obligations that Contracting 
Parties have to each other under the International Convention for the Protection of 
Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations done in Rome, 
October 26, 1961 (hereinafter the “Rome Convention”). 
(2) Protection granted under this Treaty shall leave intact and shall in no way affect the 
protection of copyright in literary and artistic works. Consequently, no provision of this 
Treaty may be interpreted as prejudicing such protection.1 
(3) This Treaty shall not have any connection with, nor shall it prejudice any rights and 
obligations under, any other treaties. 
 
Article 4. 
National Treatment 
(1) Each Contracting Party shall accord to nationals of other Contracting Parties, as 
defined in Article 3(2), the treatment it accords to its own nationals with regard to the 
exclusive rights specifically granted in this Treaty, and to the right to equitable 
remuneration provided for in Article 15 of this Treaty. 
(2) The obligation provided for in paragraph (1) does not apply to the extent that another 
Contracting Party makes use of the reservations permitted by Article 15(3) of this Treaty.  
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Appendix  6: Words and Phrases defined in Society of Composers, 
Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v Canadian Association of 
Internet Providers, [1999] C.B.D. No. 5, 1 C.P.R. (4th) 417 [Tariff 22] 
 
Cache (Paras 42 and 43) 
An ISP may use caching to improve the efficiency and response time of transmissions. 
Specifically, when an ISP's end user requests information from a server that may be in a 
remote location, a temporary copy of the information may be retained on the ISP's local 
server (usually called a "proxy server"). This means that when another customer of that 
ISP requests the same information, it may be retrieved from the local server. Caching 
reduces the cost for the delivery of data by allowing the use of lower bandwidth than 
would otherwise be necessary. 
A cache may be deployed at any point in the Internet (e.g., at a point where an undersea 
link is made to optimize transoceanic data transfers). The operator of the original server 
on which a site is located may prevent caching. The operator of a proxy server may also 
configure it to limit the time that information is retained (i.e., before a request goes back 
to the original server). 
 
Hyperlink (Para 67) 
Hyperlinks can be automatic links or user-activated. A link is automatic when a code is 
embedded in the Web page which instructs the browser, upon obtaining access to the first 
site, to automatically download a file from the second site. The information from the 
second site is pulled without the need for further action on the part of the user. A link is 
user-activated when the user must click the mouse button over the hyperlink in order to 
obtain access to the information from the second site. If the linked files are located on 
another server, the user's browser makes a direct connection to the second server. The 
user-activated hyperlink may be made to the home page or a subpage located on the 
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second site, in which case, the end user may have to take further action to access a 
particular file at that site. The link may also be made directly to a specific file, in which 
case the user will receive the content represented by that file without the need for further 
action. 
 
Internet (Para 7 and 8) 
The Internet is a worldwide network of interconnected computers. It evolved from a 
network originally designed to connect various computers operated by the military, 
defense contractors and universities conducting military-related research, and provided 
for redundant connections to allow communications to continue even if a part of the 
network was damaged in military action. 
The Internet has developed into a mass communications system available to users located 
throughout the world, provided that they have a personal computer or other access 
device, the appropriate software and the ability to gain access to the system (sometimes 
referred to as "obtaining connectivity"). Its phenomenal growth has been made possible 
by a number of developments. These include technology that allows the digital 
conversion and storage of mass amounts of data; the increasing capabilities of access 
devices to download large quantities of data; the development of higher bandwidth 
distribution systems; the development of sophisticated routers that transmit information; 
and the advent of user-friendly software allowing access to information stored on any 
connected computer. 
 
Internet Protocol Address (Para 26)1 
Each end node connected to the Internet is assigned a unique Internet Protocol or IP 
address, made up of integers. Users do not use addresses of this form when they invoke 
                                                
1
 Footnote 3 in the text of the Copyright Board decision, which distinguishes between static and dynamic 
IPAs, is omitted.  
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services. Instead, they use names (called domain names) that are a little more user-
friendly, composed of characters. These names are translated back to their associated IP 
addresses by the 
Domain Name System (DNS) which all IAPs [Internet Access Providers] operate for the 
use of their subscribers. The domain names together constitute the Internet's addressing 
structure. 
 
Internet Service Provider (Para 30) 
In this decision, ISP (Internet Service Provider) refers to an entity that provides any 
Internet communication service, including connectivity to subscribers. This is further 
divided into IAP (Internet Access Provider) for entities that provide connectivity to 
subscribers, and BSP (Backbone Service Provider) for entities that operate infrastructure 
components of the Internet. 
 
Means (Para 129) 
“Means" has a broader meaning than "facilities". The "means" that are necessary to effect 
an Internet transmission and to which paragraph 2.4(1)(b ) [Copyright Act,  R.S.C. 1985, 
c. C-42] refers are not limited to routers and other hardware. They include all software 
connection equipment, connectivity services, hosting and other facilities and services 
without which such communications would not occur, just as much as the switching 
equipment, software and other facilities that are used as part of the infrastructure of a 
common carrier for the transmission of voice, data or other information. 
 
Mirror Site (Paras 76 and 77) 
A "mirror site" involves an arrangement in which the owner of a Web site allows another 
entity to copy the content of that site onto another server. That server will be closer to a 
segment of users, who may obtain access to the materials without going back to the 
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original site. 
Mirroring arrangements are of two kinds. The first involves the owner of a Web site 
entering into a separate agreement to make a copy of the site available on a further server. 
The second occurs when the site owner grants a second party the right to operate a mirror 
site in its own name. 
 
Protocols (Paras 38 – 40) 
The Internet functions by means of conventions and standards (called "protocols") that 
are implemented in the software and other products used in the operation of the Internet 
and that define how information is to be processed.  
The Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) is implemented in software running in the end 
nodes. It opens and closes the connections necessary to allow the exchange of 
information; its function is to ensure that any message is sent, not to interpret the 
message. TCP software does this by numbering the packets being sent, keeping track of 
them as they arrive at the destination, demanding retransmission until all packets get 
through, and giving them to the user in the proper order upon receipt. TCP software at the 
source computer will continue to send any packet until the destination computer sends an 
acknowledgment of receipt. TCP software will also adapt to the speed with which data is 
being transmitted according to the amount of congestion on the network. 
Another protocol on the Internet is Real Time Protocol (RTP). It is used to support 
streaming or transmissions that simulate real-time communications. RTP can skip packets 
while allowing subsequent ones to be transmitted so that the work as a whole continues to 
be received. 
 
Internet Transmission (Para 82) 
Internet transmissions are communications by telecommunication. A musical work is not 
communicated when it is made available on a server, only when it is transmitted. A 
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transmission requires: (1) a file incorporated into an internet-accessible server; (2) a 
request at a time chosen by the recipient for the file to be broken down into packets to 
allow the recipient to hear, see or copy the work, and transmitted from the host server to 
the recipient's server through one or more routers; and (3) a recipient usually using a 
computer to reconstitute and open the file upon receipt or to save it to open later. Either 
action in (3) involves a reproduction of the file. 
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